The minority report, however, urging in addition the immediate recognition of the Cuban Republic as then organized, was finally embodied in the Senate resolution, April 16, by a vote of 67 to 21. The two Houses were thus brought into conflict over the question of recognition of the Cuban republic so-called. After two days of heated controversy the Senate gave way, and on April 19, the anniversary of the battle of Lexington, and of the first bloodshed of the Civil War on the streets of Baltimore, the fateful resolution was adopted in the following terms:

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled,

"First, That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

"Second, That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuban waters.

"Third, That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect

“Fourth, That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people.

These resolutions were, of course, equivalent to a declaration of war. As soon as they were approved by the president, April 20, the Spanish minister asked for his passports, thus severing diplomatic relations, and Woodford left Madrid the following day. The American people entered on this war with enthusiasm, eager to test the national strength. Every movement of army and navy was closely watched, and the public was almost hourly informed by the newspapers, through special editions, of what was going on. A special interest was felt in the navy, which, as was well known, had, through the efforts of Assistant-Secretary Roosevelt, been for

months engaged in target practice., Even with this T IT

practice only 123 out of about 8000 projectiles hit the Spanish ships at Santiago."

There has been much discussion as to the validity of the grounds on which the United States based its right of intervention in Cuba. Most writers sanction intervention for the enforcement of treaty rights,for the preservation of the balance of power, and for self-preservation. "Interventions for the purpose of self-preservation," according to Hall, "naturally 1 U. S. Statutes at Large, XXX., 738.

include all those which are grounded upon danger to the institutions, to the good order, or to the external safety of the intervening state." As to humanitarian intervention, there is a wide difference of opinion among modern jurists; some sanctioning it and others denying that it is ever legal; while still others approve it only when undertaken by the body of states, or by representatives of the body of states acting jointly. Most of the discussions of this subject are specially applicable to the situation in Europe, and can be applied only by analogy to America, where the United States has to undertake many things alone which in Europe would require concerted action.3

1 Hall, Int. Law (5th ed.), 285.

2 Ibid., 291, note.

Moore, Digest of Int. Law, VI., 3.

CHAPTER II

FIRST PERIOD OF THE SPANISH WAR

PRESI

(APRIL-MAY, 1898)

RESIDENT ROOSEVELT has said that the most striking thing about the war with Spain was the preparedness of the navy, and the unpreparedness of the army. For fifteen years we had been building up a navy, and for months preceding the war every effort was made, with the resources at the command of the navy department, to put it in a state of first-class efficiency. As early as January 11, 1898, instructions were sent to the commanders of the several squadrons to retain in the service men whose terms of enlistment were about to expire. As the Cuban situation grew more threatening, the North Atlantic Squadron and a torpedo - boat flotilla were rapidly assembled in Florida waters; and immediately after the destruction of the Maine the ships on the European and South Atlantic stations were ordered to Key West.

Commodore Dewey assumed command of the Asiatic station January 3, 1898, succeeding RearAdmiral McNair. The ships were at the time scattered along the coasts of China and Korea. On

February 25 the following secret orders were cabled to Dewey: "Order squadron, except Monocacy, to Hong-Kong. Keep full of coal. In event of declaration of war Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands. Keep Olympia until further orders." This despatch was signed "Roosevelt," then assistant secretary of the navy. On the following day another despatch was sent to Dewey, and also to the commanders of all our squadrons: "Keep full of coal, the best that can be had." The Olympia, Dewey's flag-ship, had been ordered home for repairs, but this order was revoked in view of the seriousness of the situation. The Mohican was ordered to proceed at once from Mare Island to Honolulu with a large supply of ammunition, to be transferred to the Baltimore and conveyed by that ship to Dewey at Hong-Kong.

The battle-ship Oregon, which was at Bremerton, on the coast of Washington, was ordered early in March to proceed to San Francisco and prepare for a long voyage. After receiving a supply of ammunition at the latter port, she started, March 19, on the voyage around the Horn that was to make her name immortal in naval history. The Marietta, then at San José, Guatemala, was ordered to precede the Oregon and arrange for coaling.

Both from a political and a military point of view,

1 Sec. of the Navy, Report, 1898, App., p. 23.