XIX. CHAPTER press-gangs, this naturally became the first topic, upor which several earnest, but friendly and candid discus1806. sions took place between the commissioners. Monroe and Pinkney had been instructed by Madison to contend, that as the right of impressment existed by mere municipal law, it could not be exercised out of the jurisdiction of Great Britain. The British commissioners, on the other hand, produced the opinions of the chief law-officers to the effect that the king had a right, by his prerogative, to require, as against his maritime enemies, the personal services of all his seafaring subjects, and the right also to seize by force such subjects for that purpose every where and any where except within the territorial limits of some other power; and further, that the high seas were extra-territorial, and that merchant vessels navigating thereon did not carry with them any such foreign jurisdiction as to protect British subjects on board from this exercise of the king's prerogative. To give up this prerogative would render American ships an asylum for British seamen anxious to evade their country's service, and even for deserters from British ships of war, and might, in the peculiar existing state of things, go far toward the overthrow of that naval power on which the safety of the state essentially depended. The Board of Admiralty and the law-officers of the Admiralty courts were unanimous as to the right of the crown, and the impolicy and danger of giving it up; and, under such circumstances, so the British commissioners stated, the ministry could not give it up, without taking a responsibility such as no administration would be willing to assume, however pressing the emergency. At the same time, a readiness was avowed to do any thing to satisfy the United States short of a positive relinquishment of the right to impress British seamen on XIX. the high seas; and Monroe and Pinkney were called CHAPTER upon to point out any thing short of such relinquishment which would be satisfactory; but this the Ameri- 1806. can commissioners professed their inability to do. They offered, indeed, by way of offset to the relinquishment upon which they insisted, that the aid of the local authorities in America should be given toward the arrest and return of deserters from British ships, whether national or merchant vessels; but this was not thought satisfactory by the British commissioners, since little could be hoped from such interference, even if exercised in good faith; the popular feeling in both countries being in favor of shielding deserters, while their most likely places of refuge would be on board of American vessels, where, by the stipulation asked for, they would be expressly protected. On their part, the British commissioners proposed that laws should be passed by both nations, making it penal on the one hand for British commanders to impress American citizens, and, on the oth er, for any officer of the American government to grant certificates of American citizenship to British subjects; but this the American commissioners declared to be inadmissible; and indeed, it raised the whole delicate and disputed question of the right of a subject or citizen to renounce the allegiance under which he had been born. In this state of the case, a very important question presented itself to the American commissioners. Should they forego the present fair opportunity of settling so many other grave subjects of dispute, because, as to this one, they could not obtain all which they were instructed to ask? The British negotiators declared that although the ministry could not venture to give up, by formal treaty, the right of impressment on the high seas, yet that special instructions should be given and enforced requiring in the officers of the navy the greatest caution XIX. CHAPTER not to subject any American-born citizen to molestation or injury, and that, in case of any such injury, upon rep1806. resentation of it, the promptest redress should be afford. ed. These assurances they reduced to writing, suggestNov. 8. ing, at the same time, that while both parties thus reserved their rights, this stipulation might temporarily answer all the purposes of a treaty provision. The American commissioners were, in fact, given to understand, though it was not so expressed in terms, that the intention of the British government was not to allow impressments from American vessels on the high seas except under extraordinary circumstances, such as their having on board known deserters from the British navy; thus gradually and silently abandoning a practice of which the national sentiment did not allow a specific renunciation, going back as it did to an indefinite antiquity, strongly supported as it was by the national feel. ing, and thought, at the present crisis of European affairs, essential to the national safety. Every concession on the subject of impressment short of a renunciation by the British government of the claim of right to take British subjects out of American vessels being thus offered to the American commissioners, and having thus placed the United States, as to this question, on ground short, indeed, of their pretensions, and perhaps of their rights, but the best which, at present, there was the slightest prospect of obtaining—especially considering the total inability of the United States to enforce by arms their claim to be exempt from maritime visitation and search, and the total ruin which must ensue, from war with Great Britain, of that maritime commerce which alone made this question of impressments of any practical importance:-under these circumstances, imitating the example of Jay, and of the commaission to France in 1799, Monroe and Pinkney did not deem it XIX. consistent either with common prudence or common CHAPTER sense to relinquish the advantage thus within their power, and, along with it, other advantages in prospect, and, 1806. by breaking off the negotiation, from a too strict adherence to instructions, to leave the country exposed to vast maritime losses, to the continuance and aggravation of present misunderstandings, and to imminent risk of war. They accordingly resolved to proceed with the negotiation, having first informed the British commissioners that they did so on their own responsibility, and with full reserve to the American government of the privilege to ratify or not, as might be deemed proper. The stumbling-block of the impressment question thus removed out of the way, the terms of a treaty for ten years were soon agreed to, based principally on Jay's. By a slight improvement on the provisions of that treaty, the trade between the United States and the European possessions of Great Britain was placed on a basis of entire reciprocity. On the subject of the East India trade the provision was less favorable than Jay's, American vessels being limited in terms to the direct voyage to British India and back. No concessions could be obtained as to the trade to the British West Indies; that stood as before, American vessels being excluded from it. The questions of blockades and of contraband were arranged as in Jay's treaty, an additional express provision being inserted that no American vessels were to be visited or seized within five miles of the American coast. This provision no doubt grew out of the case of Captain Pierce, killed, as we have seen, off the harbor of New York, by a cannon shot from the British ship Leander, an act for which the commander of that ship had lately been tried and acquitted by a naval court martial. On the great point of the carrying trade, as to which XIX. CHAPTER the decisions of the British admiralty courts had caused so much excitement, the right was conceded, for the pres 1806. ent war, to transport in American vessels, to any belligerent colony not blockaded by a British force, any European goods except contraband of war, provided the same were American property, had previously been landed in the United States, and had paid a duty of at least one per cent. above the amount drawn back on reexportation. In like manner, all the produce of such colonies the property of American citizens, and not contraband of war, might be brought to the United States, and having been landed, and having paid a duty of at least two per cent. exclusive of drawback, might be exported in American vessels to any port of Europe not blockaded. The issue of the Berlin decree which reached England just as this, on the whole, very favorable treaty was ready for signature, occasioned some hesitation on the part of the British commissioners. They wanted assurances that the United States would not allow their trade with Great Britain and in British merchandise to be interrupted and interfered with by France without 1807. taking measures to resent it. Finally, however, they Jan. 3. consented to sign; but they presented, at the same time, a written protest against the Berlin decree, reserving to the British government the right, should that decree be actually carried into force as against neutrals, and be submitted to by them, to take such measures of retaliation as might be deemed expedient. And indeed one measure of retaliation as against France and her allies. was immediately taken, by the issue of an order in council restraining neutrals from the coasting trade between one hostile port to another, an extension to all the hos tile ports of the principle already applied to the line of coast from Brest to the Ens, under the order in council |