first section of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, deprived him of his liberty and property without due process of law and denied him the equal protection of the laws. The motion to quash was overruled, and the case was heard upon an agreed statement of facts. It appears from that statement that the parties stipulated, for the purposes of the case, that Kansas City was under a duty to keep its streets and highways in repair, and make all contracts to grade and pave them and for all other public improvements within its limits; that the defendant entered into a contract with the city to construct a pavement on Quindaro Boulevard, a public highway in that city, and employed, among others, one George Reese to perform the labor of shoveling and removing dirt in the prosecution of that work; permitted him to work more than eight hours on each calendar day, although there was no extraordinary emergency arising in time of war, nor any necessity that he or any other person engaged on the work should work more than eight hours for the protection of property or human life; that the agreement with Reese was to pay fifteen cents per hour and no more, the current rate of wages for such work in that locality being $1.50 for ten hours' labor per day; and that the defendant exacted and required of him that he work ten hours each calendar day in order to be entitled to the current wages of $1.50 per day; that if the contractor had been compelled to pay Reese and other laborers at the rate of $1.50 per day for eight hours' work, his compensation would have been diminished by one hundred dollars; that Reese was not compelled, required or requested to work more than eight hours in any one day, but did so voluntarily, and was permitted and allowed to work ten hours in each calendar day in order to earn $1.50 in a calendar day; that he was employed at his own solicitation, and entered into the agreement with Atkin freely, and worked at the time and place mentioned in the complaint with the knowledge, consent and permission of defendant; that it was not the 191 U. S. Statement of the Case. intention, expectation, desire or agreement of Reese or of the defendant that the former should ask, demand or receive the same compensation for eight hours' work as was paid for ten hours' work each calendar day to laborers doing the same kind of work for persons having contracts with private persons or corporations; that he was hired and employed without the knowledge or consent of the city, and neither the city nor its officers, had or exercised any control or supervision over him, he being the servant of the defendant and not of the city; and, that the contract between the defendant and the city did not contain any provision as to the number of hours laborers should work in a calendar day, nor any provision as to their compensation, but left the contractor free as to the means and manner of performing his contract. It was also stipulated that the labor performed by Reese was healthful out-door work, not dangerous, hazardous or in any way injurious to life, limb or health, and could be performed for a period of ten hours during each working day of the week without injury from so doing, and that the labor he was employed to perform, and did perform, "was in no respect or manner more dangerous to the health or hazardous to lifeor limb or to the general welfare of the said George Reese or other persons doing such work than the labor performed by persons doing the same kind of or character of work as the employés or [of] contractors having contracts to do the same kind of work for private persons, firms or corporations, or as the servants of private persons, firms or corporations." It was further stipulated that the work of shoveling and removing dirt in the construction of a pavement was in all respects the same whether the pavement be constructed for a city of other municipality or for a private person, firm or corporation. Such was the case presented for the determination of the trial court. The prosecution resulted in a judgment against the defendant, and he was sentenced to pay a fine of fifty dollars on each Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 191 U. S. count of the complaint. Motions in arrest of judgment and for new trial having been denied, the case was taken to the Supreme Court of Kansas, which affirmed the judgment and sustained the validity of the statute. Mr. T. A. Pollock for plaintiff in error: The provisions of the law of 1891 constituting eight hours a day's work for persons employed by contractors engaged in paving streets for cities and requiring such contractors to pay their employés for eight hours' work the current rate of wages for ten hours' work, in this case, are in conflict with section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Such provisions deprive the plaintiff in error of his liberty and property without due process of law. For legal meaning of word "liberty," see Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578; Butchers' Union &c. v. Crescent City Live Stock Co., 111 U. S. 746, and see also p. 755; Bracewell v. People, 147 Illinois, 65; S. C., 35 N. E. Rep. 62; State v. Coal Co., 36 W. Va. 856; S. C., 15 S. E. Rep. 1000. As to due process of law see Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366. The provisions also deny the contractor equal protection of the laws. The act is class legislation; it discriminates without reason. It has been held not to apply to contractors for work on penitentiaries or charitable institutions. State v. Martindale, 47 Kansas, 147. For purpose of the law, see In re Ashby, 60 Kansas, 106. The Fourteenth Amendment was passed to prevent discriminations and class legislation. The words "due process of law" and "equal protection of laws" are synonymous with "the law of the land." They mean a law binding upon every member of the community under similar circumstances. Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy, 2 Yerg, 554; Bank v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235; State v. Loomis, 115 Missouri, 307; S. C., 22 S. W. Rep. 351; County of Santa Clara v. R. R. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 398; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27. The power of legislatures to classify subjects of 191 U. S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. legislation is conceded but this does not mean arbitrary designation. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540; Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, 31. The equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 350; Gulf &c. R. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150; State v. Hammer, 42 N. J. L. 438; Appeal of Ayars, 122 Pa. St. 266; S. C., 16 Atl. Rep. 363. The courts determine whether the classification is arbitrary. Pell v. Newark, 40 N. J. L. 79; Connolly v. Pipe Co., supra; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366. Similar labor laws have been held unconstitutional. New York State v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 18; S. C., 59 N. E. Rep. 716; People v. Coler, 67 N. Y. Supp. 701. A municipal corporation in matters affecting its property and private contract rights enjoys practically the same immunity from legislative interference for the benefit of private corporations or individuals as is accorded to business corporations and private citizens. Board of Park Comrs. v. Detroit, 28 Michigan, 228; Citizens' Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 87 U. S. 655; People v. Batchellor, supra; Weismer v. Village of Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91; Board v. Blodgett, 155 Illinois, 441; 40 N. E. Rep. 1025; People v. Orange Co. Road Assn., 66 N. E. 895; Ohio, Cleveland v. Clement Bros., 65 N. E. Rep. 885, citing Palmer v. Tingle, 55 Ohio St. 425; 45 N. E. Rep. 313; Indiana, Street v. Varney Electrical Supply Co., 67 N. E. 129; California, In re Kubach, 85 California, 274; 24 Pac. Rep. 737; Illinois, Fiske v. People, 188 Illinois, 206; 58 N. E. Rep. 985, citing Ritchie v. People, 155 Illinois, 98; 40 N. E. Rep. 1028; United States v. Marshall, 94 U. S. 400; Washington, Seattle v. Smyth, 22 Washington, 327; 60 Pac. Rep. 1120; Nebraska, Low v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Nebraska, 127; 59 N. W. Rep. 362, citing Trumble v. Trumble, 37 Nebraska, 340; Colorado, In re Morgan, 58 Pac. Rep. 1071; In re Eight Hour Law, 21 Colorado, 29; 39 Pac. Rep. 328; Missouri, State v. Loomis, 155 Missouri, 307; 22 S. W. Rep. 350; Kansas, State v. Haun, 61 Kansas, 146; 59 Pac. Rep. 340. See Cooley's Const. Lim. 6th ed. 484. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 191 U. S. The courts of almost every State in the Union have united in declaring such legislation as is attempted in the act under consideration to be unconstitutional, vicious and void. In addition to the cases heretofore cited, see In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98; People v. Mark, 99 N. Y. 378; People v. Gilson, 109 N. Y. 389; Colon v. Lisk, 153 N. Y. 188; People v. Hawkins, 157 N. Y. 1; People ex rel. Tyroler v. Warden of City Prison, 157 N. Y. 116; People ex rel. Treat v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 144; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pennsylvania, 431; 6 Atl. Rep. 354; Bramley v. Norton, 5 Ohio N. P. 183; State v. Goodwill, 33 West Va. 179; 10 S. E. Rep. 285; State v. Fire Creek Co., 33 West Va. 188; 10 S. E. Rep. 288; Ramsey v. People, 142 Illinois, 380; Frorer v. People, 141 Illinois, 171; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Illinois, 66; 35 N. E. Rep. 62; Ritchie v. People, 155 Illinois, 98; Gillespie v. People, 58 N. W. Rep. 1007; In re Preston, 59 N. W. Rep. 109; Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Massachusetts, 1107; City of Denver v. Bach, 58 Pac. Rep. 1089. The Supreme Court of Kansas followed In re Dalton, 61 Kansas, 257; 59 Pac. Rep. 336. In this case as well as in that case there are flagrant errors. The statute is not a mere rule of procedure for the State or its municipalities but affects many persons who are in no sense the agents of the State or its municipalities. The statute was not to prevent cities abusing their power to improve streets and levy taxes, but to reduce the toil of certain laborers without reducing their pay. The State is not a person within the meaning of that word as used in the Fourteenth Amendment. The constitution of Kansas prevents the State from being a party in carrying on any works of internal improvement. As to this see Attorney General v. Pingree, 79 N. W. Rep. (Michigan) 814; People v. Board, 25 Michigan, 152. Employés of contractors are not employés of cities. United States v. Driscoll, 96 U. S. 421. Contracts for paving streets are matters pertaining to cities in their private corporate capacity. Commissioners v. Topeka, 39 Kansas, 197; Hari v. Ohio Township, 62 Kansas, 318. The duty to repair streets |