when a bankruptcy had been declared in any country there could be no other, though that view raised difficult questions as to the law of the distribution of the assets. Then another view was that every other country except that of the domicile of the debtors must give way to the jurisdiction of the country of their domicile; but then that view raised questions as to their domicile, as to which there was in this case no evidence to determine it, though, apparently,. it was not a domicile in France. The only view on which the application could be put could not be sustained. He concurred, therefore, in the conclusion that the application must be refused.

This was an action by Madame Tussaud and Sons (Limited) against Mr. Louis J. Tussaud, in which the plaintiffs sought to restrain the defendant from registering a new company under the name of "Louis Tussaud (Limited)," or any other name so nearly resembling the name of the plaintiff company as to be calculated or likely to mislead or deceive the public into the belief that the new company was the same as the plaintiff company; and from issuing advertisements, circulars, or prospectuses representing that a company was to be incorporated under the name of "Louis Tussaud (Limited)," or any such other name as aforesaid; and from carrying on or commencing any business similar to the business of the plaintiff company under the name of " Louis Tussaud (Limited)," or any such other name as aforesaid. The business of the plaintiffs consisted in carrying on the well-known exhibition of waxworks, founded as long ago (according to one witness) as 1802 by Madame Tussaud, and continued by lineal descendants of hers down to 1889, when it was sold to a Mr. Poyser, who has transferred it to the plaintiff company; and it did not appear that at the present moment any member of the Tussaud family was interested in the business. The evidence showed that the plaintiffs' exhibition, though perhaps most commonly refrerred to as "Madame Tussaud's," " is still not unfrequently spoken of as "Tussaud's only. The defendant, Louis Joseph Kenny Tussaud, is a young man in his 23d year, and the son of Joseph Randle Tussaud, who with his brothers formerly carried on in Baker-street and Marylebone-road the exhibition now belonging to the plaintiffs. According to his own evidence, he had learned the business under his father, and had assisted him in the modelling department from the time when he was 13 years of age up to 1881, when the business was sold; and he had himself modelled a number of the figures now exhibited by the plaintiffs, and amongst them "the well-known figures of Baker, Pigott, Connell, Lipski, Sir C. Dilke, the present Pope, and Cardinal Manning." He had for some months past been negotiating for a company to erect a building and open an exhibition of waxworks, of which he was to have the management. This, he said, was a matter of public notoriety, and he had early in the present year succeeded in his object, and a company had been formed whose prospectus had been recently issued. He had arranged with this company

to pay all advertising and other expenses up to allotment, and neither he nor the directors of the company had the slightest intention of endeavouring to mislead the public, and, in fact, in the prospectus they had disclaimed all connexion with the plaintiff company. The prospectus itself stated that the new company was "formed for the purpose of introducing to the Westend of London a new exhibition, similar in many respects to, but having no connexion with, the one so long and successfully carried on in Baker-street and Marylebone-road." The site of the proposed new exhibition was in Shaftesbury-avenue, facing the Loadon Pavilion and Trocadero Music-halls, and between the Lyric Theatre and Piccadilly. The name of the new company was to be "Louis Tussaud (Limited)," and the defendant's name appeared on the front sheet of it as general manager, where it was given as Louis Tussaud. The memorandum of associa tion of the new company was dated March 12, 1890. It stated that the objects of the company were-(a) to undertake and carry on the business of a waxwork exhibition, and it combined there with a great number of other objects which were more or less auxiliary thereto. It stated that the capital of the company was £100,000 in 100,000 shares of £1 each, and it was signed by the requisite number of seven persons, one of them being the defendant, each of whom subscribed for one share. On the formation of the company three contracts were entered into, two of which were dated the 6th of March, 1890, and were made between Mr. Harry Smith and the defendant, and thereby Smith agreed to sell the site of the proposed exhibition in Shaftesbury-avenue, and to erect the necessary buildings. The third contract was dated March 8, 1890, and was made between the defendant and one Austin, who was a trustee for the new company, and thereby Austin, on behalf of the company, agreed to purchase the benefit of the previous agreement for £7,500, £3,000 of which was to be paid in cash and £2,500 in fully paid-up shares, which were to be issued to the defendant or his nominees, and it was further agreed that the company should not proceed to allotment unless 60,000 shares were applied for by March 24; that the defendant should be the manager of the company for the period of seven years, and should perform the duties of a wax-modeller, and be paid a salary of £200; he was also to have 5 per cent. upon the profits of the exhibition, and he bound himself not to model any wax figures for any other company. The plaintiffs contended that the business which the defendant proposed to start was exactly similar to that carried on by themselves, that the name of the new company so nearly resembled that of the old as to be calculated to deceive within the meaning of section 20 of the Companies Act, 1862, and that upon that ground, as well as under the general principles acted upon by the Court in such cases, they were entitled to the relief they claimed. On behalf of the defendant it was argued that the names were not so similar as to be likely to deceive, and that the defendant was by right entitled to carry on in his own name a business in which he had been engaged all his life. There was a great deal of conflicting evidence directed, on the one hand, to show that there would and, on the other, that there would not be any likelihood of the public being deceived into thinking that the new company was the same as the old.

