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able according actions advantage agreeable allow animals appear argument arises attended authority beauty become betwixt cause character circumstances common concerning consequently consider considerable continued contrary derived desire determine difficulty direct distinct easily easy effect emotion entirely equal established esteem evident evil excite experience explain farther feel follows force former founded give greater hatred human humility ideas imagination immediately impossible impressions influence injustice instances interest judgment justice kind laws least less manner matter means mind moral motive natural necessary necessity never object obligation observe operate original ourselves pain particular passions perform person philosophers pleasure possession possible present pride principles proceed produce promises qualities reason reflection regard relation remarkable render resemblance rules SECT sensation sense sensible sentiments sion situation society sufficient supposed sympathy thing thought tion uneasiness universe vice virtue whole
Página 224 - I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.
Página 161 - Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.
Página 541 - In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.
Página 508 - The true conclusion is, that the original source of all things is entirely indifferent to all these principles, and has no more regard to good above ill than to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light above heavy.
Página 452 - And what shadow of an argument, continued Philo, can you produce from your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the deity? A great number of men join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a commonwealth: Why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world? This is only so much greater similarity to human affairs.
Página 209 - Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.
Página 247 - I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually expressed, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour.
Página 162 - Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.