for transportation, and received a receipt containing a condition that the
company was not to be held liable for any loss occasioned by the dangers
of transportation. The goods were lost en route without fault or negli
gence. Plaintiff did not read the receipt, and the condition was not
brought to his knowledge. Held, that plaintiff was bound by the condi
tion, and that defendants were not liable. Kirkland v. Dinsmore
(N. Y.), 475.
B. Damages for expulsion of passenger.] A passenger who had purchased a
ticket for a berth in a sleeping-car, lost it, and gave evidence to the con-
ductor that he had done so, and refused to pay over again, whereupon the
conductor expelled him, without violence, from the car, and he was com-
pelled to ride in a common car. Held, that plaintiff could recover of the
owners of the sleeping-car the price he paid for his ticket and a reason-
able compensation for his trouble and inconvenience, but that he could
not recover exemplary damages, and that a verdict for $3,000 was excess
ive. Pullman Palace-Car Co. v. Reed (Ill.), 232.
Evidence of.] Be EVIDENCE, 325.
COMMISSIONS.
See BROKER, 66.
COMMON CARRIER.
See CARRIER.
Contract of affreightment—place of performance.] Plaintiff delivered to de
fendant at Hartford, Connecticut, goods to be transported to Des Moines,
Iowa, and received a bill of lading exempting the defendant from liability
for losses by fire. Such exemption was valid in Connecticut, but was void
in Iowa. The goods were destroyed by fire at Chicago, while en route.
Held, that the contract was governed by the laws of Connecticut, and the
exemption was therefore valid. Talbott v. Merchants' Dispatch Transpor
tation Co. (Iowa), 589.
As to lien of attorneys.] See ATTORNEY, 184.
Agreement to withdraw objections to bankruptcy proceedings.] The considera
tion of a contract was, that one of the contracting parties should withdraw
opposition to bankruptcy proceedings pending against his firm, and con-
sent to an adjudication against them. Held, that the consideration was
valid. Sanford v. Huxford (Mich.), 648.
When sufficient to sustain action.] See INSURANCE, 106.
Note for embezzled money.] See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 288.
Mortgage given for embezzled money.] See ILLEGAL CONTRACT, 631
Moral obligation as.] See INFANT, 399.
1. Statute authorizing counselor to act as judge-mistrial.] A statute author-
ized actions, in which the judge was interested or prejudiced, to be tried
by consent of the parties, before a counselor of the court. Held, that the
statute was unconstitutional, that a person assuming to act under it was
not even a judge de facto, and that his judgment was absolutely void.
Van Slyke v. Trempealeau Ins. Co. (Wis.), 50.
2. Trial by jury — compulsory reference.] A statute authorized courts, with-
out the consent of parties, to commit any cause to a referee for trial, and
provided that after such trial, the cause should, at the request of either
party, be tried by a jury, and that upon such trial the report of the
referee should be evidence of all the facts stated therein, subject to be
impeached by either party. Held, that the act was constitutional so far
as it authorized a compulsory reference; but quære as to the provision
making the referee's report admissible. Copp v. Henniker (N. H.), 194.
3. Verdict of jury — confinement of one acquitted on the ground of insanity —
due process of law.] A statute provided that, when the defense of insanity
was set up upon the trial of an indictment for murder, etc.,
the jury
should find specially whether the defendant was insane when the alleged
crime was committed, and that, if they acquitted on that ground, the
verdict should so state; that, thereupon, the court should sentence the
defendant to confinement in the insane hospital until such time as the
governor should discharge him; that such discharge should be granted
whenever the prison inspectors should summon certain officers named, to
examine the defendant, and they should certify to the governor that he
was no longer insane. Held, (1) that the jury had the constitutional
right to give a general verdict, but that a special verdict was not
unauthorized; (2) that the statute was unconstitutional in that it pro-
vided for depriving one of his liberty without due process of law.
Underwood v. People (Mich.), 633.
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution - depriving paupers of
liberty without due process of law.] A State statute authorized two over.
seers of the poor in any town, by writing under their hand, to commit
paupers and vagrants to the work-house. Held, in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as it deprived
a person of liberty without due process of law.
(Me.), 681.
B. Local option laws.] An act provided for an election in the several election
districts at which the voters should vote for or against the sale of intoxi-
cating liquors; and that if in any district the vote was against such sale,
it should thereafter not be lawful to sell liquor therein. It was provided
that the act should take effect immediately after such election. Held, that
the act was not a delegation of the legislative power to the people, and
was valid. Fell v. The State (Md.), 83.
6. License to sell liquor revocable.] A license to sell liquor under the general
license laws of the State is not a contract, and it may be terminated before
its expiration by a change or repeal of the law. lb.
7. Tax on liquor— taxation is not "license" — collection of] A statute pro-
vided for the assessment of a specified tax on liquor dealers, the money
thereby raised to be devoted to the use of the towns, villages and cities
in which the business was carried on. Held, (1) not a "State tax," and
therefore not within the constitutional provision directing the applicatior
of "specific State taxes;" (2) that the fact that the same tax was levied
on all dealers without regard to the amount of business did not render it
unjust or unequal; (3) that the parties taxed could not object because the
municipality had no voice in the levy, nor because the sheriff, and not the
tax collector, was made the collector, and (4) that the tax was not equiva-
lent to a license so as to come within the constitutional prohibition of
licensing the sale of liquors. Youngblood v. Sexton (Mich.), 655.
8. Hawkers and peddlers —“ carrying to sell” — police power.] A statute made
it a penal offense to travel from place to place" for the purpose of carry
ing to sell, or exposing to sale any goods, wares and merchandise" with.
out a license as a broker and peddler. Held, (1) that the act was valid ;
(2) that the act was an exercise of the police power of the State, and
therefore not repugnant to the requirement of the Constitution that "the
rule of taxation should be uniform;" and (3) that it was not in violation
of the Federal Constitution. Morrill v. State (Wis.), 12.
