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sible, which involve particular theories in them. To avoid the fallacy, which the introduction of such theories in his language would occasion, Butler is often obliged to employ a circuitous, and apparently awkward, style in stating his arguments; or, as says himself, in reference to the principles of liberty and moral fitness, has "sometimes been obliged to express himself in a manner which will appear strange to such as do not observe the reason for it"*. Thus, in his chapter on a Future Life, he does not speak of the soul, as an immaterial, or naturally immortal, principle; since his object is, to employ such arguments as would be conclusive, whatever theory of the soul be maintained; appealing, simply, to such facts as are signs of its posthumous existence, whatever may be its nature. Hence his use of such expressions as "faculties of perception and action”— "living powers"—"living agents"—" the

* Butler's Works, by Halifax, Vol. I. p. 398, Oxford Ed. 1820.

living being each man calls himself”—&c.: which, to be justly estimated, must be regarded as exclusions of any particular theory concerning the soul; so as to leave the question of a future life, as there entered into, purely a question of fact. And so throughout the treatise, it will be found, on a close examination, that it is the difficulty of stating an accurate generalization of particular facts, exempt from all particular theories of the subjects about which they are conversant, which occasions a difficulty in the style. Had a more familiar expression been employed, though founded on some abstruse speculation, the apparent difficulty would have been less, whilst a real perplexity would have been introduced into the argument, from the fallacy involved in the more specious term. Conclusions of the kind employed in "The Analogy" differ from mere speculative conclusions, in being drawn immediately and wholly from the facts examined. In stating them, there fore, we cannot proceed a step beyond the

limits of the facts. Great precision of language, accordingly, is required, in order to exhibit them faithfully. And they exact from the reader the like patient and close attention, in order that he may perceive their true outline, and know why such a particular form of expression is used in each instance, and not one more usual and obvious.

At the same time, it is not meant, by what is here said, to defend every particular expression employed in the conduct of the argument of "The Analogy ", as the most appropriate and simple;-or to assert, that other forms might not sometimes have been substituted, at once accurate, and more familiar to the general reader,-or, that greater expansion of the reasoning, with less of that allusion to collateral topics of discussion, with which, the very comprehensiveness of his mind, and his forecast of possible objections to particular statements, have led him occasionally to interrupt the straightforward course of his argument-would not

have given greater perspicuity to it, without diminishing its force. It is only meant to remove that general imputation of obscurity, which is carelessly and unjustly cast upon the work. That there is some degree of obscurity arising from the nature of the discussion pursued in "The Analogy," it must be conceded; and it is to the removal of this, that the inquiry here instituted into the grounds, nature, and importance, of the Evidence itself illustrated in that work, is intended to serve.

The separate arrangement, adopted by Butler, of the arguments from the constitution and course of nature, as they refer to natural or revealed religion, has not been followed in this Essay; because, when once it is admitted, that religion has been authenticated and enlarged by a distinct communication from God, it seems, that nature is then superseded, as the source of instruction on the subject, by the more express and copious subsequent information: and we have only to examine how far nature leads us on

the same track of divine truth, and confirms and illustrates the words of her successor : ranging the scriptures exclusively on one side, as containing the truths of religion, and the instruction of nature on the other, as containing their evidence. Butler's arrangement, however, is not objectionable in itself; since the concession of some fundamental truths to the province of natural religion, by no means implies, that such truths were originally discovered, or are necessarily discoverable, by dint of human reason. Natural and revealed religion may be contradistinguished, in respect of the truths properly belonging to each; the former containing those truths which result from our relations to God, as the Lord of the visible world; the latter containing those truths which result from our relations to God, as the Lord of the invisible world. Now, in the case of those belonging to the latter class, their origin must be known to us, because we have no other means of apprehending them, but