Their nature and character remain the same whether they are kept in the Executive Mansion or deposited in the Departments. There is no mysterious power of transmutation in departmental custody,nor is there magic in the undefined and sacred solemnity of Department files. If the presence of these papers in the public offices is a stumbling block in the way of the performance of Senatorial duty, it can be easily removed.

The papers and documents which have been described derive no official character from any constitutional, statutory, or other requirement making them necessary to the performance of the official duty of the Executive.

It will not be denied, I suppose, that the President may suspend a public officer in the entire absence of any papers or documents to aid his official judgment and discretion. And I am quite prepared to avow that the cases are not few in which suspensions from office have depended more upon oral representations made to me by citizens of known good repute, and by members of the House of Representatives and Senators of the United States, than upon any letters and documents presented for my examination. I have not felt justified in suspecting the veracity, integrity and patriotism of Senators, or ignoring their representations, because they were not in party affiliation with the majority of their associates; and I recall a few suspensions which bear the approval of individual members identified politically with the majority in the Senate.

While, therefore, I am constrained to deny the right of the Senate to the papers and documents described, so far as the right to the same is based upon the claim that they are in any view of the subject official, I am also led unequivocally to dispute the right of the Senate, by the aid of any documents whatever, or in any way save through the judicial process of trial on impeachment, to review or reverse the acts of the Executive in the suspension, during the recess of the Senate, of Federal officials.

WHERE THE POWER OF REMOVAL IS VESTED.

I believe the power to remove or suspend such officials is vested in the President alone by the Constitution, which in express terms provides that "the Executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America," and that "he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."

The Senate belongs to the legislative branch of the Government. When the Constitution by express provision superadded to its legislative duties, the right to advise and consent to appointments to office, and to sit as a court of impeachment, it conferred upon that body all the control and regulation of Executive action supposed to be necessary for the safety of the people; and this express and special grant of such extraordinary powers, not in any way related to or growing out of general Senatorial duty, and in itself a departure from the general plan of our Government, should be held, under a familiar maxim of construction, to exclude every other right of interference with Executive functions.

In the first Congress which assembled after the adoption of the Constitution, comprising many who aided in its preparation, a legislative construction was given to that instrument in which the independence of the Executive in the matter of removals from office was fully sustained.

I think it will be found that in the subsequent discussions of this question there was generally, if not at all times, a proposition pending to in some way curtail this power of the President by legislation, which furnishes evidence that to limit such power it was supposed to be necessary to supplement the Constitution by such legislation.

The first enactment of this description was passed under a stress of partisanship and political bitterness which culminated in the President's impeachment.

This law provided that the Federal officers to which it applied could only be suspended during the recess of the Senate when shown by evidence satisfactory to the President to be guilty of misconduct in office, or crime, or when incapable or disqualified to perform their duties, and that within twenty days after the next meeting of the Senate it should be the duty of the President "to report to the Senate such suspension, with the evidence and reasons for his action in the case."

THE TENURE OF OFFICE LAW.

This statute, passed in 1867, when Congress was overwhelmingly and bitterly opposed politically to the President, may be regarded as an indication that even then it was thought necessary by a Congress determined upon the subjugation of the Executive to legislative will to furnish itself a law for that purpose, instead of attempting to reach the object intended by an invocation of any pretended constitutional right.

The law which thus found its way to our statute-book was plain in its terms, and its intent needed no avowal. If valid and now in operation it would justify the present course of the Senate and command the obedience of the Executive to its demands. It may, however, be remarked in passing, that, under this law, the President had the privilege of presenting to the body which assumed to review his executive acts his reasons therefor, instead of being excluded from explanation or judged by papers found in the Departments. Two years after the law of 1867 was passed, and within less than five weeks after the inauguration of a President in political accord with both branches of Congress, the sections of the act regulating suspensions from office during the recess of the Senate were entirely repealed and in their place were substituted provisions which, instead of limiting the causes of suspension to misconduct, crime, disability, or disqualification, expressly permitted such suspension by the President "in his discretion," and completely abandoned the requirement obliging him to report to the Senate "the evidence and reasons" for his action.

With these modifications and with all branches of the Government in political harmony, and in the absence of partisan incentive to captious obstruction, the law as it was left by the amendment of 1869 was much less destructive of Executive discretion. And yet the great General and patriotic citizen who, on the 4th day of March, 1869, assumed the duties of Chief Executive, and for whose freer administration of his high office the most hateful restraints of the law of 1867 were, on the 5th day of April, 1869, removed, mindful of his obligation to defend and protect every prerogative of his great trust, and apprehensive of the injury threatened the public service in the continued operation of these statutes even in their modified form, in his first message to Congress advised their repeal and set forth their unconstitutional character and hurtful tendency in the following language:

"It may be well to mention here the embarrassment possible to arise from leaving on the statute-books the so-called 'tenure of office acts,' and to earnestly recommend their total repeal. It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution, when providing that appointments made by the President should receive the consent of the Senate, that the latter should have the power to retain in office persons placed there by Federal appointment against the will of the President. The law is inconsistent with a faithful and efficient administration of the Government. What faith can an Executive put in officials forced upon him, and those, too, whom he has supended for reason? How will such officials be likely to serve an administration which they know does not trust them?

