...ends in the undecidability of what Derrida calls the "double bind" of an "aporia": "In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them" (appendix, pp. 633, 636). 19. Ibid., pp. 270, 273. 20. Derrida, Of Grammatology, pp. 24, 314, 164;...

...ends in the undecidability of what Derrida calls the "double bind" of an "aporia": "In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either ol them" (appendix, pp. 633, 636). 19. Ibid., pp. 270, 273. 20. Derrida, Of Grammatology, pp. 24, 314,...

...identity is inconsistent. There are two principles that he can neither renounce nor render consistent: "that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences." 36 As all readers quickly realize, these two principles are...

...consciousness. I cannot discover any theory which gives me satisfaction on this head. In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor...existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences. [If] our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual,...

...opinions, nor how to render them consistent. (633)1 Then, more specifically, he tells us: [T]here are two principles, which I cannot render consistent;...either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. (636)...

...the problem of personal identity in the appendix to A Treatise of Human Nature. "In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent;...either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For...

...connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. ... In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent;...perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. . . . For my part, I must plead the privilege of a skeptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too...

...contradictory. He stated that he was unable to reconcile two of his principles that he employed in this account: that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences. Now, as Kemp Smith pointed out, these two principles do not conflict,...

...succession no other connection of perceptions is ever perceived. But he was unable to render consistent: That all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences and that the mind never perceives any connection between distinct existences., However, Hume did suggest that if a form of necessary connection...

...consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head. In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent;...renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptsons are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct...