Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 191 U.S. and injured while the car in which he was shipped was standing on the track of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company in the city of Philadelphia, it being run into by heavily laden cars. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the judgment was affirmed. 202 Pa. St. 222. Mr. John G. Johnson for plaintiff in error: The common law of the United States as interpreted by this court permits carriers, in the course of interstate commerce, in consideration of making a reduced rate, to limit their liability to a designated valuation. Hart v. P. R. R. Co., 112 U. S. 331, and cases cited, in which the rule is laid down which has been sustained by later decisions. Phanix Ins. Co. v. Erie & Western Transportation Co., 117 U. S. 312; Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phænix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397; New York &c. R. R. Co. v. Estill, 147 U. S. 591; Primrose v. West. Un. Tel., 154 U. S. 1; Chicago, Milwaukee &c. Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133; Calderon v. Atlas Steamship Co., 170 U. S. 272; and Queen of the Pacific, 180 U. S. 49. In reaching its conclusion, this court interpreted the common law of the United States as the same exists in every State, including the State of Pennsylvania. West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 181 U. S. 101. A contract for an interstate transportation, especially one valid where made, is not subject to inconsistent public policies nor to any other public policy than that of the United States. Morgan v. New Orleans &c. R. R. Co., 2 Woods, 244; S. C., 17 Fed. Cas. 754, cited in Liverpool Co. v. Phænix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, and see Hale v. Navigation Co., 15 Connecticut, 538. There is no public policy such as was supposed to exist by the learned trial judge. This court has so held and the courts of Pennsylvania have refused to enforce contracts exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Federal laws, and which, under such laws, are valid. If, therefore, a public policy in any State interferes with interstate commerce it must yield to the superior rights of those interested in the latter. Though such public 191 U. S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. policy may control commerce within the State, it is utterly inefficacious as regards commerce between the States. The bill of lading in the present case was an entire contract stipulating for an entire transportation from one State to another, though performable at different points by different connecting carriers. It could not be held valid in one part and invalid in another, inasmuch as one consideration was paid for the whole service. The shipper received in New York, for the transportation through New York, a benefit which, under the laws of New York, resulted from the contract. This consideration sustained the contract in all its parts. An entire contract is not subject to several inconsistent public policies. A state law or state policy which interferes with or regulates interstate commerce, is void because it is exclusively within the power of Congress to regulate such commerce and such power has been exercised by the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. A State cannot interfere, whether by an act passed before the Interstate Commerce Act, or thereafter, or by its so-called common law, or by its so-called public policy. If there is any public policy of Pennsylvania which condemns the contract, it cannot be one found in the common law of the United States. This court has so said. It must be the result of something peculiar to the law of Pennsylvania. The purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and as amended was to compel the exaction of reasonable rates; to bring about shipments connectedly and continuously from one State to another; to bring about by agreements between the carriers the establishment of joint rates; to compel the publication of such joint rates for through traffic; and to prohibit departures from the rates as published. See original act 24 Stats. U. S. 379, 382, and amendments, 25 Stat. 855, 856. No State could prescribe to a common carrier engaged in interstate transportation its rates for such transportation. It can compel neither the raising nor the lowering of the same. It necessarily raises the rate of interstate carriage if it deprives VOL. CXCI-31 Argument for Defendants in Error. 191 U.S. the carrier and shipper of the ability to make bargains upon terms mutually satisfactory, which bring about a reduction of the cost of transportation. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485; Wabash &c. