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regulation of trade, local administration, taxation for these purposes, and treatment of the native tribes.

In the opinion of the reviewer, the ideas of the Americans from 1754 to 1765 are interpreted by the author too narrowly from the contemporary facts and documents, as if that period had no connection with the period before and after it; so that he mistakes in many ways the motives of the Americans and does them injustice. It is only by viewing the history of the American Colonies from 1606 to 1783 as a whole that a correct idea of their political conceptions can be gained and the motives of their political actions understood. Though the American Colonies from 1754 to 1765 were, as the author shows, in one sense a collection of heterogeneous units, each acting for itself, there existed, even at that time, as later events proved, a homogeneity and unity among them which they themselves did not fully realize. There was during that period a common belief in the existence of a fundamental compact between Great Britain and the Colonies, implied in fact and acquiesced in by both parties, according to the terms of which Great Britain was obliged to provide, at its own expense, for the protection of the colonies and they in return were obliged to permit Great Britain to regulate their foreign trade (including the trade with Great Britain), and the intercolonial trade, to the extent necessary for the general welfare. As a part of this fundamental compact, they recognized the right of Great Britain to participate in their local administration to the extent necessary to make its protection and its regulation of trade effective. Every omission on the part of Great Britain to protect them at its own expense, they held to be a justification to them in ignoring the British regulations concerning their trade.

As early as 1700 it was recognized by the best informed men on both sides of the water that the only way to make this fundamental compact effective was to form a federation of the Colonies with a general legislature elected by them and under an executive appointed by the British Crown. It seems now clear that when the final judgment on the American Revolution is passed, it will be concluded that the original mistake of Great Britain was in not taking up the Albany Plan of Union of 1754 and pushing it to immediate completion. After the failure of the Plan of Union, the American Colonies kept on their guard more carefully than ever before, lest they might do anything which might be construed by Great Britain as an acquiescence by them in its claim to reject this fundamental compact and to exercise absolute legislative power over

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them. The maintenance of the fundamental compact became the basis of the policy of each of the Colonies, and in spite of their being kept disunited by Great Britain, their common interest in maintaining the fundamental compact resulted in the formation of a steadily strengthening bond of imion between them.

Looking at the history of British colonial policy from 1754 to 1765 from this wider standpoint, the history of that period is the history of an epoch during which Great Britain, under the necessity, as it believed, of economic pressure, made a serious attempt to abolish the fundamental compact so as to consolidate the military and financial resources of tlie Empire under the management of the British Crown and Parliament, and when the American Colonies began seriously to place themselves on their guard lest they might, by their acquiescence in the British measures adopted, give ground for a claim that they had acquiesced in such abolition of the fundamental compact and in the centralization of power contemplated by Great Britain. From this viewpoint, it is necessary t? dissent from many of the author's conclusions. Thus he says (p. 71):

The experiences of the (French] War served but to re-enforce the conclusion reached by many in 1755, that the defense of the colonies in time of peace could not with safety be left to them because of their lack of union, and also that they could not be relied upon as a whole to provide voluntarily for their due proportion of the necessary military establishment.

It would probably be much nearer the truth to say that the Colonies were unwilling to provide for the common defence at their own expense, since this was contrary to the terms of the fundamental compact; Great Britain alone being responsible for the defence of the Empire in consideration of its having the monopoly of the trade of the Empire.

The author makes out a clear case of the Americans ignoring the British regulations of American trade; but the question which it appears he does not sufficiently consider is, whether, considering the attitude of Great Britain in questioning or denying its obligation to pay for the imperial defence, the Americans were justified in ignoring the regulations of trade.

The author apparently does not perceive that in the Revolution the American Colonies deserted the “ mercantile system” and threw aside with it this old idea of the “fundamental compact," and every other technicality and fiction; and, meeting the British claim of legally-unlimited power with an unqualified denial, fought the war on the single proposition that the conception of legally-unlimited power ought to be

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banished from the civilized mind as rationally unthinkable. He says (p. 309):

The policy of Grenville led directly to a searching inquiry into the nature of the imperial constitution. Colonial opinion was at the outset not clearly defined. It was, however, patent that parliamentary supremacy could be used as a powerful check on the tendency toward independence that had already, to a marked degree, manifested itself. This tendency is plainly visible in the facts of colonial history. But the colonists were, to a great extent, unconscious thereof, and, as a rule, asserted their loyalty to the mother country. Such assertions are, however, no proof of the existence of this sentiment. other historical movements, the real motive was obscured because its revolutionary character would have injured the cause.

Their allegiance was purely utilitarian, and its fundamental basis had disappeared with the conquest of Canada.

