Front cover image for Violent peace : militarized interstate bargaining in Latin America

Violent peace : militarized interstate bargaining in Latin America

This work proposes that political leaders are influenced by the costs to their constituencies of using force, and whether the leader can survive if the costs exceed what they are willing to pay. It offers a systematic analysis of the use of military force in Latin American international politics.
Print Book, English, 2001
Columbia University Press, New York, 2001
xiv, 302 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
9780231111867, 9780231111874, 023111186X, 0231111878
45002276
Preface: Interstate Competition in a Heterogeneous World: The Importance of Understanding Violent Peace Part One: The Issue 1. The Origins of Violent Peace: Explaining the Use of Force in Foreign Policy 2. The Latin American Experience Part Two: Analyzing Latin America's Violent Peace 3. The Myth of Hegemonic Management 4. Democracy, Restrained Leadership and the Use of Military Force 5. The Distribution of Power and Conflict Management 6. Military Leadership and the Use of Force: Illustrations from the Beagle Channel Dispute 7. Democracies and the Use of Force: Suggestions from the Ecuador-Peru Dispute Part Three: Conclusions 8. Militarized Bargaining in Latin America: Prospects for Diminishing its Use Bibliography
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