Skillman v. Clardy. Again, the deed shows that the land was described by abbreviations, and that the quarter section in question was sold in bulk. It is argued those alleged defects are fatal to the deed, and it is also contended that the deed is fatally defective because of its narrations relating to the sheriff's advertisement of sale, which were, to-wit: ". and having previously to the day of sale, hereinafter mentioned, given at least twenty days notice of the time and place of sale, and of the real estate to be sold, and where situate, as the law directs, by advertisement in the Vindicator, a newspaper published in my said county," etc. We cannot very well follow the lead of appellants' suggestions in the foregoing insistences, supported as they are by ingenious argument, because: (1) In the first place, the certificate of acknowledgment must be read with the deed. [City of Kansas v. Railroad, 77 Mo. 1. c. 185.] Part of the function (and a main one) of a certificate of acknowledg ment to a deed is to identify the person who signs and executes the deed. Here that person is identified by the judge as the sheriff who made the conveyance. Why should an appellate court have doubt about his identity when the sitting judge below, who knew the fact and solemnly vouches for it, had none? There is an elaborately reasoned case in point, Lincoln v. Thompson, 75 Mo. 1. c. 629 et seq. Do not sheriffs' deeds, in the particular in hand, stand on the same foot with other conveyances of real estate? And, if we once announced the doctrine that a deed was bad in the body of which the full name of the grantor appeared but which was signed by the initials of his Christian name with his full surname, though properly acknowledged, would it not draw within its hazard all other conveyances? Clearly so. The point has been rarely made but (so far as we stand advised) when made has always been disallowed. We do the Skillman v. Clardy. same now. The maxim is: The presence of the body curves error in the name; the truth of the name curves error of description (Praesentia corporis tollit errorem nominis, etc.) (2) Abbreviations in land descriptions in customary use are part of the statutory scheme of a tax levy, assessment and collection by suit and such was the fact at the time of this tax suit. [R. S. 1889, sec. 7707.] That statute, as preserved and brought down to us in subsequent revisions as live law, has always been liberally construed to further its beneficent life and purpose. The authorities are canvassed on that question in a case just handed down at this delivery. [Akins v. Adams, ante, p. 2.] We can add nothing to what is there said. The abbreviations here were the customary ones and followed the statute. (3) Whatever may be the rule on direct attack where injury is made to appear, the sale of the land in bulk will not avail appellants in a collateral attack on a tax judgment or deed. [Morrison v. Turnbaugh, 192 Mo. 1. c. 444 et seq.; Shelton v. Franklin, 224 Mo. 342; Culbertson v. Edwards, 243 Mo. 433.] (4) Referring to the narrations in the deed touching the advertisement, they are well enough. Section 7684, Revised Statutes 1889 reads: "The sheriff shall execute to the purchasers of real estate under this chapter a deed for the property sold, which shall be acknowledged before the circuit court of the county or city, as in ordinary cases, and which shall convey a title in fee to such purchaser of the real estate therein named, and shall be primafacie evidence of title, and that the matters and things therein stated are true." It is argued that those narrations (q. v.) are mere conclusions of the sheriff and state no facts. As to that we say: The statute is silent on the form of a tax deed. But as the whole scheme of collecting delinquent taxes was changed in 1877 and suits, as in ordi Skillman v. Clardy. nary cases, were prescribed to be brought in courts of general jurisdiction, it is not a far-fetched conclusion to hold, as we do, that the lawmaker contemplated that the tax deed in its terms should follow the longexisting statute (in pari materia) relating to the narrations of sheriffs' deeds in general, to-wit, section 4954, Revised Statutes 1889, reading: "The officer who shall sell any real estate, or lease of lands and tenements for more than three years, shall make to the purchaser a deed, to be paid for by the purchaser, reciting the names of the parties to the execution, the date when issued, the date of the judg ment, order or decree, and other particulars, as recited in the execution; also a description of the property, the time, place and manner of the sale, which recital shall be received as evidence of the facts therein stated." The tax deed in judgment complies with the last quoted statute. So, it is in the usual form of sheriff's