consequently, must get into a good deal of bad company, and what effect this might have he was unable to say. Here we have in this body, perhaps, between fifty and sixty gentlemen, who have been in legislative bodies for upwards of three years, and if this doctrine was a good one, they have become so entirely corrupted that they ought to be thrown aside, like an old spotted greasy coat, as unfit for any service whatever. It was surprising to him that any gentleman could advocate such a project as this. He hoped the amendment would not be agreed to, but that the Convention would show, by their vote, that the people were capable of self govern

ment.

Mr. EARLE complained that he should have been so peculiarly unfortunate as to be frequently misunderstood, but he would endeavor to improve his phraseology hereafter. He had been particularly misunderstood in reference to what he had said on the subject of restrictions, and an argument unanswerable in itself had been put into his mouth. He had never supposed, for a moment, that because a limitation was put on the power of the Governor, and he was restricted in his patronage, that restrictions must be imposed in all other cases. The argument he had used was in reference to that which had been propounded by gentlemen on the other side. When gentlemen say there should be no restrictions, he asked"Will you carry out your doctrines"? They say, No. Then he replied to them that they had abandoned their principles on the Executive. They abandoned their principles in reference to the Governor; and they had abandoned them in relation to this clause. Gentlemen wish to leave the people free to judge in reference to this matter; but would they be willing to leave the people of Beaver at liberty to take a man from Ohio, and put him into the Legislature. The true ground to be taken is the ground of expediency. The President had said that the Governor was properly restricted, because of the great patronage in his hands, by the limitation of which it was rendered more easy to remove him, if the people should desire to do so. This was equally applicable to members of Assembly. Every one knew there was a great deal of private legislation. When a member had succeeded in getting a private bill through for A, B, or C, he naturally considered the person he had served in this matter, as under some obligation to him; and he would be very much hurt if that individual afterwards refused to vote for him, and would be disposed to think it very wrong. Or, if an individual asked for an office, and was desirous of the patronage of the Governor, and applied to him, or through the members of the Legislature, which was the same thing, and through them he succeeded in obtaining the appointment; would he not be regarded as very ungrateful, if he should afterwards oppose those through whom he had gained his office? This is a reason which will operate with great force, although it might not operate to as great an extent, in one case, as in another. It was the general belief, that men who remain long in office, become corrupt. He knew a gentleman who had passed through a long public life without suspicion; and he also knew that THOMAS JEFferson proved, through a long period when he was in office, that he was not to be corrupted. On the contrary, he became more democratic the longer he remained in office. But power does corrupt men. SOLOMON himself, as we are told, departed from his original purity; and JESHURUN is said to have waxed fat, and kicked. A gentleman near him, had suggested that

men were apt to become corrupt when they went into office early; and some persons stated that AARON BURR went into office at the age of nineteen. These were instances which shew that office does corrupt

men.

Mr. M'CAHEN said he was not in favor of imposing any restrictions on the rights of the people. They were as competent to use a correct judgment in selecting for themselves, as we are to prescribe regulations for their judgment. If a gentleman had served the people faithfully for three years, and they wished to continue him longer in their service, they ought to be left free to do so. He would not consent to cast any reproach on the public, for he held in too high estimation their character and intelligence. He would not vote for any such proposition. The argument by which it was sustained might do very well to be addressed to a nominating committee, engaged in selecting candidates, but when addressed to the people it was anti-democratic. They are as competent to judge what is proper for them to do, as we are. Again, it might so happen that a gentleman who is in the Legislature, may be engaged in a case, which no other is so conversant with, and so well prepared to carry it through, and it would be obviously wrong to cut him off from the opportunity of advocating it with the views which he desires to communicate. If a man had not served faithfully, it was not likely that the people would send him ágain.

The question was then taken on the motion of Mr. EARLE, and decided in the negative.

The committee rose, reported progress, and obtained leave to sit again-and

The Convention adjourned.

SATURDAY, JUNE 3, 1837.

The PRESIDENT laid before the Convention the following communication and statement from the Secretary of the Commonwealth, published in compliance with a resolution of the Convention, which was laid on the table, and ordered to be printed:

SECRETARY'S OFFICE,

HARRISBURG, June 2, 1837.

SIR --In compliance with two resolutions of the Convention to prepare and submit to the people amendments to the State Constitution, I have the honor to transmit a tabular statement, showing the whole number of persons executed, and the number of pardons and remissions, during the term of office of each Governor, since the adoption of the present Constitution.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

THOMAS H. BURROWES.
Secretary of the Commonwealth.

Hon. JOHN SERGEANT, President of Convention.

whcih shall then be established. No two or more counties shall be connceted, to form a district; nor shall any county, entitled to one representative, or more, be allowed an additional representative on any number of its taxable inhabitants, less than one half of the one hundredth part of all the taxable inhabitants of the Commonwealth".