Sir Horace Davey, Q.C., Mr. Buckley, Q.C., and Mr. Wace appeared for the plaintiffs; and Mr. Graham Hastings, Q.C., Mr. A. à B. Terrell, and Mr. H. P. Wilkinson for the defendant.

At the conclusion of the arguments on March 28 the Court reserved judgment.

MR. JUSTICE STIRLING this morning delivered

judgment, and, after stating the facts of the case, said-It appears from the contracts entered into on the formation of the company that the interest of the defendant in the company is twofold—(1) he is to be the recipient of 2,500 fully paid-up shares, and (2) he is to act as manager and modeller of the company, being in that respect the paid servant of the company, whose orders he is bound to obey. Up to the present time, so far as appears, he has not carried on any exhibition business upon his own account, nor any business in connexion with the plaintiffs' exhibition except that of modeller. It cannot be doubted, as it seems to me, that the name of "Tussaud" is well known and of high reputation in connexion with waxworks, and that if another exhibition of a similar nature to the plaintiffs' were to be established in London under the defendant's name the one would in the ordinary course of human affairs be likely to be confounded with the other, and visitors from the country who have heard of the plaintiffs' establishment would be likely to be misled into going to the other. If persons not bearing the name of Tussaud and deriving no title from any one bearing that name were to seek to establish under the name of Louis Tussaud a company such as is promoted by the defendant, I think that the natural result of their carrying on business under that name would be to mislead people who were desirous of visiting the plaintiffs' exhibition into going to theirs, and that the persons so doing ought, on the principles laid down in "Hendricks v. Montagu" (17 Ch.D., 638), to be restrained by an injunction similar to that granted in that case. The question which I have to decide is whether the defendant, bearing as he does the name of Tussaud, is equally liable to be so restrained. The principles on which the Court acts are laid down in "Burgess v. Burgess" (3 D. M. and G., 896, 904), where Lord Justice Turner says :—** No man can have any right to represent his goods as the goods of another person, but in applications of this kind it must be made out that the defendant is selling his own goods as the goods of another. Where a person is selling goods under a particular name, and another person, not having that name, is using it, it may be presumed that he so uses it to represent the goods sold by himself as the goods of the person whose name he uses; but where the defendant sells goods under his own name, and it happens that the plaintiff has the same name, it does not follow that the defendant is selling his goods as the goods of the plaintiff. It is a question of evidence in each case whether there is a false representation or not." That statement of the law was cited and approved of by the Court of Appeal in "Turton v. Turton " (42 Ch. Div., 128). It follows from the decisions in those cases that the defendant is at perfect liberty to open on his own account and carry on in his own name an exhibition of waxworks. Further, he may take partners into his business and carry it on under the name of Louis Tussaud and Co. Having commenced business on his own account, I apprehend that he might sell it, with the benefit of the goodwill, to third parties, and that these third parties might, if they thought fit, continue to carry on the business under the same name-that of the defendant. They, again, might transfer the business and goodwill to a joint stock company, though I do not express a final opinion to that effect; and I am not prepared to say that that company might not be registered under the same name as had previously been used in connexion with the business. But that is not the present case. On the other hand, I conceive it to be clear that the defendant could not, either for valuable consideration or otherwise, confer on another person the right to use the name of Tussaud in connexion with a business which the defendant had never No. 22. VOL. VI.

carried on and in which the defendant had no interest whatever. Then comes the question, Can he confer his right on a person or company towards which he stands simply in the position of a paid servant? He can, no doubt, confer the right of saying that the business is under his management, but could he go to A. B. and say to him :-" I will become your servant as manager and modeller for seven years, and you shall carry on the business (which is not to be mine but yours) by my name "? Does it make any difference that, instead of going to a private individual, he invites the public to become proprietors of a business upon like terms? On this question there is some authority. In "Massam v. Thorley's Cattle Food Company (14 Ch.D., 748) a person named Thorley manufactured cattle food according to & recipe which he had obtained, and sold it under the name of "Thorley's Food for Cattle." Upon his death the plaintiffs succeeded to his business and continued it, and shortly afterwards the defendant

company was registered as a limited company, with a capital of £200, divided into 4,000 shares of 1s. each. The articles provided that the directors were to enter into an arrangement with a brother of the plaintiffs' predecessor in title, who had become acquainted with the secret of the manufacture, for the purchase of that secret and for his employment in the business of the company. The decision was not given in this simple state of facts; but Lord Justice James observes on it as follows :

The name of the company is, to my mind, a fiction. The meaning which the name of 'J. W. Thorley and Co. (Limited) ' would convey to any person's mind is that there had been a partnership of J. W. Thorley and Co., a real partnership, which had been carrying on business in the manufacture of this food for cattle, and that for some reason or other, such as we have seen constantly in our experience in this Court, the partnership had been minded to convert itself into a limited company for the more convenient transaction of its business. But here J. W. Thorley was not a partner. J. W. Thorley was employed as an agent, as the manager, and J. W. Thorley's only connexion with the company, quá company, is that he had a 1s. share in this company. To my mind that is the same thing as if somebody were to get up a brewery at Burton, finding somebody of the name of Bass, or somebody who would take the name of Bass (for there is no law to prevent a man assuming any name he likes), and then get a company registered under the name of J. Bass and Co. (Limited),' or W. Bass and Co. (Limited),' and advertise Bass and Co.'s Pale Ale.' I really can see no distinction between Bass and Co.'s Pale Ale,' as advertised by such a company, and Thorley's Food for Cattle,' advertised by the company now before us, which has procured a person of the name of Thorley to be connected with their company."

6

It seems to me that here, in like manner, the name of the company represents that which is not true in fact. There never has been any business carried on by Louis Tussaud under the name of Tussaud of which he has been the proprietor, and I think that in accordance with the first of the two propositions laid down by Lord Justice Turner it ought to be presumed, primâ facie, that the object of the defendant and the proposed company is to induce the world to believe that the business intended to be carried on is that of the plaintiffs, or a branch of it. It is said that the prospectus plainly states on the face of it that the new exhibition has no connexion with the plaintiffs'. That is true, and the statement would be a complete answer to a person who complained that he had been misled into taking shares in the new company on the faith

39

that it was connected with the plaintiffs'; but is it an answer to the plaintiffs' complaint, that the natural result of their intended acts will be to induce the public at large to suppose that their business is that of the plaintiffs? If the defendant had written to a Mr. Brown, saying "the business you propose to carry on will have no connexion with that in the Maryleboneroad,' and Mr. Brown had replied of course not,' none the less would the defendant be liable to be restrained. I think, therefore, an injunction ought to be granted in similar terms to that in "Hendricks v. Montagu (17 Ch. Div., 638)-that is to say, to restrain the defendant until trial or further order from registering under the Companies Act any company to be incorporated under the name of "Louis Tussaud (Limited)," or any other name likely to mislead or deceive the public into the belief that the new company is the same as the plaintiff company, and to further restrain him in the terms of the present application. [Solicitors-E. J. and H. Landon; Terrell, Atkinson, and Winstanley.]

"The

This case raised a question as to the liability of a journalist for republication of a libel he has published in other papers. The plaintiffs were the proprietors of an entertainment known as Wild American Company," being an exhibition of scenes from Western American life, and they complained that the defendant, the London publisher of the New York Herald, had, in November, published a paragraph reflecting upon their exhibition, and the statement of the plaintiffs' case contained this passage - The defendant well knew that the words so published by him would be, and they in fact were, repeated and published in editions of the newspaper published in France and other countries." And it was further stated that by reason of these publications the reputation of the exhibition had been injured, and its prospects of success in this country had been prejudiced, and the plaintiffs claimed £10,000 damages. The Judge at Chambers had struck out the paragraph above cited, because he thought the republication could not be given as evidence. The plaintiffs appealed.

Mr. H. REED appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs in support of the appeal, and urged that the statements objected to were material as to damages and whether or not the republication was itself a cause of action, yet if it enhanced the damages it was at least admissible in evidence; and the defendant had the advantage of being informed that it was to be relied upon at the trial.

Mr. J. E. BANKES, on the part of the defendant, argued that the Judge's order, striking out the paragraph, was right.

