to the jurisdiction of an international commission are found in two sources, the treaty or protocol establishing the tribunal and the rules for the submission of claims adopted by the commission. Claimants failing to comply with these jurisdictional conditions are barred. For example, the Lasarte claim before the United States-Peruvian commission of 1863 was disallowed because the claimant had failed, as the treaty required, to file a statement of his claim in the ministry of foreign affairs of his country, asking the diplomatic interposition of his government.1 The commission's requirements as to proof of citizenship, which are usually jurisdictional, are occasionally found, not only in the treaty or rules, but also in the decisions ("jurisprudence") of the commission.2 Domestic commissions established by Act of Congress are governed in their jurisdiction by the statute creating the commission and by the rules adopted. For example, the Act establishing the Alabama Claims court provided that no claim should be allowed "arising in favor of any person not entitled at the time of his loss, to the protection of the United States in the premises." 3 Under § 4 of the Bowman Act of March 3, 1883,4 giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction over certain claims for stores and supplies, loyalty of the claimant throughout the war was a jurisdictional fact, and the claim was likewise barred if it had not previously been presented to some other department of the government.5 1 Lasarte (Peru) v. U. S., Jan. 12, 1863, Moore's Arb. 2390, 2395. See also Kinney (U. S.) v. Peru, ibid. 1626. The same result was reached in the case of certain claims before the U. S.-Mexican commission of 1839, Moore's Arb. 1244. The Department's circular of March 5, 1906 for this reason advises that "interposition" of the United States "should be requested in express terms." 2 Supra, § 212. 3 Act of June 23, 1874, § 12, 18 Stat. L. 248. 4 22 Stat. L. 485. Fors v. U. S., 19 Ct. Cl. 519, Senate Rep. 544, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., 6-7. See also Fletcher v. U. S., 32 Ct. Cl. 36; Nance v. U. S., 23 Ct. Cl. 463, and McStea v. U. S., Moore's Arb. 2381. In cases transmitted under the Tucker Act loyalty is not a jurisdictional fact. Chieve v. U. S., 42 Ct. Cl. 21. For the acts creating a few other domestic commissions or their rules see: Rules and regulations of Commissioners of Claims under Act of March 3, 1871, H. Misc. Doc. 12, 42nd Cong., 3d sess. 41-49. Decree (May 17, 1911) creating the Nicaraguan mixed claims commission, and rules of procedure, Managua, 1912. Acts creating Hawaiian court of claims, 87 St. The rules of international and domestic commissions usually provide for the method of presenting claims, the documents which must be submitted, the formal contents of petitions or memorials, the necessary jurisdictional data concerning the claimant and the claim, the form of the papers, the method and time of filing, and other matters of pleading and procedure.1 CLAIM MUST BE NATIONAL IN ORIGIN § 306. Impossibility of Nationalizing Claim by Naturalization or Assignment. Few principles of international law are more firmly settled than the rule that a claim, in order to justify diplomatic support, must when it accrued have belonged to a citizen. This principle that a claim must be national in origin arises out of the reciprocal relation between the government and its citizens, the one owing protection and the other allegiance. If the claim did not originally accrue in favor of one owing allegiance, protection cannot be invoked or properly extended. To support a claim, originally foreign, because it happened to come into the hands of a citizen would make of the government a claim agent. The rule that "citizenship at the time the claim arose must be shown" is invoked by the Department of State to reject two classes of claims in which efforts have been made to nationalize a diplomatic claim originally held by a foreigner. 1. The first class covers cases where the original claimant, a foreigner when the claim accrued, becomes subsequently a naturalized citizen, and seeks the diplomatic interposition of the United States in support of his claim. This class of claimant is uniformly barred by the rule that naturalization is not retroactive but prospective only, and that the state of adoption cannot extend diplomatic redress to an individual in matters which arose before his admission to citiPap. 