court.

1. Construction in general.

2. Proceedings in vacation or at chambers

in general.

3. Courts of record.

4. Order to show cause.

5. Res judicata.

6. Control over judgments or decrees in general.

7. Power of court over judgment or decree during term.

8. Power of court over judgment or decree after term.

9. Appointment and discharge of receivers. 10. Mode of proceeding.

11. Attendance and compensation of clerk. 12. End of term.

13. Term of court may exist without transaction of business.

1. Construction in general.-This section is substantially the same as Equity Rule No. 1 U. S. Cir. Ct. and under its authority district courts as courts of equity are always open. Central Trust Co. v. Sheffield & Birmingham Coal, I. & Ry. Co. (C. C. 1894) 60 Fed. 9, 15.

A circuit judge of the United States may do chambers business at any place within his circuit without regard to the particular district in which the cause is pending. Horn v. Pere Marquette R. Co. (C. C. 1907) 151 Fed. 626. See Pooley v. Luco (D. C. 1896) 76 Fed. 146, 147.

2. Proceedings in vacation or at chambers in general.-A motion for an order overruling an answer as frivolous may properly be heard and disposed of by a District Court on a rule day or in vacation, and a judgment entered on such order at the next ensuing term of court is valid. Knotts v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. (1913) 204 Fed. 926, 123 C. C. A. 248.

An order by a district judge for the release of a vessel libeled for breach of the embargo laws is as valid when made at chambers as if made in open court. U. S. v. The Little Charles (C. C. 1819) Fed. Cas. No. 15,613.

The federal court, as a court of equity, may award attachments for contempt in vacation. Vose v. Reed (C. C. 1871) Fed. Cas. No. 17,011.

A sale made under a decree in chancery may be confirmed in vacation, especially when each of the parties has brought the other before the chancellor on the subject by a rule nisi. Central Trust Co. of New York v. Sheffield & Birmingham Coal, Iron & Ry. Co. (C. C. 1894) 60 Fed. 9.

Anything that a judge may properly

do in a cause on the application of a party is an exercise of jurisdiction, whether done in open court or in chambers, and hence an order extending the time to plead, made by the judge as he was leaving the courthouse, was valid under the rule that that which a judge may lawfully do in chambers he may do at any other place in the district. Murphy v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. (C. C. 1911) 184 Fed. 495.

3. Courts of record.-A United States district court sitting in admiralty is a court of record. Brown V. Bridge (1871) 106 Mass. 563.

4. Order to show cause.-An "order to show cause" is but a means prescribed by law in the nature of a process to bring a defendant into court to answer plaintiff's demands. Morehouse v. Pacific Hardware & Steel Co. (1910) 177 Fed. 337, 100 C. C. A. 647.

5. Res judicata.-Interlocutory order denying motion to discharge defendant in civil action from custody made before trial held not res judicata on motion to strike from judgment provision directing defendant's arrest. Mitchell v. Porter (1912) 194 Fed. 49, 114 C. C. A. 69.

Where an application for vacation of a decree finding defendant guilty of contempt had been made and denied, a second application to the same effect, without leave of court first obtained, will not be considered. A. B. Dick Co. v. Wichelman (C. C. 1901) 109 Fed. 81.

6. Control over judgments or decrees in general.-A court of admiralty has power, on seasonable application, to reopen a decree entered under a misapprehension of the facts or on improper evidence. The Eva D. Rose (1908) 166 Fed. 101, 92 C. C. A. 85.

It is competent for the court, at any time before the final decree has been signed, to reconsider, modify, or set aside any of the interlocutory rulings or orders made in the course of the proceedings. Clark v. Blair (C. C. 1883) 14 Fed. 812.

A court of admiralty has no general power at least, after expiration of the term-to set aside a final decree on the ground of oversight, inadvertence or mistake. The Illinois (D. C. 1857) Fed. Cas. No. 7,003.

