to declare by whom certain appointments shall be made ; as to which more particularly, he should say a word hereafter. The first objection, which applied to both, was, that they went to blend the Executive and Legislative authority. The power of appointment is strictly Executive, because all officers are appointed for the purpose of carrying the laws into execu

Thus, then, the power of appointment was naturally, and according to the best authority they could obtain, a matter which belonged to ihe Executive. Certainly it does not belong to the Judiciary, and it does not naturally belong to the law making power. This was self-evident, and before we take a step of such importance as blending these two powers in any manner, we ought to consider what is likely to be the consequence. Heretofore, we have studiously endeavored to keep separate the different departments of the Government, and, especially, efforts were made to restrain the Legislature from exercising certain powers conceived to be judicial ; but now we have come to the question of confering upon it, directly, powers, which strictly and appropriately belong to the Executive; and the question is, whether it is likely, according to our notions of right Government, to conduce to the advantage of the Commonwealth, that the Executive authority should be placed in the hands of the Legislature directly or indirectly, generally or partially, or in any manner whatever. What is the argument in favor of it? If we were to proceed to argue upon the facts as they are alleged, it would be a difficult matter to come to any satisfactory result; because it would involve an examination of things about which we are not furnished with sufficient, nor indeed with any evidence, andalong with which there would be required a considerable notice of individual conduct which might be unjust, and at best would give us but a one sided and imperfect view. You look only at the existing state of things, and point out whatever appears to be defective, and propose a change, not because you can give a better plan, but because the old plan is alleged to be objectionable. But we ought to look at both sides, to consider carefnlly whether the plan proposed is not more likely to be defective and objectionable than the existing one. In doing this, it was best and safest to abstain from the use of harsh terms in relation to any matter or any body. The gentleman from Luzerne had said yesterday, no doubt without meaning any reproach, that the Senate of the United States had been a factious body ; some gentlemen entertaining different views, might use equally severe language in relation to the Executive of the United States, and gentlemen would frequently use such language according to their particular political and party bias; but that was no way of reaching the truth, and he proposed to avoid it altogether, as an insecure and irrational basis, and to argue this question on the ground of principle; and with respect to the general view of both parts of the proposition, he would appeal to gentlemen to say, whether they think it is expedient now to begin with that mixture of powers which every one considered as erroneous and inadmissible in a well constituted republic.

In the absence of any thing like experience to aid us; in the absence of argument to aid us, we have recourse to analogy. The advisory power of the Senate of the United States has been, therefore, held up to us as an evidence, that this thing is right in itself; and, as an evidence that it has worked well in practice, in the Government of the United States, and herefore, the conclusion is come to, that it would work well in Pennsylvania.

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Now, is there any analogy between the two cases? that is the first ques. tion, because, if there is not, then the argument falls entirely to the ground. It appears from the history of the Constitution of the United States, that there was a proposition brought before the Convention which framed that instrument, to give to the President of the United States, the aid of what was called a Privy Council. There are two sorts of Council, and we must distinguish between them. One was merely for consultation, a consultative Council, and another was such a Council as was proposed to be established here, with a controling power. The King's Privy Council was a consulting council. NAPOLEON, in the plenitude of his power, had a council, and he admitted, in after years, that he derived great aid from it, but it was merely a consulting council. The Governor of Pennsylvania at present has, in effect, a consultative council, because he has the members of the Legislature, to whom he can refer, whenever he deems it proper to call for their advice and assistance. If he wishes to obtain local information, are not the members from those particular districts always able to furnish him with any information he may desire, without the aid of others; for, we all know that this question, with regard to appointments comes to be considered as a local matter, and it is deemed impertinent for any other persons to interfere with it, than those who are from the neighborhood. If an appointment was to be made in county A, it was deemed not to be a matter which belonged to county B, and that the members from that county should have nothing to do with it. Then, with regard to this consultation, we know, that the operation of the present Constitution gives the Governor the benefit of the aid of members from the particular districts, and as many more as he chooses to consult. But, now you propose to give him a controling council; and, the argument in favor of it was, that there was such a council connected with the office of President of the United States. To see whether the analogy existed, he proposed to bring into view the construction of the Government of the United States, and see whether we could, or ought to apply the system practised upon there to our own Government. Were the Senators of the United States the representatives of the people, in the same sense as the members of the House of Representatives ? Certainly not. The Senate was 3 representation of States, not a representation of the people, and an equal representation of States, without regard to the extent of their territory, or the amount of their population. The smallest State has as many Senators as the largest State in the Union ; and, of course, the smallest State had an equal voice in the Senate of the United States with the largest.– How was this brought about? By compromise--a compromise arising out of the nature of the case, and agreed to, for the sake of union. It is true, that this Government was formed by the people of the United States, but they were, at the same time, from separate and independent States, and in both capacities, may be said to have confered upon that Government certain powers. What was the plan upon which those powers were granted! Why, that there should be one great body chosen to represent the people ; a popular representation, and that body was the House of Representatives. That there should be an Executive also chosen by the people of the United States, in a manner directed by the Constitution. This is the office of President. The Senate is the representative of the States, and has a two fold character—first, as a part of the law making power, and

