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Justifiable ground of war, but he denied that it amounted CHAPTER to war in fact, and therefore it became necessary to say whether we would go to war or not. We must expect, 1798. if we went to war, to encounter all its expenses and other evils. If we would remain at peace, we must, in a certain sense, submit-that is, we must submit to have a number of vessels taken, but this he thought very differ ent from the submission spoken of on the other side. Gentlemen need not be so much alarmed about French influence. There had been a great enthusiasm for France, but that feeling was much diminished in consequence of her late conduct toward us. What course the interest

and happiness of the country required was a mere matter of calculation. If he could separate defensive war at sea from offensive war, he should be in favor of defensive war; but as he could not make that distinction, he was in favor of peace measures. Giles took the same ground. March 28. He deprecated war of any kind, unless the country were actually invaded.

"Would to God," said Thomas Pinckney, "it were in our power, by this or any resolution, to avert war and maintain peace. In questions of war there are always two parties, one of whom is generally the aggressor and the other passive. In the present case this country is the passive party, and any declaration, therefore, on our part, could have but little effect. Individuals or nations, led by interest or passion to pursue certain measures, are not easily diverted from their object; and if the French are actuated by either of these motives, no declaration of ours will prevent a war. A resolution like the present would rather accelerate the evil. If declarations could have availed, they have not been wanting. Indeed, too much had been rested on such declarations, nothing having been done for defense.

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"How different was the course now proposed from that adopted in 1794, during the misunderstanding with 1798. England. Abundant measures were then suggested and carried into effect for countervailing the losses which our citizens experienced and for bringing Great Britain to reason. He had expected something similar now; he should not have been surprised had some member, fired with the injuries we have received, proposed a declaration of war. Instead of that, smarting as we are under injuries, our commerce bleeding at every pore, and our country deeply humiliated, we are called upon to say to France, 'You have. done every thing to injure, insult, and degrade us, but we have deserved it, and will not resist. Whatsoever injuries you may inflict, we will not go to war.''

Giles was convinced that if we carried our preparations for defense beyond our own limits, instead of gain. ing glory or honor, we should meet with nothing but disgrace. If any object was to be subserved by nayal preparations, it was the protection of our commerce with Great Britain; but two acts of Parliament, recently passed, were likely to take that trade, in a great measure, from us. The allusion here was to the passage of certain acts, under the right reserved in Jay's treaty, for counteracting the American differential duties in favor of American shipping, acts over which the opposition somewhat prematurely exulted, as likely, so soon as peace took place in Europe, to prove ruinous to the American ship owners. Under these circumstances, Giles thought we had no sufficient object for incurring so much risk. The apprehension of war already began to cause disagreeable effects in his part of the country. Produce had fallen in price, and the sale was very dull at that. The proposed resolution, if agreed to, would quiet the public

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mind. But it would have no good effect, so it was said, CHAPTER on the French Directory. He did not know that it would; but it would have no bad effect, and might have 1798. a good one. He did not think that body quite so abandoned as some gentlemen represented; and he proceeded to apologize for the partition of the Venetian territories, which Pinckney had just before cited in proof of the inexorable rapacity of the French republic, not to be softened by any humiliation or concession, the very example, as it happened,-though neither Pinckney nor Giles then knew it—which had been held up in France to frighten the American envoys.

Harper, in a very animated speech, charged home upon the opposition, and upon Giles in particular, the strange contrast between their present attachment to peace, and their eagerness, in 1794, to plunge into a war with England, both the one and the other growing out of devotion to France; and he assailed with great energy that abject spirit which would abandon all American property beyond the limits of our territory, all our commerce, from which was derived five sixths of our revenue, lest, in defending it, we might give offense to the French republic!

Giles, nothing daunted—indeed, he was a person not to be abashed by any thing-made a labored attempt to prove himself to have been as much the friend of peace in 1794 as now. Finding this rather a difficult task, he soon branched off into a multiplicity of recriminations on a variety of subjects; among others, Cobbett's newspaper, which he denounced with great energy; the president's neglect to lay the whole of the recent dispatches before the House; the British ambassador's connection with Blount and his projects; and an imagined arrangement for a more intimate connection with Great Britain, of which country he predicted the total ruin

1798.

"Perhaps

CHAPTER and downfall within the space of two years. XII. gentlemen may ask," he said, "what will you do if France carries her injuries further? I would have us draw ourselves within our shell sooner than go to war. I would, though I do not pledge myself to do it, indemnify our commercial fellow-citizens for their losses. I am now, and always have been, for peace."

March 29.

Harper having replied to Giles with great severity, Nicholas threatened to come to the aid of his suffering colleague, when the debate, which was growing very personal and acrimonious, was suddenly cut short, much to the chagrin of the opposition, by the offer of a resolution by way of answer to Giles' speech, calling upon the president for copies of the recent dispatches. Thus somewhat unexpectedly met, Giles and Smith of Maryland insisted upon striking out that part of the call which left it in the president's discretion to withhold any part of the papers asked for, while Livingston claimed to have the instructions also. Bayard objected that, as the negotiation was not yet terminated, it would not be wise, by insisting on the instructions, to inform the French of our ultimatum-for secrecy, if the papers were communicated, would be out of the question. It was deemed April 2. best, however, to silence the opposition by modifying the April 3. call as they had proposed; and the next day the presi dent sent in all the papers called for, and, in addition, some subsequent dispatches from the envoys, bringing the history of the negotiation to the beginning of the year. Nothing was withheld except the names and personal description of Hottinguer and Bellamy, Talleyrand's agents, to whom secresy had been promised by the envoys, and the name also of M. Hauteval, who had acted as Talleyrand's go-between with Gerry, lest the mention of it, though he had received no promise of

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secrecy, might lead to the discovery of the other two. CHAPTER Wherever the names of these persons occurred in the dispatches, the letters X, Y, and Z had been substituted. 1798. The president requested that, in the first instance, these papers might be considered in secret session, but he left it to the discretion of each house to publish them or not, as they might see proper. Their publication, which was very soon agreed to by both houses, produced as powerful an effect upon the people as the reading of them had done upon all the more moderate members of the congressional opposition. Nothing, indeed, could shake the leaders; but so soon as it was seen, what these papers proved beyond question, that the Directory had demanded a douceur for themselves, and a sum of money for the republic, as the only conditions on which they would treat, the cry of "millions for defense, not a cent for tribute," spread enthusiastically through the country, and the opposition both in Congress and without dwindled down at once to an evident minority.

Even Jefferson admitted, in his confidential correspond- April & ence with Madison, that "the first impressions" from these papers were "very disagreeable and confused," and that the arguments used by Talleyrand's secret agents "were very unworthy of a great nation (could they be imputed to it), and calculated to excite disgust and indignation in Americans generally, and alienation in the Republicans particularly, whom they had so far mistaken as to suppose their first passion to be attachment to France and hatred of the Federal party, and not love of their country." It was "this little slanderous imputation" which, in his opinion, had caused the publication of the dispatches. Still, however, he was not without consolation. "The first impressions with the people will be disagreeable, but the last and permanent one will be,

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