I am unable to state whether or not this recommendation for a repeal of these laws has been since repeated. If it has not, the reason can probably be found in the experience which demonstrated the fact that the necessities of the political situation but rarely developed their vicious character.

LAWS WHICH HAVE FALLEN INTO DISUSE.

And so it happens that after an existence of nearly twenty years of almost innocuous desuetude these laws are brought forth-apparently the repealed as well as the unrepealed-and put in the way of an Executive who is willing, if permitted, to attempt an improvement in the methods of administration.

The constitutionality of these laws is by no means admitted. But why should the provisions of the repealed law, which required specific cause for suspension and a report to the Senate of "evidence and reasons," be now, in effect, applied to the present Executive, instead of the law, afterwards passed and unrepealed, which distinctly permits suspensions by the President "in his discretion," and carefully omits the requirement that "evidence and reasons for his action in the case" shall be reported to the Senate?

The requests and demands which by the score have for nearly three months been presented to the different Departments of the Government, whatever may be their form, have but one complexion. They assume the right of the Senate to sit in judgment upon the exercise of my exclusive discretion and executive function, for which I am solely respon.

sible to the people from whom I have so lately received the sacred trust of office. My oath to support and defend the Constitution, my duty to the people who have chosen me to execute the powers of their great office and not to relinquish them, and my duty to the Chief Magistracy which I must preserve unimpaired in all its dignity and vigor, compel me to refuse compliance with these demands.

To the end that the service may be improved, the Senate is invited to the fullest scrutiny of the persons submitted to them for public office, in recognition of the constitutional power of that body to advise and consent to their appointment. I shall continue, as I have thus far done, to furnish, at the request of the confirming body, all the information I possess touching the fitness of the nominees placed before them for their action, both when they are proposed to fill vacancies and to take the place of suspended officials. Upon a refusal to confirm I shall not assume the right to ask the reasons for the action of the Senate nor question its determination. I cannot think that anything more is required to secure worthy incumbents in public office than a careful and independent discharge of our respective duties within their well-defined limits.

Though the propriety of suspensions might be better assured if the action of the President was subject to review by the Senate, yet if the Constitution and the laws have placed this responsibility upon the executive branch of the Government, it should not be divided nor the discretion which it involves relinquished.

ALL PLEDGES MADE HAVE BEEN KEPT.

It has been claimed that the present Executive having pledged himself not to remove officials except for cause, the fact of their suspension implies such misconduct on the part of a suspended official as injures his character and reputation, and therefore the Senate should review the case for his vindication.

I have said that certain officials should not, in my opinion, be removed during the continuance of the term for which they were appointed solely for the purpose of putting in their place those in political affiliation with the appointing power; and this declaration was Immediately followed by a description of official partisanship which ought not to entitle those in whom it was exhibited to consideration. It is not apparent how an adherence to the course thus announced carries with it the consequences described. If in any degree the suggestion is worthy of consideration, it is to be hoped that there may be a defense against unjust suspension in the justice of the Executive.

Every pledge which I have made by which I have placed a limitation upon my exercise of executive power has been faithfully redeemed. Of course the pretense is not put forth that no mistakes have been committed; but not a suspension has been made except it appeared to my satisfaction that the public welfare would be improved thereby. Many applications for suspension have been denied, and the adherence to the rule laid down to govern my action as to such suspensions has caused much irritation and impatience on the part of those who have insisted upon more changes in the offices.

The pledges I have made were made to the people, and to them I am responsible for the manner in which they have been redeemed. I am not responsible to the Senate, and I am unwilling to submit my actions and official conduct to them for judgment.

There are no grounds for an allegation that the fear of being found false to my professions influences me in declining to submit to the demands of the Senate. I have not con. stantly refused to suspend officials, and thus incurred the displeasure of political friends, and yet wilfully broken faith with the people for the sake of being false to them.

Neither the discontent of party friends nor the allurements constantly offered of confirmations of appointees conditioned upon the avowal that suspensions have been made on party grounds alone, nor the threat proposed in the resolutions now before the Senate that no confirmations will be made unless the demands of that body be complied with, are sufficient to discourage or deter me from following in the way which I am convinced leads to better government for the people.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

Washington, D. C.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

CHAPTER XI.

REPUBLICAN OPINIONS ON THE TARIFF.

WHAT PROMINENT MEN OF THE PARTY HAVE HAD TO SAY IN FAVOR OF A LIBERAL SYSTEM OF CUSTOMS TAXATION.

