8 Wall. 168; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28, 45, and did not set it up. The general power of a State to restrict the right of a foreign corporation to sue in its courts is assumed in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 589-591. As to discrimination against non-residents, see Chemung Canal Bank v. Lowery, 93 U. S. 72.

The plaintiff lays great stress upon Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290. In that case suit was brought in Mississippi on a Kentucky judgment against a citizen of Mississippi upon a promissory note made in Mississippi and payable in New Orleans. A suit upon the note would have been barred by the Mississippi statute of limitations when the suit in Kentucky was begun, and the defendant set up a statute of Mississippi providing that no action should be maintained upon a judgment rendered in such circumstances without the State against a resident of the State. It was held that the statute was void, and that as the judgment was valid in Kentucky it could not be treated as invalid in Mississippi. It will be observed that this was a suit by a citizen. There was no suggestion that the statute went to the jurisdiction of the court. Obviously it did not. Indeed, the suit was brought in the United States Circuit Court. The statute made no discrimination in the right to come into court, according to the character of the plaintiff or of the cause of action, but attempted to create a defense against a plaintiff assumed to have a right to come into court and to invoke the jurisdiction. But when the plaintiff was in court and exhibited his judgment, it was too late for the State to interfere. In the case at bar the plaintiff had no right to come into the New York Supreme Court.

What, if any, limits there may be to state restrictions upon the jurisdiction of state courts, when such restrictions do not encounter article IV, section 2, of the Constitution, it is unnecessary to discuss. But we think it too plain for further argument that the New York restriction upon suits by foreign corporations against foreign corporations is not affected by either section 1 or section 2 of article IV. It will be time

enough to consider the suggestion that the law is an interference with interstate commerce, within Cooper Manuf. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727, 734, when the record presents it. The question is one of degree, and it is obvious that the supposed interference is very remote. See Diamond Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co., 187 U. S. 611, 616.

Judgment affirmed.

ANGLO-AMERICAN PROVISION CO. v. DAVIS PROVISION CO. No. 2.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

No. 63. Argued November 9, 1903.-Decided November 30, 1903.

When the Circuit Court has decided the question of its jurisdiction and the alleged unconstitutionality of a state law in favor of the plaintiff, but has decided against him on the merits, the plaintiff cannot appeal directly to this court under the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, § 5, for the purpose of a revision of the judgment on the merits.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Henry Wilson Bridges for appellant.

Mr. Frank E. Smith for appellee. Mr. Thomas F. Conway was on the brief.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court dismissing the plaintiff's bill. The bill is founded on the matters stated in the preceding case. It alleges that the Davis Provision Company recovered a judgment against the plaintiff, in New York, about a year and a half after the judgment recovered by the plaintiff against the Davis Provision Company in Illinois. It shows the effort of the plaintiff to recover in New

York on the Illinois judgment, and the action of the New York courts which we have reviewed. It alleges that the two judgments arose out of the same transaction, and that by reason of the New York decision the plaintiff is unable to set off the judgment against that obtained in New York by the defendant. It sets up the unconstitutionality of the New York statute, alleges the insolvency of the Davis Provision Company, and prays for a set-off of judgments. A demurrer to the bill was overruled, 105 Fed. Rep. 536, but on final hearing the bill was dismissed on the ground that the judgment in favor of the Davis Provision Company had been assigned to the defendant Weed, for value, and under such circumstances that it was not subject to the set-off claimed. The plaintiff appealed to this court.

It was admitted by the appellant, at the argument, that the plaintiff would fail on the merits if the preceding case should be decided as it has been. But we are precluded from an inquiry into the merits or even into the jurisdiction taken by the Circuit Court under Rev. Stat. §§ 1977, 1979, until the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the appeal is established. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Railway Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382.

Under the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 827, this must be maintained either as a case in which the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is in issue, or as a case in which the "law of a State is claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States." With regard to the former ground, the Circuit Court sustained the jurisdiction, and the case is disposed of by United States v. Jahn, 155 U. S. 109, 114, 115. "If the question of jurisdiction is in issue, and the jurisdiction sustained, and then judgment or decree is rendered in favor of the defendant on the merits, the plaintiff, who has maintained the jurisdiction, must appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, where, if the question of jurisdiction arises, the Circuit Court of Appeals may certify it." With regard to the latter ground, the decision of the Circuit Court again was in favor of the plain

tiff, and it has nothing of which to complain. "As a general rule the court will not allow a party to rely on anything as cause for reversing a judgment, which was for his advantage." Cited from Mr. Justice Curtis' dissent in the Dred Scott case, 19 How. 393, 566, in Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Railway Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 383. This remark, to be sure, is not strictly in point, as the plaintiff would not ask to have the judgment reversed on the ground that this New York law was constitutional. But it, with the quotation from United States v. Jahn, helps to indicate a principle to be applied to the construction of the words "in any case in which the constitution or law of a State is claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States." Those words are general in form, but they do not mean that whenever a party makes a case of that sort he may appeal directly to this court whenever the decision is against him, no matter on what grounds, although his contention about the state law is sustained. If a party comes into the Circuit Court alleging that a state law is unconstitutional, and the Circuit Court decides for him on that point, the mere fact that there was such a question in the case does not authorize him to appeal to this court on grounds that otherwise would not support an appeal. See Lampasas v. Bell, 180 U. S. 276. The present case illustrates the principle. The argument for the appellant is devoted not to any constitutional or jurisdictional point, but to an attempt to upset the decision of the Circuit Court upon the question, mainly of fact, as to the good faith, etc., of Weed in taking the assignment of the judgment. The provisions of § 5 of the act of 1891 were not intended to be made an instrument for such attempts.

Appeal dismissed.

191 U. S.

Argument for Appellant.

WISCONSIN AND MICHIGAN RAILWAY CO. v. POWERS.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN.

No. 77. Submitted November 13, 1903.-Decided November 30, 1903.

A provision in a general tax law that railroads thereafter building and operating a road north of a certain parallel shall be exempted from the tax for ten years, unless the gross earnings shall exceed a certain sum, is not addressed as a covenant to such railroads and does not constitute a contract with them, the obligations of which cannot be impaired consistently with the Constitution of the United States.

THE facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. Jesse B. Barton for appellant:

Under the constitution of the State of Michigan the Legislature has at all times had the power to exempt from taxation. This was expressly held by the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan in Board of Supervisors of Chippewa v. Auditor General, 65 Michigan, 408. The law which is attacked in this case was before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan in the case of Manistee & N. E. R. R. Co. v. Comrs. of R. R., 118 Michigan, 349, in which it was attacked solely on the ground that it was a violation of the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Michigan, prohibiting the passage of laws impairing the obligations of contracts; and while that court in that case held that the exemption was only a bounty and that it was, therefore, subject to repeal, it held that the exemption was good and that the right to it was vested until repealed and that the company was exempted from taxation until the act went into effect.

Section three of article three of an act to revise "An act to revise the laws providing for the incorporations of railroad companies and to regulate the running and management and to fix the duties and liabilities of all railroad and other corpo