191 U. S. Argument for the United States. The offer of plaintiff in error to prove the probable use that the government would make of the lands sought to be taken, and the further offer to prove that the use of the land for military purposes would injure and diminish the value of his adjoining farms was properly overruled. The tract taken being a separate and independent holding, it would be improper to allow damages to the remaining and adjoining farms. Assuming that the land sought to be taken by the government is to be devoted to a perfectly harmless use, without causing any inconvenience or annoyance to neighboring land owners, to entitle an owner to recover damages to the whole tract, when a part of his lands has been taken, there must have been a unity of contiguous parcels. The land must have been together. All of it must have been used as a single tract. 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, p. 1166; Keithsburg, etc., R. R. Co. v. Henry, 79 Illinois, 290; Hunter v. Wisconsin, etc., R. R. Co., 61 Iowa, 716; Hartshorn v. Burlington, etc., R. R. Co., 52 Iowa, 613; Kansas City R. R. Co. v. Merrill, 25 Kansas, 421; Cedar Rapids, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ryan, 36 Minnesota, 546; Peck y. Superior Short Line Ry. Co., 36 Minnesota, 343; Wilmes v. Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Co., 29 Minnesota, 242; Minnesota Valley R. R. Co. v. Doran, 15 Minnesota, 230; Wyandotte, etc., R. R. Co. v. Waldo, 70 Missouri, 629; Parks v. Wisconsin Central R. R. Co., 33 Wisconsin, 413; Bigelow v. West Wisconsin R. R. Co., 27 Wisconsin, 478; Lincoln v. Commonwealth, 164 Massachusetts, 368, 379. The rule for measuring damages in the State of New Jersey is that when the whole property is taken, it is its market value, and when a part only is taken, it is the difference in the value before and after such taking, to be ascertained by the use to which such untaken part can be put. Henderson v. Orange, 9 N. J. L. 71; Butler Rubber Co. v. Newark, 61 N. J. L. 32; Currie v. Waverly, etc., R. Co., 52 N. J. L. 381. The evidence as to the use by the government of the lands taken was too vague and speculative to be received. It was Argument for the United States. 191 U. S. not founded upon any clear, certain, or avowed obnoxious uses to which the property in question was to be put. It has frequently been held in condemnation proceedings that the damages are to be assessed upon the basis that the work will be constructed and operated in a skillful and proper manner. Jones v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 68 Illinois, 380; Jackson v. Portland, 63 Maine, 65; Fremont, etc., R. R. Co. v. Whalen, 11 Nebraska, 585; Seltzler v. Pennsylvania, etc., R. R. Co., 112 Pa. St. 56; Neilson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 58 Wisconsin, 516; Wichita & W. R. R. Co. v. Kuhn, 38 Kansas, 104; Leavenworth, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hurley, 45 Kansas, 535; Blakely v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 25 Nebraska, 207; Stewart v. Rutland, 58 Vermont, 12; Lewis on Eminent Domain, vol. 2, ¶ 482, citing Union Springs v. Jones, 58 Alabama, 654; North Vernon v. Voegler, 103 Indiana, 314; Miller v. Keokuk & Des Moines Ry. Co., 63 Iowa, 680; Newgass v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 54 Arkansas, 140; Alloway v. City of Nashville, 88 Tennessee, 510; McGregor v. Equitable Gas Co., 139 Pa. St. 230; Denniston v. Philadelphia Co., 161 Pa. St. 41. The specific acts of users of the lands complained of not being actionable at common law if done by a neighboring landowner, damages could not be predicated upon such acts in these proceedings instituted by the government. Lincoln v. Commonwealth, 164 Massachusetts, 368; Titus v. Boston, 161 Massachusetts, 209; Bacon v. Boston, 154 Massachusetts, 100, 102; Caledonian Railway v. Ogilvy, 2 Macq. 229, 235; Ricket v. Metropolitan Railway, L. R. 2 H. L. 175, 187; Burwell v. Commissioners, 93 N. C. 73; Wehn v. Commissioners, 5 Nebraska, 494; Adams v. R. R. Co., 39 Minnesota, 286; Cameron v. Chicago &c. R. R. Co., 42 Minnesota, 75. Evidence of such acts of user by the government would not establish a taking of private property for public use within the meaning of the Constitution. Kaje v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 57 Minnesota, 422; Beseman v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 50 N. J. L. 235, 242; Decker v. Evansville, etc., Ry. Co., 133 Indiana, 493; Dunsmore v. Central Iowa Ry. Co., 72 Iowa, 182; Werges v. St. 191 U. S. Argument for the United States. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 35 La. Ann. 641; Baltimore & Potomac Ry. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U. S. 317, 331. Although this court sustained an award for damages in United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 472, it distinctly recognized in that case that there were many cases of injury resulting to adjacent property where no remedy exists against the United States. Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635; Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166; Eaton v. R. R. Co., 51 N. H. 504, 642; Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U. S. 161; Montana Co. v. St. Louis &c. Co., 152 U. S. 160; Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269; Marchant v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 153 U. S. 380; Meyer v. Richmond, 172 U. S. 82; Mills v. United States, 46 Fed. Rep. 738; Baltimore & Potomac R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 105 U. S. 328. The rule of damages in condemnation proceedings to adjacent and independent tracts of land is that where the government condemns a tract of land in its entirety, the owners of adjacent and independent tracts cannot be permitted to make proof of any damage or depreciation in value of their lands, no part of which is taken, either by reason of the taking or on account of the future uses to which the lands taken may be put by the government. If, however, in the future the government should devote the land to certain obnoxious uses, or to such a purpose as would result in the actual taking of the lands the landowner would have his remedy when such injury actually occurred. novo, The proceedings before the District Court was a trial de upon which the findings and awards of the commissioners could not properly be considered by the jury in determining the amount of damages. The appeal supersedes the award of the commissioners. Metler v. E. & A. R. R. Co., 37 N. J. L. 223; Henderson v. Orange City, 9 N. J. L. 71; Browning v. Camden & Woodbury R. Co., 3 Gr. Ch. 47; Johnson v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co., 45 N. J. Eq. 454; Waite v. Port Reading R. Co., 48 N. J. Eq. 346; Ringle v. Freeholders, 56 N. J. L. 661; Coyner v. Boyd, 55 Indiana, 166; McKinsey v. Bowman, 58 Indiana, 88; Bohr v. Neuenschwander, 120 Indiana, 449; Covey v. Swagger, 74 Indiana, 211; Winklemans v. Des Moines, etc., Ry. Co., 62 Iowa, 11; Seefeld v. Chicago Ry. Co., 67 Wisconsin, 96; Chicago Ry. Co. v. Broquit, 47 Kansas, 571; Daigneault v. Woonsocket, 18 R. I. 378. MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court. The questions to be reviewed by this court arise upon exceptions appearing in the record taken upon the decisions of the court in relation to the admissibility of evidence, and also to the charge of the court as to the proper items to be considered by the jury in arriving at their verdict. The errors assigned and upon which the argument was had in the Circuit Court of Appeals were twelve in number. They are in substance the same here. The first seven refer to the rejection of evidence in regard to offers to purchase the lands from the plaintiff in error. It was held by the trial court, in response to the proposal to give such evidence, that the plaintiff in error could not testify to different offers he had received to purchase the property for hotel, residential or amusement purposes, or for a ferry, or a railroad terminal, or to lease the property for hotel purposes. Upon principle, we think the trial court was right in rejecting the evidence. It is, at most, a species of indirect evidence of the opinion of the person making such offer as to the value of the land. He may have so slight a knowledge on the subject as to render his opinion of no value, and inadmissible for that reason. He may have wanted the land for some particular purpose disconnected from its value. Pure speculation may have induced it, a willingness to take chances that some new use of the land might in the end prove profitable. There is no opportunity to cross-examine the person making the offer, to show these various facts. Again, it is of a nature entirely too uncertain, shadowy and speculative to form any solid foundation for determining the value of the land which is sought to be taken in condemnation proceedings. If the offer were admissible, not only is it almost impossible to prove (if it exist) the lack of good faith in the person making the offer, but the circumstances of the parties at the time the offer was made as bearing upon the value of such offer may be very difficult, if not almost impossible, to show. To be of the slightest value as evidence in any court, an offer must, of course, be an honest offer, made by an individual capable of forming a fair and intelligent judgment, really desirous of purchasing, entirely able to do so, and to give the amount of money mentioned in the offer, for otherwise the offer would be but a vain thing. Whether the owner himself, while declining the offer, really believed in the good faith of the party making it and in his ability and desire to pay the amount offered, if such offer should be accepted, or whether the offer was regarded as a mere idle remark, not intended for acceptance, would also be material upon the question of the bona fides of the refusal. Oral and not binding offers are so easily made and refused in a mere passing conversation, and under circumstances involving no responsibility on either side, as to cast no light upon the question of value. It is frequently very difficult to show precisely the situation under which these offers were made. In our judgment they do not tend to show value, and they are unsatisfactory, easy of fabrication and even dangerous in their character as evidence upon this subject. Especially is this the case when the offers are proved only by the party to whom they are alleged to have been made, and not by the party making them. There is no chance to cross-examine as to the circumstances of the party making the offer in regard to good faith, etc. Evidence of this character is entirely different from evidence as to the price offered and accepted or rejected for articles which have a known and ready sale in the market. The price at the stock exchange of shares of stock in corporations which are there offered for sale or dealt in is some evidence of the value of such shares. So |