Gleaned from Speeches in Congress and Political Campaigns, from Letters, Interviews and Official Reports.

JAMES G. BLAINE on Lumber-June 10, 1868:

During the entire war, when we were seeking everything on the earth, and in the skies, and in the waters under the earth, out of which taxation could be wrung, it never entered into the conception of Congress to tax breadstuffs-never. During the most pressing exigencies of the terrible contest in which we were engaged, neither breadstuffs nor lumber ever became the subject of one penny of taxatiov. ***Now, as to the article of lumber, I again remind the House that there has never been a tax upon this article. The gentleman from Ohio may talk on this question as he pleases; but I say that wherever the Western frontiersman undertakes to make for himself a home, to till the soil, to carry on the business of life, he needs lumber for his cabin, he needs lumber for his fence, he needs lumber for his wagon or cart, he needs lumber for his plough, he needs lumber for almost every purpose in his daily life.

WILLIAM D. KELLEY, of Pennsylvania on Free Wool-July 28, 1866:

Let the raw material come in. Let us make blankets that will drive out English blankets. Let us make our own "English frieze" and "Peterboro' frosted beaver." Let us be able to rival England and France and other representative nations in making these cloths.

Senator INGALLS, February 15, 1878:

We can not disguise the truth that we are on the verge of an impending revolution; the old issues are dead! The people are arraying themselves upon one side or the other of a portentous contest. On one side is capital, formidably entrenched in privilege, arrogant from continued triumph, conservative, tenacious to old theories, demanding new concessions, enriched by domestic levy and foreign commerce, and struggling to adjust all values to its own standard. On the other is labor, asking for employment, striving to develop domestic industries, battling with the forces of nature, and subduing the wilderness; labor, starving and sullen in cities, resolutely determined to overthrow a system under which the rich are growing richer and the poor are growing poorer; a system which gives to a Vanderbilt the possession of wealth beyond the dreams of avarice and condemns the poor to a poverty which has no refuge from starvation but the prison or the grave.

HUGH MCCULLOCH, Secretary of the Treasury. Recommendations in Report, 1884: First. That the existing duties upon raw materials which are to be used in manufacture should be removed. This can be done in the interest of our foreign trade.

Second. That the duties upon the articles used or consumed by those who are the least able to bear the burden of taxation should be reduced. This also can be effected without prejudice to our export trade.

President GRANT, Annual Message, December, 1874:

Those articles which enter into our manufactures, and are not produced at home, it seems to me, should be entered free. Those articles of manufacture which we produce a constituent part of, but do not produce the whole, that part which we do not produce should be entered free also. I will instance fine wools, dyes, etc. These articles must be imported to form a part of the manufacture of the higher grades of woolen goods. Chemicals used as dyes, compounded in medicines, and used in various ways in manufactures, come under this class. The introduction, free of duty, of such wools as we do not produce would stimulate the manufacture of goods requiring the use of those we do produce, and therefore would be a benefit to home production. There are many articles entering into "home manufactures" which we do not produce ourselves, the tariff upon which increases the cost of producing the manufactured article. All the corrections in this regard are in the direction of bringing labor and capital in harmony with each other, and of supplying one of the elements of prosperity 80 much needed.

MR. KELLEY on Tax Reduction-April 22, 1872:

If we adjourn on the 29th of May we shall have repealed no tax or duty, and the people will ask us in every paper and at every corner why we have continued the system of taxation, so largely in excess of the demands of the Government and the reduction of the public debt, at the rate of $50,000,000 per annum outside of what is already provided by law. On neither side of the House can justification be found, nor do I believe apologies which will prove entirely satisfactory to the taxpayers, who are loaded at every point and whose profits are absorbed in the excessive Treasury of the Government.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY, of Ohio, 1882:

The free list might be enlarged without affecting injuriously a single American interest.

Senator WARNER MILLER, of New York, 1882:

The sooner we have that (tariff) revision the better it will be for all industries. Senator HAWLEY, of Connecticut, 1882:

I will vote in any direction to bring about a resolute attempt to give us a revision of the tariff. I say that as representing a protectionist constituency.

Mr. KASSON, of Iowa, 1882:

Some excessive duties remain on the statute book; some dutiable articles should be on the free list, and some of the provisions of the tariff have become obsolete. Senator SHERMAN, of Ohio, 1882:

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We agree that the tariff should be revised and the taxes reduced. Under existing law we are collecting from the people of the United States as National taxes the sum of fifty to one hundred millions of dollars more than is requisite to meet all the proper current expenditures of the Government and all our obligations to the public creditors.

EUGENE HALE, of Maine, in the House, 1871:

The duty upon sait is now 18 cents per 100 pounds in bulk and 24 cents in sacks. The best Turk's Island salt can be purchased at the place where it is produced for from 9 to 10 cents per bushel. Any gentleman here can compute for himself the percentage of duty resting upon this article. I believe there is no one question