1230. Claims against Cuba growing out of insurrection, Decree 158, Nov. 22, 1906, For. Rel., 1907, I, 298–301. Claims against Colombia, Decree of Feb. 17, 1886, 77 St. Pap. 805. At times the conditions imposed by certain Latin-American republics upon claimants against themselves have been considered by foreign governments as violations of international law. Infra, p. 849. 1 See, e. g., Rules of the British-American commission under art. XII of the treaty of May 8, 1871, 63 St. Pap. 1057, Hale's Rep. 177. Organic act of March 2, 1901, 31 Stat. L. 877, creating the Spanish Treaty Claims Commission, and preceding note. zenship.1 While naturalization transfers allegiance, it does not transfer existing state obligations. "Subsequent naturalization does not alter the international status of a claim which accrued before naturalization." It has already been observed that a declaration of intention is not sufficient to warrant diplomatic interposition.3 The Department of State has in a number of instances considered the rule as not applicable to cases in which the injury is a continuing one and constantly accruing, or where injuries inflicted prior to and subsequent to naturalization may be separated. In such cases, which, however, are exceedingly rare, the Department has interposed to obtain redress for injuries sustained subsequent to naturalization.4 2. The second class covers cases where the original claimant, a foreigner, assigns his claim to an American citizen or the claim, by operation of law, passes into the hands of an American citizen who seeks diplomatic protection. This class of claim is barred by the rule that the right of interposition is not assignable, and that the Department of State will not espouse a "nationalized" claim which came into American hands after it had accrued.5 Yet where a legal assignment of an interest, e. g., a concession contract, is made to an American citizen prior to the origin of a claim, the claim is considered as having accrued to an American citizen and is not barred by the rule above mentioned." 1 Moore's Dig. VI, § 981; supra, p. 540. 2 Mr. Bayard, Sec'y of State, to Mr. Golding, Apr. 30, 1886, Moore's Dig. VI, 637. 3 Supra, p. 566. 4 Mora's claim against Spain, Moore's Dig. VI, 637 and 1017-1021; For. Rel., 1894, App. I, 364-450; For. Rel., 1895, 1160-1177. Acosta's claim, Mr. Bayard, Sec'y of State, to Mr. Curry, Apr. 9, 1886, Moore's Dig. VI, 638. See also Santangelo (U. S.) v. Mexico, Apr. 11, 1839, Moore's Arb. 2550 (a claim arising subsequent to naturalization was allowed). But see Morris' case, Moore's Dig. VI, 633, and decisions of U. S.-Spanish Commission of 1871, infra, p. 663. Moore's Dig. VI, § 982; For. Rel., 1894, 484–485. It is doubtful whether all foreign governments adhere so closely to this principle. Germany appears to have pressed against Haiti the claim of Funk and Ebersman, a debt originally due to a Haitian but assigned to this German firm. Report from American Legation at Port-au-Prince, No. 1119, Aug. 26, 1912. It is probable that such a settlement of a foreign claim would give the U. S. a good ground, based on discrimination, for urging the settlement of a similar American claim. Mr. Hay, Sec'y of State, to Mr. Powell, Dec. 23, 1898, Moore's Dig. VI, 639. § 307. Decisions of International Tribunals of Arbitration. These principles have frequently been applied by international claims commissions, where indeed it is believed they had their origin. The jurisdictional clause of treaties under which these commissions act usually provides for the adjudication of claims of "citizens of the United States." This provision has been held to require citizenship at the time of the origin of the claim, as well as at the time of presentation. Under the first head, claims of naturalized citizens have been disallowed when it appeared that their naturalization occurred subsequent to the time of the original injury, under the general rule that naturalization has no retroactive effect to accord protection for injuries received prior to naturalization.1 Claims have likewise been disallowed when their citizenship at origin was not established, even though they were