of war claims, it was observed that neutral aliens and even citizens domiciled in an enemy state, with their property there situated, are exposed to the risks of war and the consequences of hostilities to the same extent as subjects of the enemy. A citizen of a neutral nation, residing in a country between which and another war breaks out may exempt himself from the liabilities incident to hostile character by taking early steps to remove from the belligerent territory.2 By continuing his residence in the belligerent territory he may be considered to owe at least temporary allegiance and to have elected to adhere to the sovereign of his domicil of choice, and to have placed himself out of the protection of the government to which his original and permanent allegiance is due. His person and property may be treated by the other belligerent as the person and property of an enemy.1 While such domicil in belligerent territory involves a temporary allegiance and imposes upon the individual the rights and liabilities, for belligerent purposes, of a national of the country in which he is domiciled, he does not thereby become a citizen of that country, nor lose his citizenship in his home state, although he is deemed by his continued domicil in the belligerent territory, to have impliedly renounced his right to the diplomatic protection of his home government for all purposes connected with his belligerent domicil. The right of continued residence of aliens is often provided for in treaties, 1 Supra, p. 251, notes 1, 2 and p. 252, note 1. See also U. S. v. Farragut, 22 Wall. 406; The Wm. Bagaley v. U. S., 5 Wall. 377; Prize cases, 2 Black, 635; Page v. U. S., 11 Wall. 268; Green v. U. S., 10 Ct. Cl. 466 (exception in case of Abandoned or Captured Property Act); Haycraft v. U. S., 22 Wall. 81; Lamar v. Browne, 92 U. S. 187; Young v. U. S., 97 U. S. 39; Jaragua Iron Co. v. U. S., 212 U. S. 297, 306; Peter N. Paillet v. U. S., Ct. Cl. Rep. 220, 36th Cong., 1st sess., 19-20. 2 The Wm. Bagaley v. U. S., 5 Wall. 377; Gates v. Goodloe, 101 U. S. 612; Clow (U. S.) v. Mexico, Domestic commission, Act of March 3, 1849, Moore's Arb. 2657. 3 Clow (U. S.) v. Mexico, Act of March 3, 1849, Moore's Arb. 2657, 2658; Cooke (U. S.) v. Mexico, ibid. 2659, 2660; Haggerty et al. (U. S.) v. Mexico, ibid. 2663; Thompson (U. S.) v. Mexico, ibid. 2667. Cooke (U. S.) v. Mexico, Act of March 3, 1849, ibid. 2659, 2661; Haggerty et al. (U. S.) v. Mexico, ibid. 2665; Thompson (U. S.) v. Mexico, ibid. 2669; Barclay (Gt. Brit.) v. U. S., May 8, 1871, ibid. 2727 (dictum); Laurent (Gt. Brit.) v. U. S., Feb. 8, 1853, ibid. 2671 and Uhde (Gt. Brit.) v. U. S., ibid. 2691 (see also supra, p. 562, note 2). Prats (Mexico) v. U. S., July 4, 1868, ibid. 2886, 2890 (dictum). See also supra, p. 252, note 1. and their subjection to war risks by reason of continued domicil should not be extended beyond its ordinary application to belligerent acts. In some countries, the fact of being domiciled for a certain period confers the rights of citizenship, if not citizenship itself. This rule might with advantage be generally adopted by states which entertain habitually large numbers of permanently domiciled foreigners. It would furnish something in the nature of a solution for the problem which confronts the national government of such foreigners who, although permanently absent and fulfilling none of the duties of citizenship, nevertheless demand diplomatic protection when they get into difficulties. EFFECT OF DECLARATION OF INTENTION TO BECOME A CITIZEN § 247. International Effects. Under the naturalization laws of the United States, an alien who desires to become a citizen of the United States must, at least two years prior to his admission to citizenship, declare on oath before the clerk of an authorized court that it is his intention to become a citizen of the United States and to renounce forever all other allegiance.2 The few exceptions to the requirement of a declaration of intention as a condition of admission to citizenship are not important.3 1 Cockburn, Nationality, 203, 204. 2 Formerly § 2165, R. S., now § 4, paragraph 1 of Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. L. 596. 3 In case of honorably discharged soldiers, § 2166 R. S. Honorable discharge from Navy after five years' service, Act of July 26, 1894, 28 Stat. L. 124. Honorable discharge after four years' service in Navy, Marine Corps, Revenue-Cutter Service, etc., Act of June 30, 1914, Session laws, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., pt. I, 395. Widow and children of declarant who dies before final naturalization, Act of June 29, 1906, § 4, Parag. 