These decisions, however, must not be considered as affecting the principle, that the primary ground of liability for collision damage is, the liability of a master for the misconduct of his servants while in his employ. This liability extends to acts of negligence and errors of judgment, but not to wilful and criminal misconduct. Hence, where the master of a Liverpool steam tug, having been irritated by some dispute about his demand for towage, wilfully drove his tug violently several times against the quarter of the sloop he had been towing, thereby causing her considerable damage, it was decided in the Admiralty Court that the tug was not liable to arrest on that account (a). The same principle was acted upon in a subsequent case, when the master of one vessel wilfully cut another adrift from her moorings, in order to get inside of her (b). "In all causes of action," said the learned Judge of the Admiralty Court, "which may arise from circumstances occurring during the ownership of the persons whose ship is proceeded against, I apprehend that no suit could ever be maintained against a ship when the owners were not themselves personally liable, or where their personal liability had not been given up, as in bottomry bonds, by taking a lien on the vessel" (c).

Thus, in result, the liability of the ship for collision damage amounts to this, that the ship,

(a) Druid, 1 W. Rob. 391.

(b) Ida, 1 Lush. 6.

(c) Druid, 1 W. Rob. 399.

together with her earnings on the voyage, that is, the freight or balance of freight due at the termination of the voyage, supposing the ship to be arrested at that point, constitute a species of pledge or material security for the payment by the shipowner for the damage caused by the misconduct of his servants while in his employ,—a pledge which the shipowner cannot so alienate as to defeat the rights of the injured party. It may be mentioned in this place that cargo on board, belonging to the owner of the ship, is not liable to arrest for collision damage; the res subject to such liability being only the ship and freight (a).

There is occasionally a difficulty, after a collision at sea, in identifying the ship collided with. Supposing that, by mistake, the wrong ship has been arrested, the Court of Admiralty, making allowance for this difficulty, will not give damages for the improper arrest, unless bad faith or gross negligence be proved (b).

Such, then, are the general principles involved in the liability of one ship to another for collision damage. In the following chapters we shall have to consider, in detail, the mode in which these principles are to be worked out in practice: beginning with those regulations which determine the manner in which ships are to be steered or otherwise handled when they are so approaching one another as to be in danger of collision, and the look-out

(a) Victor, 1 Lush. 76.

(b) Evangelismos, Swab. 381.

which is to be kept, and the lights which are to be carried, in order that those on board either vessel may have timely warning of the presence of the other then proceeding to consider those grounds of non-liability which may be classed under the head of inevitable accident, or the directions of a pilot taken on board by compulsion of law: after which will come questions of amount of liability, computation of damages, limitation of liability by statute, and the question to what extent foreign ships, meeting on the high seas, are amenable to the municipal rules laid down in British Acts of Parliament; and, in conclusion, matters of jurisdiction and the form of procedure.

CHAPTER I.

STEERING RULES FOR SAILING VESSELS AT SEA.

The subject to be considered in this and the two following chapters is, in what manner should the course of a ship be directed, upon approaching another ship, for the purpose of avoiding a collision. It will be necessary to examine this question under two main divisions. We must first enquire how the matter stands according to the common law of the sea, independent of British statutory directions ; and, secondly, to what extent this common sea law is modified by statute. This division may appear somewhat artificial, but it is unavoidable; because, as will be shewn more at large in its proper place, there are some cases, as, for example, when two ships of different nations meet on the high seas, to which British legislative enactments are inapplicable, the case lying outside of the limits of statutory jurisdiction; whilst in other cases it is essential that the statutes should be observed.

SECT. I.-The Common Sea Law.

The Court of Admiralty, exercising jurisdiction over causes of action which arise upon the high seas, and exercising it over, or for the benefit of,