1. The testimony of Dr. Baker referred to the "mental and bodily" injury of Mrs. Thompson, which was the result of the injury. It included the loss of an unborn child, which was not the subject of the action. The testi 1 mony tended to prove the extent of the plaintiff's injuries and was competent. The testimony tended o show that the injuries caused the premature birth, and the premature birth was cause of the permanent injuries, i. e., the wreck was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The testimony was competent, and this exception is overruled. 2. The appellant thus states the second question: "The second exception assigns error in overruling the motion of the defendant, railroad company, having nonsuit made upon the ground that there was a total failure of evidence to support the allegation of negligence and specifications thereof alleged in the complaint." When a passenger is injured by an instrumentality of the common carrier, there is a presumption of negligence. 2 How much testimony is necessary to overcome this presumption is a question of fact for the jury. McLeod v. Railroad Co., 93 S. C. 71, 76 S. E. 19, 705. Mrs. Thompson, one of the plaintiffs, said, "What is the matter with this train; it rocked and pitched all night?" Did it rock and pitch all night? Mrs. Thompson was in the drawing room of a Pullman. Would a man of ordinary prudence, who was exercising due care, know that something was wrong when the Pullman rocked and pitched all night? If the jury thought so, then there was evidence from which the jury could infer negligence, independent of the presumption. The appellant says it did everything that it could have done, in that it made inspection after inspection and found only one thing wrong, to wit, two new brake shoes were needed for the "Judsonia" (the car in which the plaintiff was injured). These were supplied. The witness did not know how long a brake shoe would last. So it seems that the brake shoes that needed replacing had passed several inspections, unless they had worn to the danger point after leaving the initial terminal. There was no evidence to show that this defect developed after the car passed the other inspection. The appellant places much reliance on the testimony of an expert who states that he examined the wreck and in his judgment the cause of the accident was a broken bolt, and that the broken bolt was so placed that the most careful and expert inspection would not have revealed the defect; that the defect was a latent defect for which the carrier was not liable. 3 The jury is not bound to take the opinion of an expert witness. This Court cannot say as a matter of law that the mere opinion of an expert witness is sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence. This witness did not see the car until after the accident. Can even an expert tell, by 4, 5 looking at a wreck, what bolts were broken before the accident and what bolts were broken by the accident? That was a question for the jury, and this exception is overruled. What has been said applies to the third exception, and the third exception is overruled. 3. The fourth exception complains that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the testimony. More than one inference can be drawn from the testimony, and 6 this Court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the manifest weight of the testimony, nor to disturb the verdict, because it may be greater than the Court may think proper. The fifth exception is withdrawn. 4. The sixth exception is: "I charge you that, if you conclude from the evidence in this case that the consideration paid for these releases was so out of proportion to the injuries received as to shock the conscience of a reasonable person, under those circumstances it would release them and would not hold them bound by it, but that depends on the extent of the injuries that was caused by the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company; if the injuries were silght and reasonably in keeping with the amount paid for the release and they were willing to settle for that amount, why they would be bound by it.' "The error being that this constituted a direction that the release was invalid, if the mount paid was not reasonably in keeping with the injuries received. "Whereas, inadequacy of compensation is not ground for setting aside a release obtained without fraud, coercion, or misrepresentation." His Honor charged as follows: "If these releases were signed and the parties who signed. them knew what they were doing, and did it freely and voluntarily, based on the belief that they were only slightly injured, and did it in good faith, why then they could not recover. But if they were induced to sign these releases by fraud, coercion, or misrepresentation, not knowing or understanding what they were doing, and were persuaded to sign these releases, they would not be bound because fraud vitiates." Thus his Honor charged that, not mere inadequacy of consideration, nor after developed facts, would destroy the release, but that fraud was necessary, and he charged that both before and after the charge complained of. There was testimony in the case from which the jury might have inferred that the ladies were not in a condition to know what they were doing. A mother with her children and aunt are fastened in the drawing room of a Pullman car. The car is turned over on its side; the door will not open; there is a cry made that they may burn up if the car takes fire before they can get out; they find it necessary to break open a window, through which they are taken to safety; the negro porter, by whose heroism the sick baby is taken out, collapses from his own injuries; the mother, the plaintiff, is wounded on the head and shows a mark as big as a "lemon"-and all the other circumstances connected with the accident were before the jury. 7,8 The issue was properly submitted, an dthe charge was not misleading, taken as a whole. This exception is overruled. 5. His Honor directed a verdict in favor of the Pullman Company, and this is the basis of the last exception. The appellant cannot complain as its own witnesses testitified that it was the duty of the railroad company to inspect and repair the running gear of the Pullman cars while 9 in use. There was no suggestion that the Pullman Company was responsible for the roadbed. This exception is overruled. The judgment is affirmed. 10386 MEIER v. KORNAHRENS ET AL. (102 S. E. 285.) 1. JURY-DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL ON APPEAL FROM DECREE REJECTING WILL SHOULD BE MADE WITHIN TIME FIXED BY EQUITY RULES.Where the proponent of a will which was rejected by the probate Court appealed from the decree filed the transcript as required by Code Civ. Proc. 1912, sec. 66, the issues are made by the exception or grounds of appeal, and where respondents, the contestants, desire a jury trial of such issues, which trial is provided for by section 66, they should, in analogy to rule 28 of the Circuit Courts applicable to equity cases, give notice of desire for jury trial within 10 days after serving of the exceptions. 2. JURY-WHERE DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL IS NOT MADE WITHIN TIME FIXED, COURT MAY REJECT SAME.-Where a party to an appeal from decree of the probate Court fails to serve notice of request for order framing issues for jury trial within the time required by rule 28 of the Circuit Court, the Court may hold that he has waived his right to move for issues and refuse on that ground to entertain motion. 3. WILLS-JURY TRIAL MAY BE GRANTED ON APPEAL FROM DECREE OF 5. WILLS-PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS OF TRIAL COURT'S RULING AS TO Before WILSON, J., Dorchester, Spring term, 1919. Affirmed. Proceeding by Henry Meier, executor, to prove a paper purporting to be the will of Mrs. Meta H. C. S. Rodenberg, deceased, opposed by J. N. Kornahrens and others. From a decree of the probate Court rejecting the alleged will, the executor appeals. From an order framing issues to be submitted to jury on hearing of the appeal, the executor appeals. Messrs. Logan & Grace, for appellants, submit: The appeal herein involves but one question and that is a question of practice, namely, when does the ten days commence within which must be served the notice of motion to refer issues to a jury on a question of will or no will on appeal from the Probate Court: Code of Civil Procedure 1912, section 66; Constitution 1895, article V, section 15. On appeal from |