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CHAPTER final end the hitherto friendly, though of late somewhat ceremonious intercourse between Washington and Jef 1797. ferson. Professions of friendship to his face, and secret aspersions behind his back, were what Washington could not endure. It has even been reported and extensively believed-though when this report, at the end of some twenty-seven years, finally got into print, Jeffer son, in a letter to Mr. Van Buren (June 29, 1824,) most strenuously denied it-that the publication of the letter to Mazzei drew out from Washington a very sharp rebuke, and from Jefferson a humble and submissive apology; letters, so it was alleged, which disappeared mysteriously from among Washington's papers by the supposed agency of Tobias Lear, his private secretary, with whom Jefferson appears to have maintained a confidential intertercourse, and to whom he gave a foreign diplomatic appointment shortly after his accession to the presidency. Even apart from Jefferson's positive denial, the evidence of the above story is wholly insufficient; yet Jefferson's attempt, in the letter in which that denial was made, to show that the letter to Mazzei contained no allusions to Washington; that the reference to "the Samsons in the. field and the Solomons in the council, whose heads had been shorn by the harlot England," was meant for the Cincinnati generally; and that Washington must have perfectly understood that those phrases could not have any application to himself, must be pronounced a palpable after-thought. Such was not Jefferson's opinion at the Aug. 3. time of the publication; for, in a cotemporaneous letter to Madison, he gave as reasons for his entire silence in public as to the Mazzei letter, that he could not deny it to be his, because, though badly translated, it was his in substance, while to avow it, so the letter continued, "would render proofs of the whole necessary, and draw

X.

me at length into a publication of all, even the secret CHAPTER transactions of the administration while I was of it, and embroil me personally with every member of the execu- 1797. tive, with the judiciary, and others still;" nor could it be avowed without bringing on, such is Jefferson's express statement, "a personal difference between General Washington and myself, which nothing before the publication of this letter had ever done. It would embroil me, also, with all those with whom his character is still popular, that is to say, nine-tenths of the people of the United States." Had it been only the Cincinnati who were aimed at a subterfuge not then thought of-it could hardly have been necessary for Jefferson to have labored so hard as he did to convince Madison that it could not justly be inferred from his silence that he was afraid to avow the general sentiments of the letter.

The Directory had signified their disgust at the failure of Jefferson to be elected president by the issue, so soon as that information had been received, of a decree March 2. against American commerce, purporting to define the authority granted to the French cruisers by the decree of July 2, 1796. By this decree which reached the May 10. United States just before the meeting of Congress, the treaty with America was declared to be so far modified as to leave American vessels and their cargoes liable to capture for any cause recognized as lawful ground of capture by the British treaty. By an additional and most extraordinary provision, any Americans found serving on board hostile armed vessels were to be treated as pirates, even although they might plead compulsion in excuse. In other words, American citizens impressed by the British were made liable to be hanged by the French. Violent as the Democratic papers were, and justly enough too, against British impressment, they

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CHAPTER had not a word to say against this most extraordinary French offset to that practice. This decree, in its practical application, proved much more fatal to American commerce than might have been supposed from its terms, it being construed by the French tribunals into a justification of the capture of American vessels for not having a role d'equipage. "It was intended" so, some time after its issue, wrote Barlow to his brother-in-law Baldwin, "to be little short of a declaration of war." "The gov ernment here," such was the statement of this recreant American, "was determined to fleece you to a sufficient degree, to bring you to your feeling in the only nerve in which your sensibility lay, which was your pecuniary interest."

The idea, indeed, of a war with France was far from being agreeable to anybody. Though, among the more reflecting part of the community, enthusiasm in her favor had greatly subsided, fear and dread had replaced it. France at this time was terrible alike to her friends and her enemies. The so-called patriotic or Republican party in Holland, having called in the French to help in overturning the old government, had become their submissive tools, compelled to register their edicts, and to find them money whenever called upon. Spain, since her alliance with France, was hardly more independent. Both Spain and Holland, as appeared from the papers laid before Congress along with Pinckney's despatches, taking their cue from France, had already begun to com plain of the provisions of the British treaty on the subject of contraband and the seizure of enemy's goods in American vessels, as infractions of their rights under their treaties with the United States, of which the provisions on these subjects were similar to those of the treaty with France. In delaying to give up the posts on

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the Mississippi, and in postponing the joint survey of CHAPTER the Florida boundary, Spain was believed to act by the instigation of the French Directory, suspected of intending to obtain for themselves a cession of Louisiana and the Floridas, as they already had done of the eastern part of Hispaniola. A French agent had lately been arrested in Kentucky, sent thither, as was believed, by Adet, to renew the former intrigue for the separation of the Western country from the American Union, and its junction with Louisiana. Implacable towards England, France had required Hamburg to break off all commerce with her; and the same demand had been extended to Bremen and to Denmark. The fate of Genoa, in being compelled to relinquish her neutrality, has already been referred to. Hoche's expedition against Ireland had failed; but Bonaparte was pressing hard upon the last remaining ally of Great Britain, and Austria, it was plain, would soon be forced to a peace. Discouraged by the bad success of her allies, Great Britain herself had for some time been attempting to negotiate. What might be the fate of the United States if, with a violent French faction in their own bosom, a general peace should be concluded in Europe, leaving the American difficulties with France unsettled, and the sister republic at liberty to send thither a fraternizing army under Hoche or Bonaparte?

How moderate were the views of the leading Federalists, is apparent from a letter of Hamilton to Wolcott, March 30 written some six weeks before the meeting of Congress,

and

very shortly after the arrival of Pinckney's despatches: "It has been a considerable time my wish," so reads this letter, "that a commission extraordinary should be constituted to go to France. I was particularly anxious that the first measure of the new president's administra

CHAPTER tion should have been that; but it has not so happened. X. I still continue to wish earnestly that the same measure 1797. may go into effect, and that the meeting of the Senate may be accelerated for that purpose. Without opening a new channel of negotiation, it seems to me the door of accommodation is shut, and rupture will follow if not prevented by a general peace. Who, indeed, can be certain that a general pacification of Europe may not leave us alone to receive the law from France? Will it be wise to omit anything to parry, if possible, these great risks? But the Directory have declared that they will not receive a minister till their grievances shall have been redressed. This can hardly mean more than that they will not receive a resident minister. It cannot mean that they will not hear an extraordinary messenger, whe may even be sent to know what will satisfy. But suppose they do. It will still be well to convince the people that the government has done all in its power, and that the Directory are unreasonable. But the enemies of the government call for the measure. To me, this is a very strong reason for pursuing it. It will meet them on their own ground, and disarm them of the plea that something has been omitted. I ought, my good friend, to apprize you, for you may learn it from no other, that a suspicion begins to dawn among the friends of the government that the actual administration (ministers) is not averse from a war with France. How very important to obviate this. As in the case of England, so now, my opinion is to exhaust the expedient of negotiation, and, at the same time, to prepare vigorously for the worst. This is sound policy. Any omission or deficiency either way will be a great error."

Wolcott, whose remonstrances, as we have seen, had contributed to prevent the institution of such a mission