...Hume's Denial of Self-consciousness. David Hume (1711-1776), the Scotch skeptic, says : " For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hate, pain or pleasure. I can never catch myself...

...pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any and other other, that the idea of self is deriv'd ; and consequently there But farther, what must become...

...pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions,...idea.' Again: ' When I enter most intimately into what is called myself, I always stumble on some partjcular perception of heat or cold, light or shade, love...

...passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. . . . For my pan, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself...

...now recalls it? This truth has been extensively overlooked or denied. Thus Hume says : " For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch myself...

...ideas" (Treatise of Human Nature, bk. i. pt. ii. sec. 6). " It cannot be from any of the impressions that the idea of self is derived, and consequently there is no such idea " (bk. i. pt. iv. sec. 6 ; Green's ed., vol. i. pp. 371 and 533 ; see John S. Mill, Exam, of Hamilton,...

...sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. . . . For my part, when I enter moat intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never, can catch myself...

...pain, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions,...derived ; and consequently there is no such idea. . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular...

...and I am not aware that any reply has been given to the following just remarks of Hume: "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception * or other of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself...

...pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It Cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions,...is derived, and consequently there is no such idea. " * Hume thinks we have no more an idea of a thinking substance as the support of perceptions than...