whether the benefits to be derived from such a course are not equally obtained under the present system; and, secondly, whether some evils would not be attendant on the proposed alterations, from which the present system is free. Now, practically, the scholarships of one college are, by means of migration open to the students of another; and we may safely assume that men will not migrate from one college to another, on this account at least, without a reasonable prospect of success, and that those whose abilities enable them to obtain Scholarships in their own college will not incur the expense of migration to obtain the same advantages elsewhere. So that if we take two colleges A and B, and suppose that the first-year men of B are weak and deficient in their acquirements, the Scholarships at B can be filled by men from A, without draining A of those men whose abilities give the best promise and seem likely to do it most credit; and thus a result highly beneficial to B is obtained without injury to A. But that either the whole number or the majority of Scholarships should be thrown open, must cause prejudice and detriment to the small Colleges, since they individually will be deprived in a great measure of the attractions they offer to their members. If then these arguments be found to hold good, it will be more expedient to retain the present system, than, merely for the sake of saying that we have introduced reform, to bring forward measures not calculated to secure the permanent welfare of the University. Against the last suggestion of the Commissioners, namely, that in all cases where it may be practicable, Scholarships founded in connection with particular schools, &c., shall be thrown open to general competition, we must enter a decided protest; for such a proceeding would be a wilful and unnecessary setting at nought of the founder's express intention and desire. A certain amount is given with a specific object, but if that bounty be diverted from the channel into which it was designed to flow, if the kindly fertilization be alienated from the soil it was originally intended to enrich, a breach of trust is committed deserving the severest reprehension. It may be urged that sometimes the foundations which these Scholarships were designed to accommodate, either do not avail themselves of their privilege, or else send up inferior candidates; but the reply is obvious, that we do not legislate for exceptional cases but for the general good. To take the most notable example, that of King's College, few, we should imagine, few that are actuated neither by sordid and interested motives, nor by that contemptible spirit of levelling, which is unhappily but too prevalent at the present day, would desire to turn out the

common herd to fatten on the rich pasture which it was never contemplated they should enjoy, while those, for whose benefit this ancient and royal foundation was provided, might be excluded from all participation in its advantages. We look forward then with some anxiety to the proceedings of the Commissioners; meanwhile it cannot be expedient, that the present state of uncertainty respecting the tenure of Fellowships and Scholarships should be prolonged further than is absolutely requisite, and we may be permitted to hope that this long preparation may not lead us into a situation resembling that of the Dutchman, who, when about to jump over a ditch, took so long a run, that, when he reached the brink, he was obliged to stop and take breath.

(To be continued.)

TE

THE LATE CRISIS.

WE have lately witnessed one of those ministerial changes

which are so peculiar to our country and so characteristic of her constitution. Under no other government can a catastrophe occur which is at once so sudden in its advent, so complete in its operation, and so little detrimental in its consequences. In France the removal of a minister, if it shew anything more than the displeasure of the Emperor, at any rate can only indicate a change in his policy or his plans. If there were such a thing as public opinion in that unhappy country, we should not expect to hear its voice in the advancement of Espinasse or the mission of Pélissier. In Spain the strife of party resembles more than anything else the contest of factions in an ancient Greek state; to be out of office implies disgrace, to be in office implies the power of vengeance on those who before held office. Even in those countries whose principles of conduct most resemble our own, to whom in conjunction with England the world looks with confidence for the establishment of constitutional freedom in Europe, we find no practice similar to ours. In Belgium a ministerial crisis is rare, and when it does occur it is accompanied by no change in the governing party. If the assembly of deputies offers to any measure an opposition more than usually violent, the cabinet tenders its resignation until the measure is adopted; a compromise is almost always the result of the dispute, the ministers resume their seals, and affairs proceed in their usual course until another difficulty occasions another resignation and another compromise. By this arrangement public opinion has every power of making itself felt, it can shew a successful repugnance to an unpopular proposition, it can even procure the dismissal of an unpopular minister, but it cannot compass the downfall of the whole cabinet, it cannot raise in its room a party whose principles on all important points are diametrically opposed to those of the party which preceded it. In another country we have lately experienced the best possible proof of the stability of its government. In England the introduction of a Conspiracy bill was sufficient to overthrow the most popular minister that we have seen for many years, and to summon men to office who we might have expected would have remained all their life nothing more than brilliant leaders of opposition.

