1. That his Honor erred in not quashing the indictment in the case, on the ground that section 618 of Criminal Code 1912 is applicable only when a bridge is allowed so to fall into disuse and lack of repair as not to be a bridge, and thereby become a nuisance, and no facts appear in the indictment warranting such an inference or conclusion.

2. That his Honor, in not quashing the indictment in this case on the ground that section 618, Criminal Code 1912, is incongruous, in that its title is "Proprietors of Bridges Liable to Indictment for Not Keeping Up Their Work-Penalties Recovered-How to Be Applied;" whereas, the act purports to define offenses by owners of bridges, and only fixes penalties for offenses against owners of bridges, and is, therefore, violative of article III, section 17, of Constitution of S. C. 1895.

3. That his Honor erred in not quashing the indictment on the ground that section 618, Criminal Code 1912, is incongruous and meaningless, in that it provides no punishment, except for offenses against bridge owners, and that a conviction of defendant under this statute would be meaningless.

4. That his Honor erred in not quashing the indictment on the ground that section 618 of Criminal Code 1912 is incongruous, in that it is an old and obsolete statute, no longer of force in this State by reason of disuse, and is meaningless in its terms.

5. That his Honor erred in not quashing the indictment on the ground that there was no longer any common law in force in this State applicable to this case; whereas, he should have held that there is no statutory law in this State perpetuating the common law applicable to this case, and that there is no common law in this State applicable to this case.

6. That his Honor erred in not quashing the indictment on the ground that there is no common law of force in this State applicable to this case; whereas, he should have held that by the act of 1911 (known as section 2838 [2830],

Exceptions.

[112 S. C. Code 1912, vol. I) the common law indictment was abolished as to corporations, and that by the act of March 13, 1919 (Statutes 1919, p. 285), owners of toll bridges are no longer required to keep up their works to answer the ends of their creation, but must keep them up in accordance with the requirements of the State highway department of this State.

7. That his Honor erred in allowing witness for the State, W. R. Bonsal, to testify as to plan to repair bridge without hindrance to land traffic; whereas, it is submitted that this plan would obstruct navigation and be a violation of Fed. eral statutes known as page 1150, 30 Stat. at Large (Act March 3, 1899c, 425, sec. 9 [U. S. Comp. St., sec. 9971]) and page 362, 28 Stat. at Large (Act August 18, 1894c, 299, secs. 4, 5 [U. S. Comp. St., secs. 9861, 9973]), prohibiting the obstruction of channels and regulating the use of draws in bridges.

8. That his Honor erred in allowing witnesses of the State, Momar Goldsmith and J. W. Brandt, to testify as to motor trucks not being allowed to cross the bridge; whereas, it is respectfully submitted that this class of transportation was not contemplated in the act under which this bridge was constructed, nor when the present bridge was actually constructed.

9. That his Honor erred in allowing witness of State, Wilson G. Harvey, to offer in evidence and in admitting in evidence statement of earnings of bridge; whereas, it is submitted that this testimony was irrelevant, and only tended to cloud the real issues of the case.

10. That his Honor erred in refusing to direct a verdict in favor of defendant in this case, on the ground that there was no testimony tending to show a violation of any criminal law in this State.

11. That his Honor erred in refusing to direct a verdict in this case in favor of defendant on the ground that the testimony showed without contradiction that the bridge had

never ceased to be a bridge during the times alleged in the indictment, was answering the ends of its creation, and was only closed for a short time for necessary repairs.

12. That his Honor erred in refusing motion of directed verdict in favor of defendant, and in holding that section 618, Criminal Code 1912, contemplated that the defendant must not only keep up the bridge for the purpose for which it was created, but must provide for different kind of travel as it progressed, and that otherwise defendant should abandon the bridge and surrender its charater; whereas, it is submitted that said section should be construed strictly, and only provides for keeping up the bridge to answer its ends at the time of its creation.