6. In Hawaii only five years' residence is required, Act of April 30, 1900, 31 Stat. L. 161. By § 30 of the Act of June 29, 1906 inhabitants of the Philippines or other insular possessions need not renounce foreign allegiance. By the Act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. L. 830), a person who has resided in the U. S. for five years next preceding May 1, 1910 and acted under the impression that he was a citizen and exercised the rights of citizenship may receive a certificate of naturalization, without making a declaration of intention. In re Urdang, 212 Fed. 557. The "minor's clause” (§ 2167, R. S.) was repealed by the Act of June 29, 1906. See Van Dyne, Naturalization, 61-64. The utility and desirability of the declaration of intention have often been questioned, and because of its apparent uselessness and of the difficulties which it engenders its elimination from our naturalization laws has more than once been recommended.' Its purpose was once explained by Secretary Blaine as providing "a probationary period during which the applicant, by residence in the land of his adoption, by acquiring interests therein, by good moral conduct, and by familiarizing himself with, and attaching himself to, its constitutional methods, shall fit himself for a faithful and loyal assumption of the duties of citizenship and thus, as a member of our free society, support the government whose protection is in return extended to him." 2 The anomalous position in which the person who has thus acquired what might be termed "inchoate citizenship" is placed, has caused many diplomatic controversies between the United States and other governments and has served at times to deprive the person concerned of the protection of both his old and his new government. While the declaration of intention serves to confer upon an alien various rights in the states of this country,3 occasionally denominated as state citizenship, it has been held uniformly by our courts and by the executive department of the government that the declaration is merely an expression of intention or purpose, and has not the effect either of naturalization or citizenship in the United States or of expatriation from the country to which the applicant owes original alle 1 E. g., Report of Naturalization Commission, 1905, p. 12. 4 3 In twelve states it gives the alien the right to vote, provided he has resided in the state for a certain period. In several states he enjoys greater rights than other aliens in the acquisition of real property, and in some states he may be employed on public works and other aliens may not. He also enjoys privileges under the preemption and homestead laws. Van Dyne, Naturalization, 64; H. Doc. 326, 59th Cong., 2nd sess., 20; Nathan Wolfman in 41 Amer. L. Rev. (1907), 504. 4 Lanz v. Randall, 4 Dill. 425; In re Moses, 83 Fed. 995; Minneapolis v. Reum, 56 Fed. 576, 6 C. C. A. 31; Frick v. Lewis, 195 Fed. 693, 697; U. S. v. Uhl, 211 Fed. 628, 631, and cases cited in 41 Amer. L. Rev. 505 and Dicey, Conflict of laws (Amer. ed.), 202. See also Johnson v. U. S., 160 U. S. 546; Yerke v. U. S., 173 U. S. 439. See instructions of Secretaries Buchanan, Fish, Frelinghuysen, and Bayard in Moore's Dig. III, 337-340. See also Sec'y Olney to Mr. Denby, Jan. 13, 1897, For. Rel., 1896, 92; Sec'y Hay to Mr. McKinney, March 20, 1899, MS. Dom. Let. 544 giance.1 This principle has been confirmed by naturalization treaties concluded by the United States with foreign countries 2 and by the decisions of arbitral tribunals.3 § 248. Anomalous Position of Declarant. While the principle is, therefore, clear that a declaration of intention does not confer citizenship, the position of such an alien declarant when abroad is not free from doubt. Legally, he has not abjured his original allegiance, and he remains a national of the country of his origin until his naturalization has been completed. This has been reiterated, as has been observed, by various secretaries of State and is made clear by numerous treaties. Nevertheless, having clearly ex 1 Mr. Hay, Sec'y of State, to Mr. Conger, Feb. 15, 1902, For. Rel., 1902, 221; Mr. Cass, Sec'y of State, to Mr. Washburne, March 9, 1857, Moore's Dig. III, 338; Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Dunne, July 31, 1883, ibid. 339; Mr. Bayard to Mr. West, Oct. 17, 1885, ibid. 341; Mr. Blaine to Mr. Hicks, Feb. 26, 1890, ibid. 341. Adlam (Gt. Brit.) v. U. S., May 8, 