7. Power of court over judgment or decree during term.-The federal courts

have no power to set aside, reverse, or modify a judgment at law or decree in chancery after the term at which it was entered. Bronson V. Schulten (1881) 104 U. S. 410, 415, 26 L. Ed. 797; Elder v. Richmond Gold & Silver Min. Co. (1893) 58 Fed. 536, 7 C. C. A. 354; Klever v. Seawall (1894) 65 Fed. 373, 12 C. C. A. 653 (judgment reversed [1895] 65 Fed. 393, 12 C. C. A. 661); U. S. v. Williams (1895) 67 Fed. 384, 14 C. C. A. 440; Fisher v. Simon (1895) 67 Fed. 387, 14 C. C. A. 443; O'Connor v. O'Connor (1905) 142 Fed. 449, 73 C. C. A. 565; Newman v. Newton (C. C. 1882) 14 Fed. 634; Heckling v. Allen (C. C. 1882) 15 Fed. 196; Grames v. Hawley (C. C. 1883) 50 Fed. 319; Allen v. Wilson (C. C. 1884) 21 Fed. 881; Baptist v. Farwell Transp. Co. (C. C. 1886) 29 Fed. 180; Morgan's Louisiana & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Texas Cent. Ry. Co. (C. C. 1887) 32 Fed. 525; Austin v. Riley (C. C. 1893) 55 Fed. 833; Doe v. Waterloo Min. Co. (C. C. 1894) 60 Fed. 643; Craven v. Canadian Pac. R. Co. (C. C. 1894) 62 Fed. 170; Pollitz v. Wabash R. Co. (C. C. 1910) 180 Fed. 950; Linder v. Lewis (D. C. 1880) 1 Fed. 378; U. S. v. Mani (D. C. 1912) 196 Fed. 160.

A court has power during the term at which a decree is entered to set the same aside on motion, provided the facts are such as to justify the action in the exercise of a judicial discretion. Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Com'rs of Hamilton County (1897) 79 Fed. 575, 25 C. C. A. 94; Miocene Ditch Co. v. Moore (1907) 150 Fed. 483, 80 C. C. A. 301; Wyler v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. (C. C. 1898) 89 Fed. 41; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (C. C. 1899) 101 Fed. 146.

Vacation of a judgment at the same term at which it was rendered, because inadvertently entered, leaves the case as if there had been no entry of judgment. Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Board of County Com'rs of Hamilton County (1897) 79 Fed. 575, 25 C. C. A. 94.

A petition for rehearing in an equity suit filed and taken under advisement during the term at which the decree is entered prevents the decree from becoming final until it is disposed of, and the decree may be modified at that time, though at a subsequent term. City of New Orleans v. Fisher (1899) 91 Fed. 574, 34 C. C. A. 15.

Where a formal written judgment is not made and signed until the term succeeding the one at which the matter was orally determined, the judgment comes into existence only at the later term, and remains subject to the control of the court until the close of such term. Judson v. Gage (1899) 98 Fed. 540, 39 C. C. A. 156.

A decree, although final, remains under the control of the court during the term at which it was rendered. Mah

ler v. Animarium Co. (1904) 129 Fed. 897, 64 C. C. A. 329.

In a creditors' suit an order fixing the amount of an intervener's claim is interlocutory, and may be set aside for cause at any time before the close of the term at which final decree is entered. Standard Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Aldrich (1908) 163 Fed. 216, 89 C. C. A. 646, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 393.

8. Power of court over judgment or decree after term.-A judgment, rendered by a court of law, which is a nullity, may be set aside by the court on motion, even at a subsequent term. Thomas v. American Freehold Land & Mortgage Co. (C. C. 1891) 47 Fed. 550, 12 L. R. A. 681 (decree reversed American Freehold Land-Mortgage Co. v. Thomas [1896] 71 Fed. 782, 18 C. C. A. 327); U. S. v. Wallace (D. C. 1891) 46 Fed. 569.

The courts have no power to set aside their decrees in equity on motion after the term at which they are rendered. Cameron V. M'Roberts (1818) 3 Wheat. 591, 593, 4 L. Ed. 467. The circuit courts of the United States have no power to set aside decrees in equity, on motion, after the term at which they were rendered. McMicken v. Perin, 59 U. S. (18 How. 1855) 507, 15 L. Ed. 504.

After hearing a case without a jury, the court took it under advisement, and, during vacation, entered judgment. Afterwards, at the next term, the court vacated such judgment, as void because entered in vacation, and entered a new judgment to the same effect. Held, that the last judgment was regular and valid. Abraham v. Levy (1896) 72 Fed. 124, 18 C. C. A. 469.

After the term at which a judgment is entered, the court pronouncing it cannot vacate it because entered "erroneously, and without authority of law," unless at such term steps are taken towards its vacation. U. S. v. 1,621 Pounds of Fur Clippings (1900) 106 Fed. 161, 45 C. C. A. 263.

A court has no jurisdiction to grant a motion to set aside a judgment, after the termination of the term at which it was rendered, on the stipulation of the attorneys, that the same should abide the event of a writ of error in another cause. Brown v. Arnold (C. C. 1904) 127 Fed. 387, decree reversed (1904) 131 Fed. 723, 67 C. C. A. 125. Where a new term of court intervened between the making of an order and the making of a motion to vacate the same, the court lost jurisdiction to consider the motion. Born v. Schneider (C. C. 1904) 128 Fed. 179.