It was this unconscious desire for complete self-government which could be realized only by political independence, that explains the intensity of the opposition aroused by Grenville's policy. As Osgood has said: “In this last idea, that of national independence, lies the secret spring of the revolt.”

As in many



From this view of the causes of the American Revolution, it is necessary, in the opinion of the reviewer, emphatically to dissent. The reasons for this dissent are given in the preceding review of Sir Charles Lucas’s History of Canada, 1763 to 1812.


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l'ors La Pair Études sur l'Établissement de la Pair Générale et sur

l'Organisation de l'Ordre International. By Alberto Torres. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional. 1909. pp. viii, 115.

These studies, which form a volume of some one hundred and fifteen pages, are dedicated by the author to his wife and children.

Three pages are devoted to a justification and ninety pages to a projet for a conference for the establishment of a general peace and the oganization of international order.

Twelve pages to the justification of and two to the projet for the organization of an international court of justice.

The arguments in the first justification are the usual mnes against the waste and horrors of war expressed with epigrammatical effekt in a language which lends itself easily to such composition.

Mr. Torres strongly advocates the necessity for adjusting the economic and social problems as a preliminary to international peace. that the problem of pacification has arrived at the state of a practical problem and by the progress of civilization, and the development of re

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He urges

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lations, social, political and economic between peoples, it is now placed on the same footing which the problem of the equilibrium of the nations formerly held between sovereigns.

He asserts that the rivalry of peoples of different races or divided by ancient dissensions is, in our age, a political fact, more artificial than natural, provoked by the acts of rulers and agitators with the end either to divert general attention from internal politics, to attract partisans or to flatter popular vanity. He believes, without counting philosophers, moralists and thinkers, that the majority of opinion is, over all, opposed to war; that the powerful nations have frankly arrived at the age of industrial civilization; that, in this society, neither capitalists nor workmen, nor any but a few who produce war supplies or adhere to some ancient forms of patriotism, see in the armed struggles of peoples any elements of progress; that the fight for life has evolved from the grosser combats into an intellectual concurrence; that contemporary monarchies are pacific because they depend for existence on peace. He believes that naval and land police will be the only armed forces of the nations of the future. He urges us to suppress the charges of war and its effect on the economies of the people and says the expansion of wealth will be stimulated and the probabilities of success in the struggle of life multiplied for all the world.

He points out that emigration makes life easier in both the old and new countries but that the “armed peace” hinders colonization on the part of the older countries and development on that of the new.

His first projet calls for a conference of representatives of all civilized nations. This conference may adjudicate questions between the nations from the point of view of law and equity, of the reasonable interests of each country and the interests of civilization; it may take notice of the aspirations of powers founded in the interest of civilization and human progress; it may establish the general peace by the disarmament of all the power reserving to each a force sufficient to preserve order; it may organize international justice and regulate its procedure.

It may organize, at the place where the court of international justice sits, the military and naval forces destined to guarantee international order, the stability of peace and the superior interests of humanity and civilization, also a bureau to administer these forces.

It may colonize and adjust population and adopt measures to ameliorate the conditions of the proletariat.

The delegates to this conference are to be accredited as ambassadors

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with power to bind their several states even by the final signing of treaties.

The breach of an international engagement should be held a casus belli by all the other powers.

Questions submitted should be decided in each instance by commissions constituted according to the projet of organization of the court of international justice.

Elaborate rules for deciding territorial questions are prescribed in which a plebiscite of the men of the territory plays a chief part as well as ideas of convenience, topography and the (often recurring) " interests of civilization."

In the “ justification ” of the projet for the court of international justice, Mr. Torres points out that at the peace conference the organization of such a court was advocated by the great powers on a basis of representation founded on military force and with a preponderating share in the great powers; that the lesser powers objected to this and claimed absolute equality of representation on the basis of the law of nations.

He seeks to mitigate these differences in his projet by providing that each power name a delegate and a substitute and by classifying the powers in three catagories.

When the powers pleading belong to the same catagory, the litigation shall be decided by the delegates of that category, excluding the delegates of the parties to the cause. Where the litigation is between two powers of diverse categories the commission to determine shall be composed of an equal number of judges from the two categories under the presidency of one from the third.

Causes between three or more powers belonging to three categories shall be adjudged by a commission chosen in equal number from all three categories, when the rights claimed are distinct. There are various other provisions for special cases.

There is no historical argument or comparison. No general review of the many kindred schemes, which are now spawned in every community and hatched in every printer's press.

This reviewer entertains such a hearty sympathy for the objects which are sought that he desires to avoid anything like censure on measures proposed in good faith for their advancement. However, he is in great doubt whether this good cause of universal peace is fostered by the great number of rhetorical dissertations, composed with little expenditure, apparently, of thought or reseach, each proposing, with remarkable con

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