CHAPTER VI.*

OF MORAL LAW, OBLIGATION, ACTION AND CHARACTER.

CALVIN,

AND

1. The will of God is the moral law of man; and from his being a creature, the property of God, results his obligation to obey. "They consider not that true religion ought to be framed according to the will of God, as by a perpetual rule: and that God himself abideth always like himself, and is no imagined apparition or fancy, that may be diversely fashioned

OTHERS.

1. "The moral lawt is the declaration of the will of God to mankind, directing and binding everyone to personal,perfectand perpetual conformity and obedience thereunto, in the frame and disposition of the whole man, soul and body, and in performance of all those duties of holiness and righteousness which he oweth to God and man; promising life upon the

power to excite motion. They attribute to his providence higher praise, than could be derived from the regulation of machines. Before they will suppose God to regulate moral beings, as an artificer manages the hands of a clock, they will assert, that God rules, that man is ruled; that God is sovereign, that man is free; and then freely confess their ignorance of the mode of divine operation.

*It is granted by all Calvinists and Hopkinsians, that the providence of God has respect to all the conduct of every accountable creature; to the first sinful volition of the angel who first rebelled, to the lapse of man, and all the subsequent actions of Adam and his posterity. But how does the divine providence respect the moral actions and character of angels, devils and men? This is an important question. Much is said, on one side, at least, about the manner of providential government. Before we can treat of this subject, we must examine into the nature of moral action, which is the object of this divine controul. Moral action is said to regard a moral law, in consequence of a moral obligation, and to constitute the character of the elect and the reprobate. It seemed necessary, therefore, to introduce a chapter upon these topics, in this place, to prepare the way for an exhibition of that part of the two systems, which relates to the pro vidence of God in the formation of moral character.

See note A. at the end of this chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

OF MORAL LAW, OBLIGATION, ACTION, AND CHARACTER.

after every man's liking." Inst. fulfilling, and threatening death

B. 1. ch. 4. sec. 3.

upon the breach of it."

Larger West. Cat. Q. 93.

"God gave to Adam a law, as a covenant of works, by which he bound him, and all his posterity to personal, entire, exact and perpetual obedience; promised life upon the fulfilling, upon the and threatened death breach of it; and endued him with power and ability to keep it." Con. P. C. U. S. p. 90. Con. C. Scot. ch. 19. sec. 1. and B. 1. ch. 5. sec. 12. Say. Plat. p. 62. with this ad

"Forasmuch as thou art his creature, therefore thou art of right subject to his authority." Inst. B. 1. ch. 2. sec. 2. They who regulate their conduct by any thing but the revealed law of God, worship an unknown God, and are by Christ's mouth, John iv. 22. pronounced guilty.

«Now whereas the Lord giving a rule of perfect righteousness, hath applied all the parts thereof to his own will, therein is declared that nothing is to him more acceptable than obedience, which is so much more diligently to be observed as the wantonness of man's mind is more ready to devise now and then divers sorts of worshipping to gain his favour withal."

dition, "God gave to Adam a law of universal obedience written in his heart, and a particular precept of not eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, as a covenant," &c. &c.

God gave man the moral law, and made him capable of performing it.

Heidelbergh Cat. Q. 9. God expressed his will by the moral law; and man before the fall was able to keep it.

Latter Con. Helvetia. ch. 9

B. 1. ch. 8. sec. 5. and 12.

The law requires conformity in thought and action as well as affection.

B. 1. ch. 8. sec. 6. 2. "Now when thou hearest judgment universally named in the difference of good and evil,

2. Moral obligation results from a right to command. Con. C. Scot. ch. 2. sec. 2. Con. P. C. U. S. ch. 2, sec. 2. and Say. Plat. ch. 2. sec. 2. Larger Cat. Ques. 99. "God manifests his sovereignty, as being Jehovah, the eternal, immutable and al

HOPKINS,

AND

OTHERS.

With this moral law, man, ness, bitter and sweet should

being made a moral agent, capable of discerning the right and wrong in the nature of things, was not made acquainted by revelation; nor was he formally put under it, because that was entirely needless. * Syst, Vol. 1. p. 261.

cease. These distinctions do not depend upon the bare will of the Deity; for so long as he continues the nature of things, no law or command of his can change light into darkness, bitter into sweet, nor virtue into vice." Emmons, p. 62 and 63.

2. Moral obligation, therefore, results from the right and wrong in the nature of things, from natural powers to discern this moral fitness, and from the possession of natural faculties to love it. Syst. Part 1. ch. 4, 7 and 8. passim.

2. "As moral agents we are capable of knowing the relation in which we stand to our Creator and moral governor, and how he ought to treat us.” "But the truth is, we are as capable of knowing, when God's treatment of us is just and right, as when a creature's is so." Mass. Miss. Magazine, Vol. 3. p. 347. God has given

* Calvin admits that God has planted so much knowledge in the minds of men that they are inexcusable. They have, he says, 66 a certain conscience of good and evil," or so much of the law written on their hearts, that their conscience either accuses or excuses them before God. "Therefore the end of the law natural is, that man may be made inexcusable. And it shall be defined not improperly thus; viz. That it is a knowledge of conscience which sufficiently discerneth between just and unjust, to take away from men the pretence of ignorance, while they are proved guilty by their own testimony." Inst. B. 2. ch. 2. sec. 22. This knowledge, however, he does not consider an uncorrupted relique of the fall, but the gift of God.

CALVIN,

fect judgment."

*Inst. B. 2. ch. 2. sec. 24. "Our understanding is al together impotent and blind except it be by grace illuminated not once but continually in every divine and heavenly thing which we have to learn."

OTHERS.

think it not very sound and per- mighty God; having his being in and of himself, and giving being to all his words and works," and "therefore we are bound to take him for our God alone, and to keep all his commandments." Larger Cat. Q. 101. "Because God is the Lord, and our God and Redeemer, therefore we are bound to keep all his commandments."

B. 2. ch. 2. sec. 25. 3.† "To extend the power of man to the commandments of the law, hath indeed long ago begun to be common, and hath some speciousness; but it proceeded from most rude ignorance of the law. For they that think it a heinous offence, if it be said that the keeping of the law is impossible, do rest forsooth upon this most strong ar gument, that else the law was given in vain."

B. 2. ch. 5. sec. 6.

Shorter Cat. Q. 44.

3. Complete inability to obey the law, produced by the apostacy, does not release any man from moral obligation. Larger Cat. Q..94, 95, 149. Shorter Cat. 39, 40 and 82. Say. Plat. Con. C. Scot. and Con. P. C. U, S. ch. 7. sec. 3, and ch. 19.sec. 2,

"Now it is easy to understand what is to be learned by the law, that is, that as God is our Creator, so of right he hath the place of Father and Lord, and that by this reason we owe to him glory, reverence, love and fear." Inst. B. 2. ch. 7. sec. 2.

"Neither may we pretend this excuse that we want power, and like wasted debtors are not able to pay. For it is not convenient that we should measure the glory of God by our own power: for whatsoever we be, he always remains like to himself, a lover of righteousness, a hater of wickedness. Whatsoever he requireth of us, (because he can require nothing but that which is right) by bond of nature we must of necessity obey: but that we are not able is our own fault." Inst. B. 2. ch. 7. sec. 2.

How natural imbecility became a crime is exhibited in the chapter on the apostacy.