A federal law court has no power to vacate its judgment of a former term, founded on a false, but apparently valid, return of service of process. King v. Davis (C. C. 1905) 137 Fed. 222, judgment affirmed Blankenship v. King (1906) 157 Fed. 676, 85 C. C. A. 348.

corporated in the record of the case to show such jurisdiction. Goll v. U. S. (1907) 151 Fed. 412, 80 C. C. A. 642. A special term of court may lawfully be held while a regular term is in session at another place in the same district, where there are two judges, each having authority to hold court in such district. In re Stevenson (C. C. 1903) 125 Fed. 843.

The word "term" means "session." Pitman v. U. S. (D. C. 1891) 45 Fed. 159, 160, affirmed (1892) 13 Sup. Ct. 425, 147 U. S. 669, 37 L. Ed. 324.

Power of judge.-Where a judge who had power to fix terms of court, and to hold special sessions at such times as he might deem expedient, having fixed regular terms and the limit of their duration, at the close of one of such terms, instead of adjourning court sine die adjourned to the next secular day, his action was equivalent to the convening of a special session to commence on that day, and the court had the same power to transact business thereat as though a formal order had been entered calling such session in the absence of any statutory provision requiring such order. In re Stevenson

(C. C. 1903) 125 Fed. 843.

The additional judge for the Indian Territory appointed under Act June 7, 1897, c. 3 (30 Stat. 62), when holding a term of court under assignment from the appellate court has the same power to call and hold a special session after the close of the regular term, to dispose of unfinished business, as the judge of the district would have. Id.

Judge as court. The form of declaring himself to be a court is not indispensable to the validity of judicial acts of the judge. U. S. v. The Little Charles (C. C. 1819) Fed. Cas. No. 15,613.

Release of libeled vessel by order made at chambers.-See U. S. v. The Little Charles (C. C. 1819) Fed. Cas. No. 15,613.

Construction and application of superseded R. S. §§ 662-670, relating to special sessions.-The contention that, because the District Court of the United States for the district of Porto Rico is required, by Act April 12, 1900, c. 191, § 34, 31 Stat. 77, to proceed in the same manner as a federal circuit court a term of that court held at Mayaguez, under the authority of the further provision of that section that regular terms of such court shall be held at stated times in San Juan and Ponce, and special terms at Mayaguez at such other times as the judge may deem expedient, is a "special," as contradistinguished from a "regular," term, within the meaning of R. S. § 670, forbidding jury trials at special terms of the Circuit Courts, except in certain specified districts, is too clearly lacking in merit to sustain a writ of error from the federal

Supreme Court, in view of the substantially uniform requirement of sections 664-669, that special terms of the Circuit Courts are to be held where the regular sessions are held. American R. Co. v. Castro (1907) 27 Sup. Ct. 466, 467, 204 U. S. 453, 51 L. Ed. 564; Same v. De Castro (1907) 27 Sup. Ct. 468, 210 U. S. 440, 51 L. Ed. 1187.

Act March 2, 1793, in relation to special sessions of the circuit court at places nearer to where the offense was committed, vests in the court a legal discretion, to be exercised on considerations of convenience and practicability. U. S. v. Insurgents (C. C. 1799) Fed. Cas. No. 15,442, 1 L. Ed. 700.

The judges have power to hold a special court in capital cases in the county in which the offense was committed; but they have a legal discretion on the subject. Id.

The court has no power to adjourn a stated general session from the place at which it is directed by statute to be held to another place, for the purpose of trying there a person indicted for a capital crime, in compliance with section 29, Judiciary Act 1789. U. S. v. Cornell (C. C. 1820) Fed. Cas. No. 14,868.

Criminal cases pending at a regular session cannot be continued to a special session held for the trial of crimes, nor can any order be made therein at such session. U. S. v. Milburn (C. C. 1834) Fed. Cas. No. 15,765.

The probability that difficult and important questions of law will arise will not ordinarily justify the postponement of the trial, so as to await the holding of the court by two judges, with a view to a certificate of division of opinion. U. S. v. Fullerton (C. C. 1868) Fed. Cas. No. 15,175.

R. S. § 662 is construed to merely provide for the holding of special sessions near the place of the commission of the offenses, and still affords a remedy. U. S. v. Berry (C. C. 1885) 24 Fed. 780, 784. Where an act changing the time of holding a term of court is passed, but too late to permit the holding of a term at the substituted time, and a special term in lieu thereof is called, proceedings for the removal of a cause,. the petition and bond in which were filed before the time of holding the regular term as fixed either by the act or the former law are before the special term for the purposes of a motion to remand; the act providing that process from the clerk's office shall be returnable at the substituted term, and R. S. §§ 669, 670, enabling a special term to transact all business that may be transacted at a regular term. Kansas City & T. R. Co. v. Interstate Lumber Co. (C. C. 1888) 37 Fed. 3.

The District Court of the northern district of Iowa may name the time and place of trial of criminal cases, whether at regular or special term, subject only