The COURT came to the conclusion that the paragraph had been wrongly struck out, and must be restored.

MR. BARON HUDDLESTON, in giving judgment, said it could not be doubted that evidence of the republications mentioned could be given in evidence, and the rule could not be better stated than by Mr. Odger

*Reported by W. F. FINLASON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

in his book on the law of libel, p. 168 :-" Where there is evidence that the defendant, though he spoke only to A, intended and desired that he should repeat his words, the defendant is liable for all the consequences of A's repetition of the slander." If then, the republication would be admissible in evidence, then the fact might be stated on the part of the plaintiff. The appeal, therefore, must be allowed.

MR. JUSTICE VAUGHAN WILLIAMS concurred, and observed that it was clear that the republications must have been contemplated by the defendant. Appeal accordingly allowed.

[Solicitor for the plaintiffs, T. Duerdin Dutton; Solicitors for the defendant, Lewis and Lewis.]

This was an appeal against the refusal of a Divisional Court (consisting of the Lord Chief Justice and Lord Justice Fry) to allow the service of notice of the writ in the action out of the jurisdiction. The case is reported in ante p. 225. The question was whether the breach of contract in respect of which the plaintiffs desired to sue had taken place in this country or in Holland, out of the jurisdiction of the Court. Rule 1 of Order XI. of the Rules of Court of 1883 provides that "Service out of the jurisdiction of a writ of summons, or notice of a writ of summons, may be allowed by the Court or a Judge whenever" (inter alia) (e) the action is founded on any breach or alleged breach within the jurisdiction of any contract, wherever made, which, according to the terms thereof, ought to be performed within the jurisdiction, unless the defendant is domiciled or ordinarily resident in Scotland or Ireland." The defendant company carry on business at Rotterdam, and the contract on which the action was to be founded was for the supply by them to the plaintiffs of 5,200 tons of "* moss litter," which is used as litter for horses and cattle. The contract was entered into in August last, at Rotterdam, verbally between a member of the plaintiffs' firm and the defendant company. It was afterwards confirmed by the following letter, dated August 21, written by the defendants to the plaintiffs :

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"We hereby confirm having sold to you 5,200 tons of moss litter, to be shipped 100 tons a week, from October 1, 1889, till September 30, 1890, in two shipments of about 50 tons per week, at the price of 22s. 9d. c.i.f." (i.c., cost, insurance, and freight paid), "London, Thames; either fibrous or non-fibrous peat; bales of about 3cwt. or 2cwt.; peat to be in good and marketable condition. Payment against one month's acceptance from month following delivery. Bills of lading to be made up and paid for in accordance with Rotterdam weights. We give you the option to send that peat where you like it; and if not for London, Thames, we will charge you 15s. 9d. f.o.b. Rotter dam. In the event that we make contracts at lower figures for supply the whole year round, we will reduce to you accordingly."

The action was for non-delivery of the stuff. On an cx parte application in Chambers Mr. Baron Pollock gave leave to the plaintiffs to serve notice of the writ upon the defendants in Holland. The defendants applied to the Divisional Court to set aside this order and

the service of notice effected under it, on the ground that upon the true construction of the contract it was to be performed by delivery of the stuff to the plaintiffs at Rotterdam, and that consequently the breach of contract had taken place there, and there had not been any breach within the jurisdiction, and the rule did not apply. The Divisional Court set aside the order. The Lord Chief Justice held that leave to serve out of the jurisdiction ought not to be given unless it was clear that there had been a breach within the jurisdiction. He was inclined to think that the contract was for delivery at Rotterdam, but, at any rate, it was not clear that there had been a breach within the jurisdiction. Lord Justice Fry concurred, being more strongly inclined to the opinion that the breach of contract took place at Rotterdam. The plaintiffs appealed.

Mr. Winch, Q.C., Mr. Ruegg, and Mr. Clarence Hamlyn were for the plaintiffs; Mr. Channell, Q.C., and Mr. Macaskie were for the defendants.

The COURT dismissed the appeal.

