last wars, therefore, do not depreciate the art, but those of previous ones afford abundant testimony, that an enemy who was skilful in manoeuvring, has often postponed the commencement of, or avoided a battle altogether.

Reverting to the present period, it is hoped that the circumstance of the comparatively large peace establishment of ships of the line recently stationed in the Mediterranean, has afforded opportunities in reference to this matter, that have not passed unheeded: and in justification of the individuals who are alluded to in the former part of this paper, it may be urged, that from whatever cause, and to whatever extent the alleged ignorance may prevail, it is really less imputable to them as a fault, than to the absence of an initiatory system of instruction in periodical operation, and easily available to the wants of the service. The recent revival of the Rodney and Clerk controversy, having excited an unusual interest, renders the present an appropriate juncture for originating such a system. Through this medium, the principles and miniature practice of naval manoeuvres might be imparted methodically to young officers, whose minds would thus become so deeply imbued with this kind of knowledge, as to place its (at least) partial retention in the memory beyond the oblivion to which half pay condemns so much useful professional acquirement. That some of the active-minded officers, whom the peace has placed in this vegetating position, would readily embrace the proposed means of instruction, may be inferred from the facts, that the prescribed number of pupils in the Senior Department of the Naval College continues complete; and also from similar alacrity having been shown with respect to the gunnery instruction on board the Excellent. It is suggested therefore, that at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Sheerness, naval manoeuvres should be taught at appointed periods of the year, by officers selected for their competency, and attached to the respective flag-ships at those ports. For this purpose, not fewer than twenty of the finest boats of the ships in port should be assembled under the above superintendance, and should proceed to practise the evolutions that are necessary for the guidance of and preservation of order in fleets,-these are few and simple. The French, who were the first people in modern history that reduced this art into a connected form, have swelled their books with a variety of manoeuvres, some of which are more ingenious than useful, except as mental exercises, which tend to create a quick conception of resource in situations of difficulty. Every officer, of whatever rank, who had charge of a boat, should in his turn lead a line and direct the proceedings. As combined movements of this nature are simplified in their execution by uniformity of size, and of rate of motion in their elementary parts, it might be advantageous to employ the boats of the Ordinary for this purpose: as they are of the same size and rig, there is probably a greater equality in their sailing than in that of the boats of commissioned ships, and besides they work quicker and with greater certainty than the latter, which are various in both these particulars: being, however, for the most part lug-rigged, and consequently in tacking, unless their sails are dipped very smartly, they are more likely than any others to miss stays, and to gather sternway, an accident that in the exercises might create confusion, it would be a more advantageous employment for these boats, to appro

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priate them for this use, solely to the half-pay officers, who should be directed to repair on board the depôt ship to take charge of them. Officers who reside at the above ports, and keep sailing-boats, should be invited to join the exercises in them. Upon foreign stations the same end may be attained whenever a sufficient number of ships meet in port, and their other duties will permit. The expense of executing this project would be limited to the supply of a few copies of printed manoeuvring instructions, diagrams, and signals: and some sets of boats, flags, and pendants, besides a little more wear and tear of the boats.

The harbours above mentioned, and the anchorages in their immediate vicinities, include such a variety of hydrographical features, as would enable the little fleets not only to practise every description of manœuvre, but also to repeat and elucidate all those that are celebrated in naval history. An interesting employment would thus be supplied for the young officers of guardships and others, that would usefully occupy some portion of the time that is now too often wasted, and a foundation might be thus laid for future individual distinction, resulting from the performance of eminent national services.

Since the foregoing observations were written, the guard-ships have been assembled, and report states, for the purpose of sailing upon a cruise of evolution: if this should prove correct, the measure seems to recognise the policy of giving the peace-formed officers some practice in that part of their duty; and the writer would finally remark, with a feeling of sincere respect for the officers who command the ships of the squadron, that the cruise may not prove valueless to them either, for a naval historian of Lord Howe's battle states, that " some of the captains, from having been long unemployed, showed an ignorance of manoeuvring."

PROTEUS.

THE EFFECTS OF INEXPERIENCE IN NAVAL AFFAIRS ON THE PART OF THE ARMY-WITH A REMEDY.

TO THE KING.