1871, Moore's Arb. 2552, Hale's Rep. 14; Tousig's case, Cockburn, 123. Citation of opinion by Lieber in Wilson (U. S.) v. Chile, Aug. 7, 1892, Moore's Arb. 2555. The argument of the American commissioners in the case of Santangelo (U. S.) v. Mexico, April 11, 1839, ibid. 2550, to the effect that the declaration of intention constituted a renunciation of orginal allegiance is clearly wrong. In the case of France, however, the declaration of intention was held in one case to serve as evidence of an intent not to return to France, which constituted a presumption of expatriation under the French Civil Code. Bouillotte (France) v. U. S., Jan. 15, 1880, Moore's Arb. 2652. But to the effect that the French code contemplates the acquisition of a new citizenship before French citizenship can be lost, see M. Flourens, French minister of foreign affairs, as reported by Mr. McLane, June 25, 1887, For. Rel., 1887. See also as to French law before 1889, circular printed in Moore's Arb. 2653–2654. 2 The particular provision generally reads: "The declaration of intention to become a citizen . . . has not for either party the effect of naturalization." It is included, in substance, in the treaties with Bavaria, Baden, North German Confederation, Würtemberg, Hesse, Austria-Hungary, Sweden and Norway, Haiti, Honduras, Brazil, Costa Rica and Nicaragua. It was also included in the treaties with Ecuador and Mexico, now abrogated. 3 Santangelo (U. S.) v. Mexico, April 11, 1839, Moore's Arb. 2549; Beales (U. S.) v. Mexico, Act of Congress, March 3, 1849, ibid. 2670; Ehlers (U. S.) v. Mexico, March 3, 1849, ibid. 2551; Ryder (U. S.) v. China, Nov. 8, 1858, ibid. 2332; Elliott (U. S.) v. Mexico, July 4, 1868, ibid. 2481 (dictum); Gros (U. S.) v. Mexico, ibid. 2772; Perez (U. S.) v. Mexico, ibid. 2718 (dictum); Adlam (Gt. Brit.) v. U. S., May 8, 1871, ibid. 2553, Hale's Rep., 14; Wilson (U.S.) v. Chile, Aug. 7, 1892, ibid. 2553, 2557. Supra, p. 566, and note 2, Supra. pressed his intention to sever the tie which binds him to his country, it is a question whether he is entitled, when abroad, to the protection of that country. The United States, on one or two occasions soughtwithout success, it would seem-to resist the right of Italy to protect certain Italian subjects, the victims of mob violence, who had declared their intention of becoming citizens of the United States.1 Germany withdrew its protection from a German in Nicaragua, who, it was found, had declared his intention of becoming a citizen of the United States. Before the French-American mixed commission under the convention of January 15, 1880, the declaration of intention was held to be prima facie proof of the absence of an intent to return (“sans esprit de retour") to France, and under the French code, a presumption of expatriation.3 Cockburn is emphatically of the opinion that a person who has declared his intention has, during the probationary period preceding his final naturalization, no claim to the protection of his home government.1 2 § 249. Protection of "Declarants." In the matter of protection abroad, the United States appears from a comparatively early period to have recognized that a declarant who manifests a bona fide intention to complete his naturalization and reside in the United States is in a somewhat different position, at least in a third country, than an ordinary alien. A limited protection 1 See quotations from diplomatic correspondence in certain mob violence cases, printed in For. Rel., 1895 and 1896, and reprinted in Moore's Dig. III, 344-353. 2 Claim of George A. K. Morris v. Nicaragua, Mr. Jas. P. Porter, Act'g Sec'y to Messrs. Kennedy and Shellaberger, Jan. 4, 1887, and previous correspondence in Sen. Doc. 287, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 10-22. See also Moore's Dig. VI, 633–634. As Mr. Morris had not yet become an American citizen, U. S. protection was also denied him. 3 Bouillotte (France) v. U. S., Jan. 15, 1880, Moore's Arb. 2652. See statement in Ryder (U. S.) v. China, Nov. 8, 1858, ibid. 2333, that when claimant first sued as British subject, his claim was rejected on the ground of his assumed American character. 4 Cockburn, Nationality, 202. See also J. Hubley Ashton's argument before U. S.Mexican commission of 1868, Moore's Arb. 2701. See also infra, p. 569. Attention has already been called (supra, p. 476) to the privileged position of seamen on American vessels who have declared their intention. After three years' service, following the declaration, they may be admitted to citizen |