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next as a part of the Executive power, in regard to certain Executive duties, that is to say, the making of treaties and appointments to office.That body, representing the States, is thus a part of the Legislature, and also a part of the Legislature. The reason of this is plain enough. The States of the Union have granted to Congress, the Senate and House of Representatives, the power of making war and peace, so that there can be no war made, without the combined action of first the representatives of the people in the House of Representatives, and then the representatives of the States in the Senate, Consider next appointments made by the President of the United States, and consider that they are all appointed within the States, so as to affect the relation between them and the Union, and that they all have some connexion with our foreign relations. In fact, you may say that every officer of the United States may have an influence upon those relations. The Senate is also, for the same reason, invested with a portion of the treaty making power. But, as to the appointing power—it is plain that they may all have an influence upon our foreign relations. Your Foreign Ministers, your Judicial officers, and your Executive officers, of every class and kind, act upon subjects which concern more or less the foreign intercourse; having to fulfil towards foreign nations the duties we owe to them by the laws of nations, that system of laws which governs a community of nations. The States, as States, chose to have a control of all questions of legislation, and, especially, the great questions of war and peace—and a control, also, of the uppointments to office, which might so materially affect them. The Senate of the United States was, therefore, to a certain extent, made a part and portion of the Executive, whether wisely or not, it was not his purpose now to enquire, he thought, however, all the circumstances considered, it was wisely done. He would ask, then, where is the analogy between this Government and the Government of Pennsylvania ? or where is the analogy between the Senate of the United States and the Senate of Pennylvania? Was this State made up of counties, townships, or boroughs, which bear the same relation to the Government of Pennsylvania, that the States do to the Government of the United States ; or have you any foreign concerns to be taken care of? What is the State Senate ? It is a representation of the people, for the purpose of law making—a simple legislative body, and nothing else. It acts in conjunction with the House of Representatives in the passage of all laws, and is, in every respect, similar to the House of Representatives, excepting that the tenure of office of Senators is different, and that it acts in a judicial character in trials by impeachment. Now then, can any body tell wherein there is the least analogy between the Senate of the United States, and the Senate of Pennsylvania, excepting that the Senate of the United States has a part of the law making power. Is it not perfectly obvious, that there might be, and were, good reasons for giving a power of this kind to the Senate of the United States, when no such reasons exist in regard to the Senate of Pennsylvania ? That analogy then entirely fails. Where, then, is the argument in favor of giving this advisory, or confirming, or controling power to the Senate ? Could any one assign a good reason why it should be given to the Senate, any more than to the House of Representatives, or both in conjunction? It is true, we may if we choose, as far the power of the Convention goes in deciding the question, take the power of appoint