SIRE,-As an officer of long standing in your Majesty's service, and having observed frequently in my humble services during the late war, where I felt, and witnessed in others, the awkwardness of a total ignorance of naval affairs, with its consequent inconvenience and ill effects upon the army generally, I am induced to call the circumstance to your Majesty's notice, and at the same time most humbly to point out a remedy.

Here I beg leave to remark, that in giving army officers a knowledge of naval affairs, I do not mean that they should in any respect infringe upon, or usurp the naval officers' profession, which should, and must be, held whole and entire. I should qualify the expression "ignorance of naval affairs," and rather term it a want of knowing how to act promptly with the navy." My object will better appear when I remind your Majesty of the helpless state of our battalions

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during and after a disembarkation, and the danger of such a state of things in the vicinity of an enemy; all owing to the want of practical experience in the officers, not one of whom, perhaps, in fifty, ever served with a floating armament; even field officers, commanding regiments, not knowing how to place their own persons in a boat. This deficiency must be familiar to those who served on coast operations in America, more particularly at New Orleans, and in Holland, &c. &c. &c. I need not take any further pains to establish the truth of my position; the thing is notorious, and is acknowledged by all my military acquaintance.

When it is recollected that our military operations are almost always combined, is it not evident that the army officers, or a portion of them, should be so far acquainted with the sea and the ship, as to be enabled to attend to their men, to the interior economy, and the several important duties connected with the arrangement of their battalions, instead of being, as has been seen too frequently, solely occupied with their own persons and baggage, all owing to the helplessness we feel when embarked on a new element?

To obviate this dangerous inconvenience is the object by which I am induced to offer these remarks, and for which purpose I beg leave most humbly to state to your Majesty, that having lately visited Chatham, I there witnessed the combined duties of the troops of the line with those of the marines: there they take the duties of the garrison, and act together in brigade; and there it at once occurred to me how easy it would be to invest the one branch of your Majesty's service with the practical experience of the other, and that all this may be done without working any great change in long established systems, or of causing the least occasion of jealousy in the minds of the most tenacious for the honour of their several departments or branches of service, and without any other alterations than that of allowing an interchange of commissions between the army and marine officers, as at present exists between the officers of one regiment of the line and those of another. It is clear that this may be effected without any other change whatever in the systems at the Admiralty or Horse Guards. It requires no change of private men, no change of discipline, no giving up or change of authority in either department; and as to the patronage usual in the disposal or interchange of commissions, a satisfactory arrangement may be made without difficulty, to prevent any inconvenience on that head.

It may not be necessary or practicable that all officers should serve at sea, but when the field officer is called upon to consult with the naval commander, a twelve-month's previous service at sea would in many cases enlighten and render him more capable of giving his opinion. Did the present severe duties of the army permit, how desirable would it be that a portion of intelligent men were serving in your Majesty's ships, visiting other countries, and practising on a small scale measures so necessary to be acquainted with in time of war and armaments; such officers returning to the army, either by exchange or promotion, would carry to their messes a fund of useful information, which is at present confined to a branch of the service, whose members have no inducement or opportunity of imparting it. Sire, much, very much more might be urged in favour of this measure, and I firmly believe if

men would divest themselves of prejudice, no argument could be brought against it; but your Majesty, who shows an equal regard for all branches of your service, and who stands high above all prejudice, will best judge.

I have the honour to be,

Your Majesty's most dutiful subject and servant,

R. Y.

*.* There cannot be a question of the deficiency represented by "R. Y.," or of the propriety of remedying it. Without, however, pledging ourselves to the peculiar mode by which our correspondent proposes to obviate the alleged defect, we will add a suggestion it has been for some time our purpose to bring forward at more length-we mean the propriety of making the regular Works and Harbour of Portsmouth, uniting, as that place so eminently does, facilities of illustrating by practice the combined or hostile operations both of the sea and land forces, a SCHOOL OF INSTRUCTION for our Troops and Shipping. Instead of the trite and mechanical details usually prosecuted, with little profit to the individual, in the barrack or upon the deck, why should not the corps, forming in succession the garrison of Portsmouth, be instructed, both officers and men, in the names, nature, and uses of the various Works which form the enceinte of that solitary British fortress, and in the qualities and classes of its Ordnance? The officers of Engineers and Artillery stationed there would, we should think, be too happy to be invested with so useful and honourable an occupation. How many officers and soldiers occupy and quit the Garrison of Portsmouth, without knowing the denominations and purposes of its elaborate fortifications, or bestowing a thought upon the acquisition of an elementary knowledge of the first importance to a soldier in the field!