13. That his Honor erred in charging the jury in this case that the "ends of the creation of a toll bridge over a navigable stream involves the idea, not only that it was to carry such traffic as was reasonably expected at the time, but to measure up to such requirements as it should thereafter be called upon to do in the carriage of traffic; in other words, to adapt themselves to the conditions as they might arise in the future, which is the object of the creation of a bridge, not only to carry the traffic then presented, but to adapt itself to changed conditions; otherwise to abandon the enterprise and let some one else take it up"-it being respectfully submitted that said section 618 of Criminal Statute 1912 is a criminal statute, and should be construed strictly, as only requiring defendant to keep bridge in condition to answer the ends contemplated at time of its creation.

14. That his Honor erred in commenting on remarks of counsel of defendant about "people being dragged into a criminal Court, etc.;" whereas, it is respectfully submitted that it is a disgrace to be dragged into a criminal Court, and that, even if this were not so, such comment on argument of counsel was unnecessary, and tended to prejudice the jury against the defendants and its counsel

15. That his Honor erred in refusing to charge the following written request of defendant, viz.: "The jury is instructed that the bridge in question was authorized and created under the provisions of the Act of 17th of December, 1808, at a time when automobiles and heavy trucks were not in existence, and that the failure to provide a bridge suitable for automobiles and heavy trucks could not be deemed a violation of the law requiring the bridge to be kept in condition to answer the ends of its creation"whereas, it is submitted that this is a correct proposition of law and applicable to this case.

16. That his Honor erred in refusing to charge the following written request of defendant, viz.: "That it appears from the evidence that the present bridge was built about 1886. If you find that the bridge was suitable for traffic such as was contemplated by the builders of the bridge at that time, and was only closed for necessary repairs, you must find the defendant not guilty”—whereas, it is submitted that this is a correct proposition of law applicable to this

case.

17. That his Honor erred in refusing to charge the following written request of defendant, viz.: "That under the act authorizing said bridge the bridge company was and is authorized to make such rules and by-laws not repugnant to the laws of the land for the good order and proper government of said company as may be thought expedient or necessary" whereas, it is submitted that same was a correct proposition of law applicable to this case.

18. That his Honor erred in refusing to charge the following request of defendant: "That not until the act of 1919, placing bridges in the State under the supervision of the State highway commission, has the General Assembly of this State seen fit to exercise any supervision over toll bridges owned by private corporations, and have left the managament and control of same to the officers and direc

tors of said corporation"-whereas, it is submitted that this was a correct proposition of law applicable to this case.

19. That his Honor erred in refusing to charge the following written request of defendant: "That it was no offense against the laws of this State for defendant company, during the course of repairs on said bridge, to refuse to use any temporary makeshift for the use of said bridge, as there is no law in this State requiring the bridge to be kept open at all hazards; but, on the contrary, the law specifically provides that when a bridge is injured by freshets or otherwise the bridge may be closed, provided the repairs are commenced within six months and completed within two years. Section 2170, vol. I, Code 1912"-whereas, it is respectfully submitted that this was a correct proposition of law applicable to this case.

20. That his Honor erred in refusing to charge the following written request of defendant, viz.: "The act of Congress prohibits the obstruction of navigable streams except in ways affirmatively authorized by Congress, and I charge you that Congress has only authorized the erection of bridges across navigable streams with suitable draws as provided by statute, and that these draws must be opened and caused to be opened under such rules and regulations as in the opinion of the Secretary of War the public interests may require" --whereas, it is submitted that this was a correct proposition of law applicable to this case.

21. That his Honor erred in refusing to charge the following written request of defendant, viz.: "I charge you that the act requiring toll bridges to be kept in repair, so as to answer the ends of their creation, fixes no standard of repair in which the bridge must be maintained; the only criterion is that the bridge can be used as a bridge under the terms of the statute authorizing its creation, and must not be allowed to become a nuisance across a stream or navigable water of this State"-whereas, it is submitted that this was a correct proposition of law applicable to this case.