...together have a three-cornered conflict, involving reason, sense, and imagination. 5. "In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent: nor...existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual,...

...consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head. In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor...existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual,...

...himself caught in a dualism between reason and the imagination. He discovered that reason tells us "that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences " (p. 46, supra). Reason cuts the very substance of the world...

...distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connection among them, there would be no difficulty in the case. For...

...consciousness. I cannot discover any theory which gives me satisfaction on this head. In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent ; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, namely, that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives...

...clear that he is compelled to accept it also. Hence, he concludes as follows:2 "In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent ;...existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual,...

...principle which gives me satisfaction on this head. In short, there are two principles which I can not render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce...existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences. Did our perceptions but inhere in something simple or individual,...

...clarifying criticism has set the problem to philosophy to-day. " In short," Hume says, " there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, namely, that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives...

...thus in all its generality, the absolutist contention seems to use as its major premise Hume's notion 'that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences,...perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.' Undoubtedly, since we use two phrases in talking first about 'M's relation to L' and then about 'M...

...thought, to pass from one object to another. . . . In short there are two principles, which I can not render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce...either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For...