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 572, and cases cited; C. C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514. A state statute, valid before an act of Congress, must yield to the latter. Kaukauna Co. v. Green Bay &c. Canal, 142 U. S. 254. The Federal question involved in this appeal is properly raised upon the record. M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Elliott, 184 U. S. 533, and cases cited; Sully v. Am. Nat. Bank, 178 U. S. 298; Erie R. R. Co. v. Purdy, 185 U. S. 153; Fire Assn. v. New York, 119 U. S. 110, 115; Jacobi v. Alabama, 187 U. S. 133; Home for Incurables v. New York, 187 U. S. 155; Detroit &c. Ry. Co. v. Osborn, 189 U. S. 383; Kaukauna Co. v. Canal, 142 U. S. 254, and cases cited p. 269. Mr. A. S. L. Shields for defendants in error: This court has no jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The Federal question was not raised on the trial and the Supreme Court of the State never considers questions not raised on the trial. Walls v. Campbell, 125 Pennsylvania, 346; Hartley v. Decker, 89 Pennsylvania, 470; Bank v. Schuylkill Co., 190 Pennsylvania, 188. The jurisdiction of this court to review the judgment of the highest court of a State is purely statutory, and will in all cases be strictly confined to questions arising under the provisions of section 709 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. Beals v. Cone, 188 U. S. 184; Hamblin v. Western Land Co., 147 U. S. 531, and cases cited; New Orleans W. W. Co. v. Louisiana, 185 U. S. 336; Equitable Life v. Brown, 187 U. S. 308; San José Land Co. v. San José Ranch Co., 189 U. S. 177; Onandago Nation v. Thacher, 189 U. S. 306. Nothing in the rule of Pennsylvania law applied in this case justifies the assumption that it interferes with or regulates interstate commerce. 191 U. S. Argument for Defendants in Error. The rule of Pennsylvania law applied here is that the policy of her laws prohibits a corporation created by her and transacting the business of a common carrier within her borders from limiting its liability for negligence by any form of contract, and that this rule will be applied by Pennsylvania courts to a contract made by a Pennsylvania corporation through an agent in another State. Forepaugh v. Delaware &c. R. Co., 128 Pennsylvania, 217, 230; Fairchild v. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 148 Pennsylvania, 527, as explained in the opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the case at bar. Hart v. P. R. R. Co., 112 U. S. 331, not applicable. The Federal power to regulate interstate commerce, however absolute and exclusive, is not a complete denial of the power of a State to control its own corporations engaged in interstate commerce. Many state laws in the nature of police regulations of such corporations have been sustained, although it was admitted that such laws had an incidental effect upon interstate commerce. A state statute prohibiting a corporation from exempting itself from liability as a common carrier by any form of contract, has been sustained as not amounting to a regulation of interstate commerce, and as within the power of the State to adopt, in spite of its incidental effect upon interstate commerce. Chicago, Milwaukee &c. Ry. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, and cases cited. The case just cited has been affirmed several times. Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Patterson Tobacco Co., 169 U. S. 311, 315; Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 627; Calderon v. Atlas Steamship Co., 170 U. S. 272, 282; Lake Shore, etc., Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 296; Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514, 517. The alleged right to sue out a writ or error in this court depended upon the existence of a Federal question, which was decided adversely to the appellant by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Since no such Federal question arose in the case, this court will decline to interfere with the policy of Pennsylvania law as declared by the highest court of that State. Appellant only has succeeded in showing that a conflict exists in the policy of the law administered by two separate tribunals, each of which is supreme within its own sphere and has failed entirely in the effort to show that he has any standing in this court. The appellant cannot import a Federal question into the facts of this case by arguments drawn from "the common law of the United States" which is said to promulgate "the public policy of the United States." The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has respectfully asserted its right to an independent opinion upon the rule laid down in Hart v. P. R. R. Co., 112 U. S. 331; Grogan v. Adams Express Co., 114 Pennsylvania, 523, 528. MR. JUSTICE DAY, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. The right to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania herein depends upon the proper assertion of a right or privilege under the Federal Constitution or statutes which was denied to the plaintiff in error by the adverse holding of the state court. Upon the trial in the Common Pleas Court, it was contended that the special contract above recited limited the recovery of the plaintiff to the sum of one hundred dollars. The court refused to so charge, but, holding that the policy and law of Pennsylvania, as declared by her courts of last resort, did not permit such limitations on the liability of common carriers, left to the jury to determine the value of the horse and the question of the negligence of the defendant. In view of being carried to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, two errors were assigned to the refusal of the court to charge: "1. That it was lawful in the State of New York for the carrier to limit its liability by a special contract for an injury resulting from its negligence; that said contract having been |