to God by the death of his Son," (Rev. v, 10,) but being reconciled, we are adopted as sons.

Let us consider also what are opposed to these, namely, imputation of sins and non-adoption. From these it is clearly seen that such is the order. Sin is the cause of exclusion from filiation by the mode of demerit. Imputation of sin is the cause of the same exclusion by the mode of justice, punishing sin according to its demerit. In reference to your remarks concerning means, I observe that this term is applied by the authors to whose sentiments I refer, to those things which God makes subordinate to the decree of Predestination, but antecedent to the execution of that decree, not those by which or in respect to which Predestination itself is made, whether to adoption or to life. But I think it may be most useful to consider whether these, either as adjuncts, or consectaries, or means, or by whatever other name they may be called, are only effective to consummate the adoption already ordained for certain individuals, or whether they were considered by the Deity in the very act of predestination to sonship, as necessary adjuncts of those to be predestinated.

SECOND PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS.

it

They differ in this, that the first presents men as not yet created, but to be created, to God, electing and pred、stinating, also passing by and reprobating, (though, in the latter case, does not so clearly make the distinction): the second presents them created, but considered in a natural state,* (in puris naturalibus), to God electing and predestinating, to be raised from that natural state above it; it presents them to Him in the act of preterition, as considered in the same natural state,

*The phrase which I have, here and very frequently afterwards in this translation, ren dered "in a natural state," is "in puris naturalibus." It was a technical phrase much used by Aquinas and other scholastic writers to designate a state in which there is an absence of grace and of all supernatural endowments.

and to Him in that of reprobation, as involved in sin by their own fault: the third presents them to Him both electing and predestinating, and passing by and reprobating as fallen in Adam, and as lying in the mass of corruption and perdition.

THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE SECOND PROPOSITION.

That, in this statement of views (which are apparently, not really, contradictory) you have, in some manner, fallen into error, we shall, in its own place, demonstrate. I could wish that in this case an ambiguity, in the verb reprcbate, and the verbal reprobation, had been avoided. This word is used in three ways; one general, two particular. The general use is when non-election, or preterition and damnation, is comprehended in the word, in which way Calvin and Beza frequetly understood it, yet so as to make some distinction. A particular mode of signification is when it is op posed to election, and designates non-election or preterition (a Latin phrase derived from forensic use) in which sense the fathers used it according to the common use of the Latins. There is also a particular use of the word, when reprobation is taken for damnation, as I perceive that it is used by you in this whole letter. The first mode is synecdochical, the second common, the third metonymical; I add that the third might properly be called catachrestic if we attend to the just distinction of these members. I wholly approve the second meaning and shall adhere to it in this whole discussion.

THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SECOND PROPOSITION.

I have made a difference, not a contrariety between those views, and have already explained that difference according to my judgment. I do not, however, wish to be tedious in the proof

of this point. For, in this matter, it is my aim that of a nunber of positions, any one being established, others, perhaps before unsettled, may be demonstrated.

The word reprobation may be sometimes used ambiguously, but it was not so used by me: and, if it had been, blame for that thing ought not to be laid on me, who have used that word in the sense and according to the use of those, whose views I presented, but especially according to the sense in which it has been used by yourself, with whom I have begun this discussion. For I had examined various passages in your writings, and in them I found that the word was used by you in the last sense, which you here call catachrestic. I will adduce some of those passages, from which you will see that I have used the word in accordance with your perpetual usage. In your Notes on Jude, (fol 27-6,) "The proper cause of reprobation is man himself, of his own sin, dying in sins." So in your Sacred Axioms concerning Nature and Grace, prefaced to the Refutation of the Pamphlet of Puccius, Axioms 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, and especially 49 and 50, the words of which I here quote. Axiom 49: "Nor is preterition indeed the cause of reprobation or damnation, but only its antecedent. But the peculiar and internal efficient cause of this is the sin of the creature, while the accidental and external cause is the justice of God." Axiom 50: "Therefore Reprobation (that we may clearly distinguish the matter) is understood either in a wider sense, or in one which is more narrow and peculiar to itself. In a wider sense, if you consider the whole subject of the divine counsel from preterition, as the antecedent and commencement, to damnation, as the end and consequent, with the intervention of the peculiar cause of damnation, namely, sin; in a more narrow and appropriate sense, if you consider only the effects of sin." We might add, also, what is said in the 51st axiom. Of the theses concerning Predestination, discussed by Coddaeus under you, the 14th has this remark: "Preterition is the opposite of preparation of grace and reprobation or preparation of punishment is the opposite of preparation of glory. But preparation of punishment is the act in which God determines to punish his creatures, &c." In theses 17

and 18, "reprobate on account of sins, from the necessity of justice." Here you seem to have wished to use those words properly: which you also signify more plainly in the Theses concerning election discussed by the younger Trelcatius under your direction. Thesis 12: "But if reprobation is made the opposite of election, (as it really is,) it is a figurative expression, that is either by synecdoche, or by catachresis. By synecdoche, if it refers to the whole series of acts op. posed to Predestination; by catachresis, if it refers to nonelection. For non-election is the first limit of the divine purpose, dependent on his will alone. Reprobation is the ultimate limit, next to the execution, dependent on the supposition of antecedent causes." Hence it is apparent that I have used that word in the sense which you have styled "appropriate." I will state, in a few words, what I think in reference to the same word, and its use. I am wholly of the opinion that the word reprobation, according to the use of the Latin language, properly signifies non-election, if election does not consist without reprobation. But I think that it is never used in the Scripture for an act which is merely negative, and never for an act which has reference to those who are not sinners. at any time Auguɛtine and others of the fathers use it for preterition, non-election, or any negative act, they consider it as having reference to a reliction in sin, and in the mass of corruption, or for a purpose to withhold mercy, the latter term being used for a deliverance from sin and actual misery. Calvin and Beza use it in almost every case, for the mere preparation of punishment, or for both acts.

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THIRD PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS.

The first theory is this, that God determined from eternity to illustrate his own glory by mercy and justice and as these could be exercised in fact only in reference to sinners, that he decreed to make man holy and innocent, that is, after his own image, yet good in such a sense as to be liable to a change in

this condition, and able to fall and to commit sin that he ordained also that man shonld fall and become depraved, that He might thus prepare the way for the fulfillment of his own eternal counsels, that he might be able mercifully to save some and justly to condemn others, according to his own eternal purpose, to the declaration of his mercy in the former, and of his justice in the latter.

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE THIRD PROPOSITION.

This view seems to have been stated not with sufficient full. ness; for Calvin in his Institutes, (lib. 3,) eloquently refers to the words of Paul in Eph. i: "He predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, &c.," and explains them, preserving the order which we noticed under Proposition I. God therefore from eternity determined to illustrate most wisely his own glory by the adoption of these and the preterition or non-adoption of those with the introduction also of mercy and justice. This being settled, that statement may be very well conceded, that "God determined to illustrate his own glory by mercy and justice, if it is rightly understood. But this will be hereafter explained in a summary manner. But it cannot be conceded, nor can I think that Calvin or Beza would have said simply that "mercy and justice cannot in fact be exercised except in reference to sinners. For in the first place (that we may sooner or later explain these things), sinners are such in act, in habit, or in capability. We are sinners in act when the depravity of our nature has carried out its own operations; we were sinners in habit in the womb and from the womb, before we wrought the works of the flesh. Adam was such in capability in some sense before the fall, when he had the power to lay aside his holy habits of life, and make himself the bond-slave of sin. So also they are miserable, in act, in habit, or in capability, who now endure miseries or have put on the habit of them, are capable of falling into them. The latter, however, are