deeds on execution sales on tax judgments. The case of Large v. Fisher, 49 Mo. 307, was under a former taxing dispensation and what is said in that case but illustrates the jealous solicitude with which courts then viewed the transfer of one man's land to another under the summary system then in vogue for tax sales. Appellants' reliance on that case we think ill advised. We shall not hold the narrations in the present deed relating to the advertisement a fatal defect or any defect at all. Prima-facie, and by virtue of the statute itself, those narrations are true. [R. S. 1889, sec. 7684.] (4) Something is made of the fact that two of the parties defendant were dead at the time the tax suit was begun. But in the face of the fact that the common source (and then owner) of the title was alive and made a party, that feature becomes unimportant. The rule is that judgment defendants well served (barring exceptions not here) cannot complain even Skillman v. Clardy. on appeal (let lone on collateral attack) that the judgment is void as to other parties defendant not served -doubly so where they had no interest, as here. [Boyd v. Ellis, 107 Mo. 1. c. 399, and cases cited.] The modern doctrine is that a judgment (saving exceptions not material to this case) is no longer held to be in so far forth an entirety that if void as to one it is void as to all. [State ex rel. v. Tate, 109 Mo. 1. c. 269 et seq.; Stevenson v. Black, 168 Mo. 1. c. 559; Keaton v. Jorndt, 220 Mo. 1. c. 133 et seq.; Stotler v. Railroad, 200 Mo. 1. c. 149 et seq.] (5) It is next argued, as we grasp it, that though the defects and irregularities specified are not fatal singly, yet taken together their cumulative effect so weighs down defendant's title in a sea of illegality as to drown it out. Such theory is more specious than sound as a working rule in reaching justice. It runs on the notion that in unity there is strength-witness, the fable of the father, sons and bundle of sticks. But there is no unity in the defects here, such as they are they do not dovetail together, one alleged defect does not aid the other to make out a want of jurisdiction and each defect (as in the saying about tubs) stands on its own bottom; or, to use counsel's word, is a "speck" to be inspected, respected, or suspected according to its own merits in meeting justiciable expectations. Do not specks abound everywhere on the right hand and on the left? In men, things, laws and titles? All things terrene have specks, why not land titles? In that behalf appellants put stress on a pronouncement by SCOTT, J., in Shields v. Ashley's Admr., 16 Mo. 1. c. 474, thus: "When there is a doubt about the regularity of the proceedings, which result in the sale of real estate, it represses the ardor of bidders at an auction, and causes a sacrifice of the property condemned to be sold. Hence courts cannot be too cautious in requiring, 256 Mo. 21 Skillman v. Clardy. in all such proceedings, a strict compliance with the forms of the law." That excerpt must be read with the facts of the particular case Judge SCOTT was dealing with, viz., an appeal on an order relating to a sale of real estate in a probate proceeding―as, in sound exegesis, must every judicial pronouncement. [State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 241 Mo. 1. c. 238 et seq.] It was, as said, a direct proceeding. The court was, therefore, called upon to see to it that no sacrifice by depressed bidding should spring from irregularities in the proceedings heading to the sale. When the order appealed from was made the whole matter was in fieri, in process of making, and Judge Scort spoke his prophylactic words to that situation. This case is not that case. This case seeks to overthrow a judgment and deed, a consummated transaction, by a collateral attack—a judgment, too, wherein the court acquired full jurisdiction, which fact, as already pointed out, made it a closed and sealed book in such form of challenge. The point is ruled against appellants. With that ruling, all other contentions are disposed of (including some considered and not mentioned in this opinion) and the judgment stands for affirmance unless there is substance in the point we take next. III. There is left one other assignment of error, viz,: It is argued the judgment quieting title in favor of defendant in the instant case is erroneous for that the record shows the deeds, the mesne conveyances, from the purchasers of the tax sale were insufficient to convey the entire title to defendant. Specifications are immaterial because error, if any, in the judgment as between Mr. Clardy and outside parties is not a particle of concern to appellants, provided their ancestor lost title at the tax sale, as we have held he did. The statute ordains that error to be reversible must |