Mr. HAMLIN, of M'Kean, said, this amendment was one of great interest to the northern counties of the State, and he desired to make a few

remarks to shew the merit of the proposition. He would be very brief,

because he was aware that any protracted observations would weary the committee. It was known to every gentleman, that the counties, in 1835 and 1836, were apportioned according to the ratio of population, and were classed in accordance with the policy presented as most suitable to the general interests. According to this classification, it appeared that several counties had no separate representative, as the following statement exhibits:

same footing. A large population must always exercise greater control than a sparse population. Several of the counties, extensive in territory, but thinly settled, had no representation at all. A large county, densely settled, might have a large number of votes in the Legislature; but, at least, one member should be given to each county. This principle was acted on in the eastern States, as could be seen by the following TABULAR STATEMENT.

The other States are represented in proportion to population. Every State in the Union gave, at least, one representative to every distinct demarcation, whether denominated township or county. Every county in this State, under the Constitution of 1776, was entitled to one representative. Here, then, we had the example of our forefathers to sustain the principle which he advocated, and this example had not been departed from by the framers of the Constitution of 1790, and many of the counties had a very sparse population. If this had been found to be an unjust principle, in the operation of the Constitution of 1776, the framers of the Constitution of 1790, instead of giving one representative to each county, would have deprived the small counties of their representative.

It may be said, perhaps, on the other side, that every county is represented. He admitted that nominally it was so; but, in fact, it was just the reverse. Every county had a distinct and separate community, looking to very distinct and separate objects. If the interests of the counties which are united for the purpose of representation, are not in unison, but in actual collision, what representation of the feelings and interests can be expected by the least influential county, with the larger one opposed to her? Measures hostile to her interests would be proposed by her own representative. The voice of the stronger county would be heard, and would prevail against her weaker neighbor. The voice of the county ought to be heard through the voice of the representative. And how could this be, when some of the representatives never saw the soil of the county which they represent. The counties of M'Kean, Potter, and Lycoming, were classed together at one time; but there never was a representative from M'Kean or Potter: the county of Lycoming always furnished the member, who had never set foot within the limits of either of the other counties which he represented. However well dis posed, therefore, he might be to serve these counties, he could not

do them the justice to which their interests entitled them, because he could have no personal, and consequently, no accurate and intimate knowledge of their wants. This state of things was a reflection on the justice of the existing policy. He never knew the interests of a county furthered by one who had not been acquainted with his constituents. A nominal representative might go as far as he knew, for measures conducive to those interests, but without a personal knowledge, no man could do justice to his county. The most important wants of a county ought to be known to her representatives.

What was the distinguishing feature in the policy of Pennsylvania? It was to press forward with untiring energy and unabated zeal, in an onward march of internal improvements. If any particular branch of the State was possessed of peculiar facilities for canals, or other great works, could the policy of the State be fully and advantageously carried out without that knowledge of localities, which could only be obtained from the representative? The march of the State might still be onward, but she would not be otherwise enabled to bring all her means into view, and to reap all the benefits from her spirit of enterprise to which she might be entitled. All the facilities of the State could never be known unless the representatives of the different counties were men of the soil. Only from such could the knowledge of all the resources of a county for improvement be obtained. If there were counties with a sparse population, ought not their claims to be heard in this Hall, where other counties contributed their influence to sanction and adopt the principle of improvement? Every county in the Commonwealth should be heard. The wants and wishes of each should be communicated by a man who knows these wants and wishes. On important questions, involving the prosperity of all, the wishes of every part of the Commonwealth should be known. He would not ask to take any thing away from the other counties. But it was about as reasonable to call on a physician to prescribe for a disease he never saw, as to require of a representative of a district to provide for the wants of a county of which he had no knowledge. He would not take any representative influence from the older counties: but would enhance the number of representatives to one hundred and five; and these to be so distributed as that every county should receive a just and efficient proportion. His plan, therefore, would require four or five additional members to the House. In some of the large counties, there was one representative, and a considerable fraction over. He would add that fraction to other fractions, by which nothing would be taken from the old counties, which had one member for their maximum, while the smaller counties, would receive the benefit from the combined fractions. He would give the Whig counties their share, and have all fairly and equally represented. But the impolicy of yoking the wolf to the lamb, the populous counties to those of sparse population, must be obvious to all. He would do the populous counties entire justice, and take away from the others, at the same time, all cause of just complaint. During the seven years that Lycoming, McKean, and Potter, were in one district, the whole power of procuring a single measure for their benefit was taken out of the hands of McKean and Potter, because they were unable to prevent Lycoming from furnishing a representative during the whole time. A measure of this kind, therefore, was required to prevent any injustice being