The whole Army and Fleet in Commission might be successively passed through a course of practical instruction and manœuvres at this station, each arm of the service gaining an insight into the movements and materiel of the other; while the details of professional knowledge might be fixed in their attention by sham sieges and fights, landings, repulses, and various manoeuvres, in which the services might be combined or opposed; the effect of which would be to invest theory with the value and identity of experience,―to expand the views, profitably employ the time, and excite the emulation of the services, results which would unquestionably tend to maintain our seamen and soldiers in a fitter state to meet the exigencies of sudden war.

The NAVAL AND MILITARY LIBRARY AND MUSEUM, the definitive establishment of which we have the pleasure to record in our present Number, will, we have no doubt, offer important and extensive facilities to the acquisition of that reciprocal knowledge indispensable to the concert and efficiency of the United Services. As a repository of all mechanical contrivances and details of construction, employed in their various and respective operations, of plans, improvements, and suggestions too numerous for actual adoption, but tending to the grand object of perfecting each system as it were by insensible links of practical ingenuity, this long-desired Institution, exclusive of other equally important advantages, will, we are convinced, prove of the highest utility.

We shall take another opportunity of recurring to this subject.-Ed.

ACTIONS OF THE BRITISH CAVALRY.

THERE appeared a few years ago in one of the Numbers of the Quarterly Review, a paper in which the merits of the British Cavalry were discussed, as compared with that of foreign nations, and the light dragoons were freely censured for inefficiency at the battle of Waterloo. Such sweeping criticisms, even in the pages of that able periodical, are seldom very correct, and their impression is not of a permanent character; but when in so admirable a professional work as that of Colonel Napier, the same sentiments are upheld, the case becomes different, and it is but fair that such a sentence as the following in the work alluded to, should be duly investigated and put to the sure test of positive evidence and correct detail of facts.

Colonel Napier in his Third Volume states,

"The result of one hundred battles and the united testimony of impartial writers of different nations, have given the first place among the European infantry to the British, but, in a comparison between the troops of France and England, it would be unjust not to admit that the cavalry of the former stands higher in the estimation of the world."

No one will certainly dispute the justice of the first part of this sentence, but it remains to be seen by reference to facts, how far the latter part is correct. The cavalry of England have, it is true, had far fewer opportunities of distinction than the infantry, but it may be confidently asserted, that in nine cases out of ten, where opportunities have been afforded them, from the year 1793 to the battle of Waterloo, they have been successful. Let us proceed to the proof of this assertion by an inquiry into the results of most of the cavalry actions during the late war. To begin with the campaigns of Holland in 1793 and 4, what was the result of the attack of the French on the British camp at Cisoing? The Enniskillens and 16th light dragoons took so active and useful a part in the repulse of the enemy, that they were especially mentioned in the dispatch on that occasion, as having contributed greatly by the spirit of their attack to the success of the day.

A short time afterwards we find a squadron of the Bays under Major Crauford attacking a picket of 150 infantry, of whom they made prisoners 104, leaving the remainder dead upon the spot.

Again at Lannoy, we hear of Lieut.-Colonel Churchill with two squadrons charging a large body of the enemy, and killing, wounding, or making prisoners 150 of their number.

At Villiers en Couchies, two squadrons of the 15th light dragoons in conjunction with two Austrian squadrons, overthrew more than double their force of French cavalry, and driving them back upon a line of infantry, also broke them, and pursued the whole to the gates of Cambrai, where they found refuge from their victors with a loss of 1200 men and three pieces of cannon: and, indeed, had it not been for a mistake by which the British supports were not sufficiently at hand, the success would have been even more signal and extraordinary. Such were the principal cavalry affairs of these campaigns, but in several more partial encounters the success of the British was equally remarkable. The next occasion, on which the British cavalry were employed upon the Continent, was the expedition to the Helder, where the peculiar nature of that country prevented much use being made