The Principles of Pragmatism: A Philosophical Interpretation of ExperienceHoughton Mifflin, 1910 - 364 páginas |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
The Principles of Pragmatism: A Philosophical Interpretation of Experience Henry Heath Bawden Vista de fragmentos - 2001 |
Términos y frases comunes
absolute abstract action activity adjustment Antinomy aspect authority become brain called causal cause character complete conceived conception concrete consciousness coördination copula criterion distinction doctrine dynamic dynamic system emotional empiricism ence energy Epiphenomenalism evolution existence experience expression external fact factor feeling full reality function habit hypostasized idea ideal idealist identity hypothesis individual instinct judgment knowledge means mechanical mediation ment mental metaphysics method modes monistic naïve nature ness object orchid organism origin perception perience phase philosophy physical point of view practical pragmatism present principle priori law problem Professor Dewey protoplasm psychical psychology question rational reason reconstruction reflective regarded relation relative rience says scientific sciousness sensation sense simply situation social space statement stimulus subjective subjective idealism teleological tension theory thing thinking thought tion tism tive true truth ultimate Uncon unconscious universe values visual perception whole words
Pasajes populares
Página 216 - Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.
Página 57 - I conceive the situation, is to have seen that though one part of our experience may lean upon another part to make it what it is in any one of several aspects in which it may be considered, experience as a whole is self-containing and leans. on nothing.
Página 250 - Reality goes on; that there is no reasonable standard of truth (or of success of the knowing function) in general, except upon the postulate that Reality is thus dynamic or...
Página 2 - But it is better to be a fool than to be dead. It is better to emit a scream in the shape of a theory than to be entirely insensible to the jars and incongruities of life and take everything as it comes in a forlorn stupidity.
Página 192 - They are studied separately for convenience in attending to them, as we may study the wheels and pistons of an engine ; but the work which gives them their names can only be done when they are together. This truth is often expressed by saying that " the sentence is the unit of language...
Página 296 - No event begins or ends ; but a process goes on which passes gradually from one phase into another. We ticket prominent or clearly distinct phases with separate names, and speak of them as different events ; but we must remember that, though in one sense they are different, there is yet no barrier.
Página 9 - Schiller defends the rights of religious faith and feeling in determining our beliefs, and prefers the term " Humanism." His philosophy has much in common with what in other quarters has come to be called " Personalism." Professor Dewey is the champion of a scientific empirical method in philosophy. This method is quite generally known as " Instrumentalism," but in a recent article is described by Professor Dewey himself as
Página 198 - ... nothing is more reasonable than to suppose that if there be anything personal at the bottom of things, the way we behave to it must affect the way it behaves to us. The true absurdity, therefore, lies in our ignoring the most patent facts of experience in order to set up the Moloch of a rigid, immutable and inexorable Order of Nature, to which we must ruthlessly immolate all our desires, all our impulses, all our aspirations, and all our ingenuity, including that...
Página 177 - interviewing " himself is rather odd, to be sure. But then that is what we are all of us doing every day. I talk half the time to find out my own thoughts, as a school-boy turns his pockets inside out to see what is in them.
Página 199 - If it baa the correspondence which it intended to have with its object, "is the correspondence reached between idea and object the precise correspondence that the idea itself intended? If it is, the idea is true. If it is not, the idea is In so far false. Thus it is not mere agreement, but Intended agreement, that constitutes truth."1 "There is no purely external criterion of truth Ideas are like tools.
Referencias a este libro
Contextualism and Understanding in Behavioral Science: Implications for ... Ralph Rosnow,Marianth Georgoudi Vista de fragmentos - 1986 |
Pädagogik und Politik: historische und aktuelle Perspektiven : Festschrift ... Claudia Crotti,Fritz Osterwalder Vista previa limitada - 2007 |