Rudyard Kipling's immortal proposition: "East is East and West is West and never the train shall meet" is most appropriate at this stage in Guam's quest for a new political status. Inspite of Delegate Ben Blaz's valiant efforts to get a large number of non-interior Committee members of Congress to COsponsor the proposed Guam Commonwealth Act, it is not likely that HR-98 (or the Senate version S-317) will emerge out of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee in its present form. The testimony presented by the Guam Delegation headed by Governor Joseph Ada, and the differing comments of the Bush Administration representatives, to the Subcommittee on Insular and International Affairs at the Honolulu hearings on December 1112, 1989 demonstrate that the gulf and issues that separate Guam from Washington have not been narrowed much less bridged. In short, Guam and the Federal Government officials are still singing different tunes and from different sheet music. First of all, the decision of the Commission on SelfDetermination to hold a plebiscite on the draft Commonwealth Act (CA) before the concerned committees of Congress have had the opportunity to express their collective views was a serious error in judgment. Many felt, including this writer (Guam Tribune, 7/14/87), that to imbue the draft Commonwealth Act with a VOX POPULI seal of approval will not mitigate the risk of a (355) Page 2 congressional rejection of some sections of the proposed Act. Since there is little doubt that HR-98 as presently drafted will not be passed by Congress, this raises the question whether the Commission on Self-Determination (CSD) has the authority to unilaterally make changes in the draft Commonwealth Act without another plebiscite. The plebiscite as had been alluded to before August 8, 1987, was akin to playing the Russian Roulett. (Guam Tribune, 7/14/87). Second, and more important to Guam, the CSD also erred in accepting the so-called legislative route toward achieving Commonwealth government instead of the negotiated covenant approach envisioned in Concurrent Resolution 131 introduced by Delegate Antonio Won Pat on May 25, 1983. (PDN/Voice 3/20/87). As it is now, members of the CSD have no control of the draft Commonwealth Act once it is introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives. To be sure, they can recommend amendments, but they can't delete amendments offered by others or rewrite the bill, only members of the committee can. For all practical purposes, then, the members of the Guam CSD have assumed the role of being petitioners seeking redress of grievances instead of being active and equal partners in the political status process. As for its relation with the administration, CSD has also been reduced to a mere conduit of information between Guam and Washington. The risk for Guam is that the Congress in working its legislative will could conceivably, though not very likely, Page 3 approve a Guam Commonwealth Act that bears little resemblance to the draft Act (PDN/Voice 12/22/87) that had been introduced by Delegate Blaz at the request of the CSD. What is needed now is to prevent the process from getting mired in rhetoric borne out of past misguided policies of the Federal Government. Similarly, the Bush Administration needs to refrain from erecting legal barriers that have no historic foundation or relevance to the national interest. inescapable policy question that needs to be dealt with remains: How do we reconcile the need to maintain military capability in the Pacific, and at the same time allow our pacific off-shore territories maximum self-government? The Guam's delegation based their case on the historical hypothesis that the rights of people to determine their own political future is rooted in the liberal declared in the American Revolution of 1776. democratic values Indeed it can be argued that the Chamorros were not consulted during the negotiations that preceded the signing on December 10, 1989 of the United States by Spain. In (Paris) was somewhat arbitrary. the Protocol that ceded Guam to this sense the Treaty of Peace But, at this point in time it is a bit tardy and somewhat frivolous to argue that the people of Guam were ruled for 91 years without their consent. The fact is that the overwhelming popular desire expressed in the 1976 referendum and subsequent referenda were for closer ties with the United States. Whether Page 4 the CSD in writing the present draft Commonwealth Act remained faithful to this mandate is a subject for another essay. In any case, the people in a plebiscite on August 8, 1987 did approve the draft Commonwealth Act, and it would be a serious mistake for Washington to dismiss the latest popular action or to continue to take the people of Guam for granted. Governor Joseph Ada, like his two predecessors, Governors Paul Calvo and Ricky Bordallo, correctly represented the sentiments and aspirations of the majority of people on Guam. But it was clear from the moment the first unofficial draft Commonwealth Act wa circulated in Washington in early 1984 (Guam Tribune, 3/9/84) that major changes in the draft Act were needed in order to gain Washington's support. Inspite of the many "red flags" and numerous warnings, including Delegate Blaz's "fatally flawed" admonition for which he was roundly and unfairly criticized, the Bordallo administration followed by Governor Joseph Ada decided to press forward with the "kitchen sink" approach toward Commonwealth government. leadership cannot be faulted entirely for pursuing a home rule with a broad brush. Both Bordallo and Ada were at the Albuquerque meeting on December 7, 1983 with then ranking minority member of the Interior Committee, Representative Manuel Lujan, Jr., when they were encouraged to include in the draft commonwealth legislation everything including the "kitchen sink". In fairness, however, immediately following the Albuquerque However, the Guam Page 5 meeting, Mr. Lujan expressed his concern to Matt Mygatt of the Associated Press "about making promises of Commonwealth status to promises Congress might change. I am concerned Mr. Lujan's warnings was prophetic. Guamanians - about their expectations." Indeed, if one objectively reviews the history and contributions of the Executive Branch toward the constitutional The former developments of the territories, the complaints of territorial officials evoked sympathy. Most of the major policy changes benefiting Guam, beginning with the Organic Act, the elective governorship and the Delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives were acts initiated by the Congress. Regrettably, there are still people in Washington who feel that "political status discussions" is an anathema. Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Territorial and International Affairs (OTIA), Richard Montoya, in his letter to then Delegate Antonio Won Pat dated November 21, 1983, underscore this attitude. The problems remains the immense vagaries that exist in Washington's attitude toward the political status issues for Guam. For the administration to suddenly assert that "self-determination cannot mean the right for Guam to determine the terms of that relationship unilaterally." is lacking in candor. The interest of the Federal Government in political status discussions with Guam have been cyclical and, more often than not, ambivalent. (Guam Tribune, 7/17/87). For |