LORD JUSTICE COTTON said that the case turned upon Rule 1 (e) of Order XI. Ile doubted the propriety of serving foreigners out of the jurisdiction unless the case came clearly within the rule. Indeed, he doubted the policy of serving persons who were not British subjects out of the jurisdiction at all. But that view had been departed from. In his opinion, leave to serve notice of the writ out of the jurisdiction ought not to have been given in the present case. There was a great deal in the contract in favour of the view that the breach had been committed out of the jurisdiction. The provision as to the insurance had an important bearing on the question. If the buyers were not interested in the safety of the goods during the voyage, such a provision would not Le inserted in the contract. If the sellers had not performed their contract by putting the goods on board the ship, they would, in the event of the goods being lost on the voyage, le bound to supply other goods to the buyers. In his Lordship's opinion, the general tenour of the contract was against the view that the delivery was to be in England. The words "to be in good and marketable condition" pointed to the condition of the litter when it was shipped, and the clause" paid for in accordance with Rotterdam weights" meant, his Lordship thought, weights at Rotterdam.' In his opinion there was not sufficient to show that the breach was necessarily within the jurisdiction. The contract pointed the other way, and the appeal must fail.

LORD JUSTICE LINDLEY concurred. The more the letter of August 21 was studied, the more, he thought, it showed that the vendors would perform their contract when the litter was shipped at Rotterdam. There were several indications in the letter that that was the right view, and the more the letter was looked at the more did the difficulties in its construction vanish.

[Solicitors-Vallance and Vallance; John Green

ordering the plaintiff, who was an undischarged bankrupt, to give security for costs, or in the alternative that the trustee should be joined. The case raised an important question as to whether an undischarged bankrupt can sue without giving security for costs. The matter came before Mr. Justice Lawrance in Chambers, who referred it to the Court.

Mr. Lynch appeared for the appellant; Mr. Yelverton for the respondent.

MR. JUSTICE VAUGHAN WILLIAMS. in delivering judgment, said the order of the Master was wrong. Where a plaintiff is an undischarged bankrupt, suing in respect of a cause of action subsequent to the bankruptcy, the plaintiff cannot be called upon to give security for costs or to join his trustee. The Common Law Procedure Act only applied to a cause of action which had accrued before the bankruptcy ("Stanton v. Collier," 23 L.J.B., 116). He is not a nominal plaintiff if he sues in respect of a cause of action accrued pending the bankruptcy. If the action had not been brought before the bankruptcy the 142d section does not apply. "Herbert v. Sayer' ?? (5 A. and E., 965) decided that to plead bankruptcy alone is not a good plea; and that unless the trustee interferes, the bankrupt has a good cause of action and is entitled to suc. In Buchan v. Hill" (W. N. (88), p. 233), Mr. Justice North held that an undischarged bankrupt could sue without his trustec, and that unless there was some suggestion that the action was brought on behalf of the trustee the undischarged bankrupt need not give security for costs. Again, if Lord Justice Bowen's judgment in Rhodes v. Dawson " (16 Q.B.D., 548) is looked at, it is clear that the rule as to the security for costs only applies when the plaintiff is a mere nominal plaintiff. In a case like the present the bankrupt's position is much like that of an agent who has made himself liable for an undisclosed principal. He has a right to sue, subject to the right of the principal to intervene. The appeal, therefore, succeeds with costs.

MR. JUSTICE LAWRANCE concurred.

[Solicitor for Cook, Arthur Crowther; Solicitor for Whellock, G. A. Hall,

This case raised a question of great importance to vendors of books or newspapers, with reference to their responsibilities for libels which may happen to be in the books or papers which they sell. It was an action against the well-known house of W. H. Smith and Son for libel in the London edition of the New York Herald. The plaintiff, formerly an Army agent, complained that on the 25th of October last the defendants" falsely and maliciously published of him in the London edition of that paper a paragraph which was libellous." They pleaded that they are book. sellers and news vendors, carrying on such business on a very extensive scale at No. 186, Strand, and at branches at Birmingham, Liverpool, and Manchester. and upwards of 500 railway stations in the United Kingdom. Their servants, in the course of their employment in their business, received the newspaper

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*Reported by W. F. FINLASON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