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ment from the Executive and give it either to the Senate or House, or both ; but, can any good reason be shown why it should be the Senate, rather than the House, or why the Senate rather than the two Houses in conjunction? There is more local knowledge in the House of Representatives than in the Senate, and where appointments are to be made for a particular county, there will be more representatives from the county in the House than in the Senate ; because in the Senate, there are but thirty-three members, to fifty-three counties, consequently there must be many coun. ties unrepresented in the Senate ; at least there are many counties in which no Senator resides. If, then, it is local information you desire, for your advisory body, it ought to be the House of Representatives. If it be a controling power that you want, can any good reason be given why the Senate should be taken instead of the House, or instead of the two in conjunction? Is not the House of Representatives elected for a shorter period, more 'promptly accountable, and by gentlemen's own argument, the deposite of the power there, would be bringing it nearer to the people. If it was legislation you wanted from the members, that was quite a different matter, because, he contended, that the longer a man is in office the more experience he has, and the better legislator he makes; but if you want local knowledge, a man who had been a hundred years in the Legislature could not give you any more than one who had just been elected for the first time.

He would now come to that part which gives the Legislature power to declare what appointments may be made and by whom they are to be made. Under this amendment he should think that the Legislature ought not to take the power of appointment into their own hands; because the natural reading of the words of this amendment would be that they may make the law declaring by whom the appointments are to be made, and generally speaking, under such an authority, they could not give the power of appointment to themselves, but he took it in its broadest sense, as he supposed it was meant, and they might introduce into an act of the Legislature a provision for the appointment of certain officers, and in the same law declare who should be appointed; which is vastly more objectionable than the other. Thus, with regard to certain officers, you will have given the power of appointment to the Governor with the control of the Legislature. but with regard to another description of officers you will have given to the Legislature the nomination and appointment both, and then, first or last, the whole appointing power is brought into the Legislature, unless, perhaps by another provision a small part are to be elected by the people. All appointments, then, are to be placed in the hands of the Legislature; the whole Executive power in effect is to be given into the hands of the Legislature. When we have reached this part of the case there are two questions to be considered. He was not now going to argue whether or not the Legislature would make good appointments, because it was a difficult question to argue. He could argue upon the authority of able writers and upon principle that these powers of government ought to be kept distinct ; but as it related to this subject of appointments he was aware of the difficulty of arguing with any effect because atlast it came to be a matter of opinion, perhaps of mere assertion, whether or not they would make good appointments. That was the first of the questions he had al.

But the remaining question here was this—will not the power

of appointment, vested in the Legislature, interfere with and dangerously affect the exercise of proper legislative authority ? It was but a small part of the question to consider whether the Legislature will or will not make good appoiutments. The primary object of the Legislature is not to make appointments ; but the great purpose for which they are convened is to make good laws. The less then that you connect any other duties with the law-making function the more sure you will be that the whole of their faculties will be applied to law making; but if you add these new duties you diminish their time and attention to be given to the making of laws. We see already, in some degree, how it works. You cannot have an election of Bank Directors without sacrificing a great deal of time belonging to other duties they have to perform, and causing much excite ment, and intrigue. Introduce all the appointments here proposed and how much more time do you take up; and it is not only the time which it occupies, but it occupies a vast deal of attention, and excites a vast deal of feeling injurious to legislation. If those persons who, on particular occasions, present themselves to the Executive, and sue fur favors from him, were to make their applications to the members of the Legislature, where would be the time for the business of law making for the Commonwealth? Suppose we were, at this moment, clothed with power to make all offices vacant and had done so, and were about to make new appointments. Suppose our doors were thrown open to receive the numerous applicants for office with their recommendations, and letters; and suppose as would be the case, every passion and feeling should be appealed to, social, and party, what would become of us? Just so would it be with the Legislature. Ought the Legislature then to be placed in such circumstances that they may legislate with a view to appointments to office, that they may alter the system of appointment, for example, because the Governor may not appoint those they wish; and alter the system that they may make the appointments, not perhaps for the better, but that they may have it in their own hands? Is there not danger in this! He did not wish to take up more of the time of the Committee, as he thought every man who reflected at all on the subject, must perceive that this plan would be attended with evil results. It would destroy all sound legislative faculty. For his own part from what he had seen of the elections of Bank Directors he was convinced that the more impassable you make the gulf between the exercise of legislative and Executive authority, the better chance you have for sound Legislation, which, after all, is the great concern, and, of itself, sufficient for the whole employment of the Legislature.

The committee then rose, reported progress, and obtained leave to sit again this afternoon, when

The Convention adjourned.