motionless. The next morning he probably heard that Sampson was off San Juan, for he put his squadron in motion and started for Curaçao just about the time that Sampson started back for Key West.1

News of Cervera's appearance off Martinique was first received at the navy department about midnight, May 12-13, nearly thirty-six hours after the fact. Schley was ordered at once to proceed with the Flying Squadron from Hampton Roads to Charleston, there to receive further orders. When Sampson left Porto Rico he was, of course, in ignorance of Cervera's appearance in the West Indies. The following night he heard from a passing ship the rumor that Cervera was back at Cadiz, and this he cabled to the department. Early Sunday morning, May 15, he received a despatch from Washington telling him that Cervera was at Curaçao the day before, that the Flying Squadron was on its way to Key West, and ordering him to proceed with all possible despatch to the same point. The problem now was to locate Cervera the moment he entered one of his own ports and blockade him, or to pounce on him in case he advanced north from the Caribbean Sea.

The presence of the Spanish fleet at Curaçao caused serious apprehensions as to the fate of the Oregon. The last news of her was that she had

1 Mahan, Lessons of the War with Spain, 123.

Sec. of the Navy, Annual Report, 1898, App., p. 387.

left Bahia, Brazil, May 9. Her movements were unknown to the navy department, for the question of prescribing her route and sending a detachment to meet her had been carefully considered but abandoned. She was left to shift for herself, and was considered safer if not so closely watched. She reached Barbadoes May 18, and turned up safely off Jupiter Inlet, Florida, on the 24th, ready for service, after a voyage of fourteen thousand miles, one of the most remarkable recorded in history.1

Sampson reached Key West at 4 P.M., May 18, several hours after the arrival of Schley. The department had heard that Cervera had munitions of war essential to the defence of Havana, and that his orders were to reach Havana, Cienfuegos, or a port connected with Havana by rail. As Cienfuegos seemed the only place he would be likely to choose, Schley was ordered there with the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, and Texas, May 19. He was joined later by the Iowa, under Captain Evans, and by several cruisers. The Spanish squadron slipped into Santiago, unobserved by the cruisers on scouting duty, May 19, two days before Schley arrived at Cienfuegos, so that had Cervera known the conditions he could easily have made the latter port. On the same day the department received from spies in Havana probable information, conveyed by the cable which had been allowed to remain in operation, that Cervera had entered Santiago. As we now

1 Mahan, Lessons of the War with Spain, 135

Several

know, he had entered early that morning. auxiliary cruisers were immediately ordered to assemble before Santiago in order to watch Cervera and follow him in case he should leave.

At the same time the department "strongly advised" Sampson to send Schley to Santiago at once with his whole command. Sampson replied that he had decided to hold Schley at Cienfuegos until it was certain that the Spanish fleet was in Santiago. Later he sent a despatch to Schley, received May 23, ordering him to proceed to Santiago if satisfied that the enemy were not at Cienfuegos.1 The next day Schley started, encountering on the run much rain and rough weather, which seriously delayed the squadron. At 5.30 P.M., May 26, he reached a point twenty-two miles south of Santiago, where he was joined by several of the auxiliary cruisers on scouting duty. Captain Sigsbee, of the St. Paul, informed him that the scouts knew nothing positively about the Spanish fleet. The collier Merrimac had been disabled, which increased the difficulty of coaling. At 7.45 P.M., a little over two hours after his arrival, Schley without explanation signalled to the squadron: "Destination, Key West, via south side of Cuba and Yucatan Channel, as soon as collier is ready; speed nine knots." Thus began the muchdiscussed retrograde movement, which occupied two days. Admiral Schley states in his book that Sigsbee's report and other evidence led him to con

1 Sec. of the Navy, Annual Report, 1898, App., pp. 465, 466.

clude that the Spanish squadron was not in Santiago; hence the retrograde movement to protect the passage west of Cuba.1 But he has never yet given any satisfactory explanation why he did not definitely ascertain the facts before turning back. Fortunately the squadron did not proceed very far; the lines towing the collier parted and other delays occurred. The next morning Schley received a despatch from the department stating that all the information at hand indicated that Cervera was in Santiago, but he continued on his westward course slowly and at times drifting while some of the ships coaled. The next day, May 28, Schley returned to Santiago, arriving before that port about dusk, and established a blockade.2

1 Schley, Forty-five Years Under the Flag, 276.

Sec. of the Navy, Annual Report, 1898, App., p. 402; Long, New Am. Navy, I., 258-287.

CHAPTER III

SECOND PERIOD OF THE SPANISH WAR

(June-August, 1898)

ADMIRAL SAMPSON arrived off Santiago June

1, and assumed direct command of the squadron. The blockade, which lasted for over a month, was eagerly watched by the whole American people. > The most thrilling incident was the daring but unsuccessful attempt made by Lieutenant Richmond Pearson Hobson to sink the collier Merrimac across the entrance to Santiago harbor, undertaken by direction of Admiral Sampson. Electric torpedoes were attached to the hull of the ship, seavalves were cut, and anchor chains arranged on deck so that she could be brought to a sudden stop. Early on the morning of June 3, Hobson, assisted by a crew of seven seamen, took the collier into the entrance of the harbor under heavy fire and sunk her. The unfortunate shooting away of her steering-gear and the failure of some of the torpedoes to explode kept the ship from sinking at the place selected, so that the plan miscarried. Hobson and his men escaped death as by a miracle, but fell into the hands of the Spaniards.1

1 Sec. of the Navy, Annual Report. 1898, App., p. 437.