mentioned from the publishers thereof, and it was thereupon sold by them in the ordinary course of their business, and without any knowledge of its contents, which is the alleged publication. None of the defendants nor their servants knew at the time they sold it that the newspaper contained any libel on the plaintiff; it was not by negligence on the part of the defendants or their servants that they did not know that there was any libel in the newspaper, nor did they know that it was of such a character that it was likely to contain libellous matter, nor ought they to have known it; wherefore they say that they never published the alleged libel." This defence was founded on the law recognized a century ago by Lord Mansfield, in the case of Aimon, that, though a bookseller may be prima facie liable for a libel in a book or pamphlet he sells, he may show that, in fact, he did not know of the publication-law lately recognized by the Court of Appeal in a case of "Emmens v. Pottle and Sons" (16 Q.B.D., 354; 2 The Times L. R., 115)— a case similar to the present, and in which it was held that such facts as stated above, being proved, made a good defence; though one or two of the Lords Justices made some observations which seemed to suggest that possibly, if the party sued knew that the paper was "likely to contain libels, he might be held liable, though he knew nothing of the particular libel. The plaintiff in the present case, however, had applied to be allowed to administer interrogatories to the defendants, not directed, as the Court thought, to prove that they had any such knowledge as would make them liable, but to discover how they intended to support their defence. The interrogatories were of this nature:-"What precautions are taken in your business against selling newspapers containing libels ? Are any and what further precautions taken by your firm in order to ascertain whether a newspaper contains libels if it is brought to the knowledge of your firm that one or more actions for libel have been successfully brought against such papers? Have any and what members of your firm, or persons in its employment, any special duty imposed on them by the firm of ascertaining whether newspapers sold by the firm have in fact contained libels, or are likely to contain libels, or have had actions for libel successfully brought against them? Were not some and which members of your firm, or some persons employed by it, aware that some actions for libel had been brought in respect of the New York Herald, London edition ? " &c. The Judge at Chambers, however, had refused to allow these interrogatories, and the plaintiff appealed from his decision.

Mr. SCRUTTON appeared for the plaintiff in support of his appeal

Mr. Finlay, Q.C., and Mr. William Ford, for Messrs. Smith and Son, were not called upon.

The COURT, without hearing them, came to the conclusion that the interrogatories were not allowable.

LORD COLERIDGE said he should be sorry that anything he said should give any currency to the idea that persons who sell and supply newspapers are not primâ facie liable for libels contained in them. But there might be circumstances under which they might not be liable, as to which he need not at present pronounce any opinion. It was sufficient to say that there may be circumstances in which such persons would not be liable for libels for which they were prima facie liable. This appeared from the case which had been cited, and from which he did not desire to dissent. But it would be for the defendants to make out the defence. The present interrogatories, however. were not directed to establish the libellous

character of the paper; but it was sought to find out how the defendants intended to make out the defence; what steps they had taken to protect themselves for liability and bring them within the principle of the case cited. That was going far beyond the proper object of interrogatories. It was asking, not anything to make out the plaintiff's case or answer the defendants', but to discover in what way the defendants intended to make out their case. That mere statement was sufficient to dispose of these interrogatories. The Judge at Chambers was therefore right in disallowing them, and the appeal must be dismissed.

MR. JUSTICE MATHEW concurred, and observed that these interrogatories were nothing else but an attempt to find out how the defendants proposed to prove their defence.

Appeal accordingly dismissed.

[Solicitors for the; plaintiff, Parker, Garrett, and Parker Solicitors for the defendants, Harvey and Capron.]

This was an appeal from an order of the Divisional Court (the Lord Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Mathew). In June, 1884, Mr. Justice North delivered judgment in an action of "MacDougall v. Knight," between the same parties, which had been tried before him. The defendants, who were auctioneers at Bath, published this judgment in the form of a pamphlet, and the plaintiff brought an action against them for libel in respect thereof. The defendants pleaded that the pamphlet was a fair, accurate, and honest report of the judgment of Mr. Justice North, and was published by them bond fide, and with the honest intention of making known the true facts of the case, and in order to protect their reputation and their business, and in reasonable selfdefence and without any malice towards the plaintiff. The plaintiff joined issue upon these pleas. The case was tried before Mr. Baron Huddleston, and the jury found the issues in favour of the defendants. The plaintiff applied for a new trial on the ground that the Judge misdirected the jury in telling them that the occasion was privileged, and in telling them that if the pamphlet was a fair, accurate, and honest report of the judgment of Mr. Justice North its publication was privileged; and in not telling them that to be privileged it must be a fair, accurate, and honest report of all the proceedings at the trial. The Divisional Court, and the Court of Appeal refused a new trial. The plaintiff appealed to the House of Lords, and the appeal was dismissed (14 App. Cas., 194). The Lord Chancellor, in giving judgment, said that he was not prepared to admit that the publication of a judgment alone of a Judge must necessarily be privileged unless it gave a fair and accurate account of what took place at the trial, and gave reasonable opportunities to the reader to form his own judgment as to what conclusion should be drawn from the evidence given, but that in this case the Judge was never asked to submit any such question to the jury, and it was too late after the trial to suggest that such a question should have been submitted to the jury. Lord

*Reported by W. F. BARRY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.