In Sardinia the same cause has failed to have the same effect. In supporting his policy Count Cavour would appeal to the experience and the success of twenty years, he could shew how he had gradually raised his country to the honourable place which she now occupies, and could convince his hearers that his possession of power was identical with her dignity and her prosperity. But we see in England what we should in vain look for elsewhere. We see a government driven from office by the adverse fortune of a single debate, so suddenly that no one could have suspected it a day before, so completely that not a member of it remains, and we see its engagements and responsibilities devolve upon those who have spent all their time and talent in denouncing their incurrence. This is dependent on no freak of the sovereign's will as in France, it is accompanied by no personal animosities as in Spain. We do not regard Lord Palmerston as disgraced in the eyes of Royalty, or augur from the advent of Lord Derby to power the growth of conservative principles in the mind of our Queen. We could behold without surprise the ex-premier and the present premier walking arm-in-arm down St. James'-street, we could believe that Mr. Disraeli and Sir C. Lewis hold amicable conferences with regard to past and present budgets. Still there is nothing wanting to complete the change, there are new faces and new principles in every official department, new occupants and new furniture in every official residence; those who formerly attacked have now to defend, those who before defended have now the more pleasing and successful position of attack. We might almost believe that a change of sovereigns would produce less real effect than a change of ministry. The nation would be plunged into sorrow and mourning at the loss of one whom it had loved and respected, its grief would be not untempered with joy at the accession of a new monarch, but our policy would remain the same. Frederick the Great might look forward to the death of Elizabeth of Russia as relieving him from his worst and most dangerous enemy, but he knew that the firm alliance of England could only be shaken or destroyed by the retirement of Pitt.

If we believe that the consequences of a change of ministry are so great, and that the change itself is often so sudden and so unlooked-for, we might at first feel inclined to regret that such a mighty power was confided to the hands of a popular assembly. In the case of a vote of direct or implied censure on a government, there are but two courses left for it to pursue, either to appeal to the country or to tender its resignation. We know that there must be a limit to the first of these

courses, but there may never be a limit to the second. It is contrary to reason to suppose that a parliament will only sit three months, but it is not contrary to experience to believe that a ministry will only last three months. It would only have justified the predictions of many political prophets, if at the end of a month's experience of office Lord Derby had laid down the seals which he had so lately received; and there is no one into whose hands we should more have expected them to come than into those of Lord Palmerston. Is there then no danger of perpetual change? Can we expect a House of Commons to afford the minister a majority on every important question; or if its opinions be so fixed, its principles so well constituted, can we ever expect a change at all? Does it not seem an anomaly that those who have so long contributed to the victory of Liberal opinions should be now content to support with equal vigor the opponents of those opinions? We would answer that our constitution is made up of anomalies, the merit of which is that they are successful and triumphant. This is one of the many dangers which beset our country. It is fatal in theory, but innocent in practice. There are few ministries which do not outlive the period assigned to them at their birth, and some whose very struggles into life were thought to be the throes of death, have survived those who predicted their early dissolution.

The solution, if there be a solution, lies in the fact that a minister is never now driven from power until he has deserved his fall; a government never loses the confidence of the House of Commons till it has lost the confidence of the country. There is no greater exemplification of this truth than the event which we are now discussing. Lord Palmerston came into power with the most abundant popularity, he was thought to represent the spirit of vigor and manliness, which we had so long desiderated in our councils. The fever of Gallicism, which has now given place to the reaction usual in such attacks, was then at its height. We were dazzled by the power and the magnificence of Louis Napoleon. We compared the short and pregnant messages which were passed between the Tuilleries and the Crimea, with our own lengthy despatches, so much slower but not so sure. In our hearts we almost cursed the fortune which had given us a constitutional government, and sighed for the unity and vigor of a paternal despotism. To execute these ideas as far as possible the voice of the country raised Lord Palmerston to the head of affairs. We knew that he was the representative of spirited foreign policy abroad, we cared not if we were made the subjects of similar policy at home. We gloried in the title of "Cives