9. Municipal license tax-impairing obligation of contract.] The city of Mo-
bile made a contract with S., whereby it was agreed that S. should carry
on the water-works of the city without "let, molestation or hindrance"
from the city, and should have the exclusive privilege of supplying water
in the city. Held, that a license tax on S., for doing business under such
contract, imposed by a city ordinance passed in pursuance of its charter,
was invalid, as impairing the obligation of a contract. Stein v. Mayor
(Ala.), 282.
10. Railroad companies subject to changes of the general laws-liability for
damage from fire.] A statute provided that all railroad corporations
should be liable for damages from fires caused by the operating of such
railroad. Held, valid and constitutional as to railroads incorporated before
the statute was passed. Rodemacher v. Milwaukee and St. Paul R. R (6.
(Iowa), 592.
![[merged small][ocr errors]](https://books.google.cl/books/content?id=yRI8AAAAIAAJ&output=html_text&pg=PA793&img=1&zoom=3&hl=en&q=editions:UOM39015004951110&cds=1&sig=ACfU3U0oIlOE8IZG-qlzbtl38POmKjLgMw&edge=0&edge=stretch&ci=121,1470,775,42)
Making railroad companies liable for expenses of coroners' inquests.] See RAIL
ROADS, 259.
Statute for admission of non-resident attorneys.] See ATTORNEY, 55.
Statute of limitations — vested right under.] See LIMITATION OF ACTIONS,
131.
Statute requiring license to do business.] See LICENSE, 290.
Promise — when implied.] In an action to recover the value of one-half of a
party wall erected by the plaintiff partly on his estate and partly on that
of the defendant, the jury may, in the absence of an express agreement
as to payment on the defendant's part, infer a promise to pay, if the plain-
tiff undertook and completed the wall with the expectation that the de-
fendant would pay him for it, and the defendant had reason to know that
the plaintiff was so acting with that expectation, and allowed him so to
act without objection. Day v. Caton (Mass.), 347.
Between mortgagor and mortgagee as to insurance.] See INSURANCE, 106.
How affected by custom.] See CUSTOM, 286.
Impairing obligation of.] See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 282.
·when sickness no excuse for breach of] See MASTER AND SERVANT
Of corporations — when ultra vires.] See CORPORATIONS, 504.
Place of performance.] See CONFLICT OF LAW, 589.
To convey land — breach of — damages.] See Damages, 261, 677
To marry.] See MARRIAGE.
When void.] See STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 502.
CONVEYANCE.
See SALE, 143.
Erpenses of inquest.] See RAILROAD, 259.
1. Contracts ultra vires.] Where a corporation has fully performed a contract
to manufacture and deliver certain articles and brings an action to recover
the price thereof, it is no defense that the contract was ultra vires. Whit-
ney Arms Co. v. Barlow (N. Y.), 504.
2. Foreign-service on — substituted service.] A statute provided that foreign
insurance companies, as a prerequisite to doing business in the State, should
designate an attorney therein, upon whom process in suits against such
companies might be served. Held, that the service of a summons on an
attorney so designated gave to the court jurisdiction, so as to enable it to
render a judgment valid within the territorial limits and enforceable
therein against defendants' property found there. Gibbs v. Queen Ins.
Co. (N. Y.), 513.
Liability as to county funds — liability of borrower from treasurer.] A
county treasurer is the debtor and not the bailee of the county and there-
fore if he wrongfully lends money received by him as treasurer and after-
ward becomes a defaulter, the borrowers are not liable to the county in
an action for money had and received. Semble, that if such borrower is
liable in any form of action it must be on the case, or by bill in equity.
Perley v. County of Muskegon (Mich.), 638.
Probate courts-surrogates.] Although surrogates' courts are of limited and
special jurisdiction which depends upon the existence of certain facts, yet
their decision upon the existence of such facts and their consequent juris-
diction is conclusive until regularly reversed or vacated, and will protect
all innocent parties acting on the faith of it. Roderigas v. East River
Institute (N. Y.), 555.
Delegation of judicial functions.] See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 50
1. Breach of covenant of warranty — eviction — damages.] In an action by a
grantee of land against the grantor for breach of covenants of warranty in
the eviction of the grantee by a mortgagee, held, (1) that entry of the
mortgagee for foreclosure was a sufficient eviction, without actual ouster:
and (2) that the measure of damage was the amount of the mortgaged
debt and interest if that was less than the full value of the estate. Fur-
nas v. Durgin (Mass.), 341.
2. Agreement to pay debt of another — action for breach of — damages.] Land
was conveyed "subject to mortgages amounting to $6,500 which the
grantee hereby assumes to pay." The grantee failing to pay one of said
mortgages at its maturity, the grantor brought action for a breach of the
agreement. Held, that the grantor had a right of action without having
himself paid the debt or any part thereof, and that he could recover the
amount of the mortgage unpaid with interest. Ib., and note, 346.
Breach of — when taxes are incumbrance.] See Tax, 547.
1. Intent to commit a crime — intent must be proved as laid.] Upon the trial
of an indictment for an assault with intent to commit murder, the defend.
ant cannot be convicted of an assault with an intent to commit manslaugh
ter, but he may be convicted of an assault. State v. White (Iowa), 602.
2. Robbery — intent compelling payment of debt.] Defendant, by means of
threats of personal violence and menaces, compelled J. S. to pay to him
money which defendant believed to be justly due to him from J. S. Held
not to constitute robbery. State v. Hollyway (Iowa), 586.
|