presented by citizens of the claimant country.2 Nor will the fact that a declaration of intention had been filed at the time of the injury be considered the equivalent of citizenship at origin, even when naturalization followed.3 Reference has already 1 Meyer (U. S.) v. Mexico, March 3, 1849, Opin. 756, not in Moore; Zander (U. S.) v. Mexico, ibid., Moore's Arb. 3433 (dictum); Medina (U. S.) v. Costa Rica, July 2, 1860, ibid. 2483; Abbiatti (U. S.) v. Venezuela, Dec. 5, 1885, ibid. 2347; Southern Claims Commission, H. Misc. Doc. 16, 42nd Cong., 2nd sess.; and see argument in Perché (France) v. U. S., Jan. 15, 1880, Moore's Arb. 2401, 2408; Pinkerton land claim, 20 Op. Atty. Gen. (Miller), 118, 123. 2 Parrott and Wilson (U. S.) v. Mexico, Apr. 11, 1839, Moore's Arb. 2381; same claim, Act of March 3, 1849, ibid. 2384; Santangelo (U. S.) v. Mexico, Apr. 11, 1839, ibid. 2549; Morrison (U. S.) v. Mexico, ibid. 2325; Dimond (U. S.) v. Mexico, ibid. 2387; Slocum (U. S.) v. Mexico, Apr. 11, 1839 and Mar. 3, 1849, ibid. 2382, 2385; Dwyer and Grammant (U. S.) v. Mexico, ibid. 2322; Sandoval (U. S.) v. Mexico, ibid. 2323; Lasarte (Peru) v. U. S., Jan. 12, 1863, Moore's Arb. 2390, 2394; Hargous (U.S.) v. Mexico, July 4, 1868, ibid. 2327; Fleury (U. S.) v. Mexico, ibid. 2156; Dusenberg (U. S.) v. Mexico, ibid. 2157. See decisions cited ibid. 1353; Zayas (U. S.) v. Spain, Feb. 12, 1871, ibid. 2341; Prieto, ibid. 2339; Carrillo, ibid. 2237; Selway (U. S.) v. Chile, Aug. 7, 1892, ibid. 2557; Corvaia (Italy) v. Venezuela, Feb. 13, 1903, Ralston, 809. See also Act of June 26, 1834, 6 Stat. L. 569, providing for East Florida claims of Spanish subjects. Peruvian indemnity, March 17, 1841, Atty. Gen. opinion, cited Moore's Arb. 4593. Virginius indemnity, case of Gen. Ryan, H. Ex. Doc. 14, 45th Cong., 1st sess. 3 Morrison (U. S.) v. Mexico, March 3, 1849, Moore's Arb. 2325; Ehlers (U. S.) v. Mexico, ibid. 2551; Ryder (U. S.) v. China, Nov. 8, 1858, ibid. 2332; Milatovitch been made to the peculiar rule of some of the earlier decisions of the United States-Mexican commission of 1868 which held that proof of domicil in the United States plus a declaration of intention at the time of the origin of the claim constituted a sufficient title to admit the claimant to standing before the commission as a "citizen." This conclusion was disavowed by Umpire Thornton in later decisions of that commission, and has ever since been regarded as erroneous. A special provision in the United States-Spanish agreement of February 12, 1871 establishing a claims commission, to the effect that Spain could "traverse the allegation of American citizenship and thereupon competent and sufficient proof thereof will be required," was due principally to the large number of Cubans who had become naturalized in the United States, and the certainty that many of them had procured naturalization solely for the purpose of invoking American protection. The United States appears to have presented claims of this character, leaving it to Spain to dispute the good faith of the naturalization.2 Ingenious arguments were made before this commission in certain cases where property was seized or embargoed by Spain prior to the claimant's naturalization. Subsequent to the naturalization, an order of restoration or an order to pay for the property was left unexecuted or a decree of confiscation was issued. Claimants sought to circumvent the rule that citizenship is necessary when the claim arises, by basing their claims not upon the original embargo or seizure, but upon the failure to restore the property or pay for it in accordance with the orders, or upon the decree of confiscation. In all these cases, the decisions were to the effect that the injury dates from the original embargo or seizure, and that the retention of the property after the owner's naturalization is no new injury. The claims were, therefore, dismissed for lack of citizenship at origin.3 (U.S.) v. Mexico, July 4, 1868, No. 395, MS. Op. IV, 350; Hutchinson v. U. S., Act of June 23, 1874 (Geneva award), ibid. 2359; De Acosta (U. S.) v. Spain, Feb. 12, 1871, ibid. 2462; Prieto, ibid. 2339; Izquierdo, ibid. 2340; Wilson (U. S.) v. Chile, Aug. 7, 1892, Moore's Arb. 2553, 2557. 'Carrillo (U. S.) v. Spain, Feb. 12, 1871, Moore's Arb. 2337; Prieto, ibid. 2339; |